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ABSTRACT 
 
JONATHAN DAW: Social Inequalities in the Kidney Transplantation System 
(Under the direction of Ted Mouw, Guang Guo, Kathleen Mullan Harris, Michael Emch, 
and Kieran Healy) 
 
Although transplantation is not a traditional topic of sociological research, these 
realms of inquiry have much to offer each other. This dissertation adopts a sociological 
perspective which situates transplant candidates as participants in an allocative system 
with clearly defined distributive rules, while recognizing the permeation of other social 
institutions into this system.  
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to research on social disparities in the kidney 
transplantation system, and is intended to introduce non-specialists to this topic.  
Chapter 2 investigates the determinants of racial inequalities in kidney 
transplantation outcomes. Using administrative data, this analysis finds that racial 
inequalities in this system are primarily the result of differences in living donor kidney 
transplants, geographic residency, and the distribution of immunologically important 
genes. Because these inequalities are largely rooted outside the institutional confines of 
the kidney transplantation system, these findings illustrate the difficulty of constructing a 
race-neutral institution in a racially stratified society. 
Chapter 3 adopts a similar research design to investigate socioeconomic 
inequalities in kidney transplantation. Educational attainment is linked to transplant 
outcomes primarily through the type of transplants obtained. Higher educated candidates 
iv 
 
are advantaged by their higher rates of living donor kidney transplantation and higher 
probability of genetic compatibility with deceased donors, whereas lower educated 
persons are advantaged by their places of residence and the dynamics of immunological 
crossmatching.  
Chapter 4 uses data on the attributes of the kidney transplant waiting list and 
population data on the distribution of biologically-informed kinship ties and health 
statuses to investigate the likely distribution of suitable living donors within the kinship 
networks of persons on the kidney transplant waiting list. The results suggest that black-
white disparities in living donor kidney transplantation are not the result of group 
differences in the availability of suitable donors in their kinship networks. Given the 
sparse number of potential donors most transplant candidates have evaluated, however, it 
is likely that the higher probability that white kin are suitable donors is a major 
determinant of racial differences in living donor kidney transplantation rates.  
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by discussing the primary themes of this 
research. 
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Chapter One: Understanding Social Inequality in the Kidney Transplantation 
System 
Suppose that, prior to the recent health care debate, the president of the United 
States approached you and asked you to design the health care system from scratch. What 
would you do? As we learned in 2009, there is sharp disagreement on this subject. 
However, if you were a Democrat, you would probably start by instituting a single-payer 
health care system, in which the government uses its tax base to pay for health care for 
everyone who needs it. You might also recognize that, while the government controls 
vast financial and institutional resources, the supply of therapeutic goods such a system 
could provide would sometimes be limited. In such cases, you may well want to design 
the system in such a way that limited resources are distributed equitably across major 
social groups among those in need of them, even if doing so was slightly less efficient 
than other alternatives. 
 Often lost in the 2009 health care debate was the fact that, for a significant portion 
of this country‟s population, universal health insurance coverage is already a reality. 
Persons older than 65, military veterans, and persons with end-stage renal disease 
(permanent kidney failure, abbreviated ESRD) are already eligible for universal health 
insurance provided by the federal government. Medicare coverage is available to about 
45 million people
1
 in the U.S., including nearly everyone with ESRD, and the Veterans‟ 
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 See https://www.cms.gov/MedicareEnRpts/Downloads/09All.pdf. Accessed 8/15/2011. 
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Affairs coverage is available to the approximately 23 million U.S. veterans alive
2
 today. 
Although these three groups certainly overlap to some degree
3
, this means a very large 
proportion of the U.S. population is eligible for free, government-funded health 
insurance.  
Persons with ESRD in this country can get free dialysis coverage for life through 
Medicare and, should they pursue a kidney transplant (a superior therapy), the costs of 
transplantation and some of the costs of post-transplantation medical care are covered, as 
well. Unfortunately, though, there is a shortage of organs for transplantation in this 
country, meaning that the number of ESRD patients awaiting a transplant exceeds the 
number of deceased donor kidneys available for transplantation. While some patients also 
obtain kidney transplants from living donors, this practice has not been sufficiently 
prevalent to cover the shortfall. 
 A shortage of resources creates a difficult problem of allocation – when 
distributing kidneys donated by deceased persons, to whom should these life-saving 
resources be given? When deciding these questions, the United Network for Organ 
Sharing (the government contractor charged with administering the organ transplantation 
system in the U.S., abbreviated UNOS) attempts to balance two key principles: efficiency 
and equity. Efficiency in this context means that they seek to award kidneys to patients 
who will most benefit from them; equity means that they seek to ensure that members of 
major social groups have equal access to this life-saving therapy. They do so by 
designing an allocation algorithm intended to appropriately balance these two maxims. 
                                                 
2
 See http://www.va.gov/vetdata/Veteran_Population.asp, accessed 8/15/2011 
3
 If we assume that half of military veterans are covered by Medicare, this suggests that approximately 18% 
of the country is currently covered by universal eligibility health insurance. Of course, this calculation 
ignores Medicaid enrollment, but eligibility for that program is largely need-based. 
3 
 
 One might think that a health care system distinguished by universal health 
insurance and an institutional commitment to equality in outcomes would result in small 
or non-existent social inequalities in health outcomes. Unfortunately, one would be 
mistaken. For instance, white patients on the kidney transplant waiting list obtain kidney 
transplants at substantially higher rates than members of most racial and ethnic minority 
groups, and those whites who obtain kidney transplants obtain them much more quickly 
on average than their non-white counterparts (Gordon et al. 2010; Hall et al. 2011). 
Furthermore, white patients are less likely to die while awaiting a transplant (or after 
obtaining one). Major inequalities in outcomes are also observed by education, age, 
gender, and region. Why would this be? 
 In the context of limited resources, an institutional commitment to equity is likely 
to reduce the inequalities which might otherwise be observed, but in many contexts this 
will be insufficient to eradicate inequalities which are rooted outside of that institution. In 
general, the following are prime candidates to explain the very large social inequalities 
observed in the kidney transplantation system: the odds of a) successfully enrolling in the 
kidney transplantation waiting list, b) obtaining a living donor transplant, c) obtaining a 
deceased donor kidney transplant (and factors influencing one‟s place in the allocation 
algorithm), d) rejecting a transplanted kidney, or e) dying while part of this system. As 
will be seen, although kidney transplantation may seem an unusual topic of sociological 
research, many of the factors influencing social inequalities in this system are familiar to 
sociologists – for instance, the social distribution of ill health, family and kin structures 
and dynamics, residential structure, attitudes toward treatment options, and variability in 
the means by which patients navigate complicated institutions appear to play substantial 
4 
 
roles within this system. Social inequalities in the kidney transplantation system illustrate 
the wide impact of these important topics. 
Inequalities in the Path from Health to Transplantation 
 There are a number of important stages involved in the path from being a healthy 
member of the population to seeking and possibly obtaining a kidney transplant, and 
social inequalities are observed at each of these stages. This process is depicted in Figure 
1. First, one develops a form of chronic kidney disease (CKD), which may then develop 
into ESRD (a more severe version of the disease; step A). The prevalence of CKD and 
ESRD has been growing rapidly in the U.S., driven primarily by sharp growth in the 
prevalence of diabetes, hypertension, and overweight – trends which have 
disproportionately affected the low educated, male, and African American 
subpopulations (Norris and Agodoa 2005). Second, to enroll in a dialysis center, pursue a 
kidney transplant, or both, one must be referred to and evaluated by a nephrologist (a 
doctor specializing in kidney disease) and decide whether to pursue a transplant or 
dialysis alone as treatment (step B). Conditional on having ESRD, African American and 
lower educated persons are much less likely than whites or higher educated persons to do 
so (Epstein et al. 2000). 
 If one decides to pursue a kidney transplant, one‟s nephrologist must determine 
whether one is a suitable candidate, and then one must then enroll in one or more kidney 
transplant waiting lists (step C). Waiting lists are organized locally, and one is free to 
enroll in whichever and how many waiting lists one wishes, conditional that one is able to 
travel to a transplant center within that locality when required. Once more, non-white and 
lower educated persons are less likely than their counterparts to enroll in a waiting list 
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(Epstein et al. 2000; Patzer et al. 2009). Furthermore, white and higher educated persons 
are more likely to enroll in more distant waiting lists with shorter waiting times, and are 
more likely to enroll in more than one waiting list (Axelrod et al. 2010; Kasiske et al. 
1998; Keith et al. 2008; Merion et al. 2004), practices which offer significant advantages 
in the allocation system. 
 Once one is on the waiting list one may experience a variety of outcomes (step 
D). Obviously, one may succumb to kidney disease and die. Second, one may obtain one 
of two different types of kidney transplants, from kidneys donated by deceased persons 
(known as deceased donor kidney transplants, or DDKTs) or by living persons (known as 
living donor kidney transplants, or LDKTs). Compared to DDKTs, obtaining an LDKT is 
associated with improved post-transplantation outcomes and shorter average waiting 
times
4
 . In keeping with the themes of this literature, white and higher educated persons 
are more likely to obtain any transplant, and are especially more likely to obtain an 
LDKT, while disparities in rates of DDKT are generally much smaller or reversed, 
although generally Asian and African Americans have longer DDKT waiting times than 
whites (Hall et al. 2011). 
 Finally, once one has obtained a kidney transplant one eventually experiences one 
of two outcomes – graft failure (better known as kidney rejection; step E) or death 
(whether due to graft failure or unrelated causes; step F). Once more, white and higher 
educated persons avoid graft failure for longer periods on average than their counterparts, 
and live longer post-transplantation (Gordon and Caicedo 2009). Conditional on 
experiencing graft failure, one may then either turn to dialysis alone or seek to return to 
the waiting list for another transplant (step G). 
                                                 
4
 http://www.unos.org/docs/Living_Donation.pdf 
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 Taken together, this research convincingly demonstrates that, compared to racial 
and ethnic minorities and patients with lower socioeconomic status, white and higher 
educated patients are advantaged at all stages associated with kidney transplantation. 
Compared to their counterparts, such persons are a) much less likely to develop kidney 
disease, b) less likely to have it develop into ESRD, c) more likely to be successfully 
referred to a nephrologist and be deemed a suitable candidate for transplantation, d) more 
likely to enroll in the waiting list and to do so in an advantageous manner, e) more likely 
to obtain a transplant and avoid death, f) more likely to obtain the preferred type of 
transplant (LDKTs), and g) have more favorable average outcomes after transplantation. 
A closer examination of the process and determinants of DDKT and LDKT, 
contextualized within the relevant sociological literature, should provide a clearer 
explanation of these troubling patterns of outcomes. 
Getting a Deceased Donor Kidney Transplant 
 Deceased donor kidneys become available for transplantation when individuals 
experience brain death and their next of kin consent to organ donation. Although 
deceased donor kidneys may be designated for a specific recipient, typically deceased 
donor organs enter the general pool for allocation transplant candidates. This distributive 
choice is made by UNOS, guided by an allocation algorithm which is revisited 
periodically. 
The Current Kidney Allocation System 
 Figure 2 depicts the current UNOS standard allocation algorithm. Patients are 
prioritized for kidney transplantation according to a set of criteria which hinge on the 
characteristics of patients and the joint properties of donors and each candidate. Higher 
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priority patients are offered each kidney first; if the kidney is declined it is offered to the 
next-highest priority case, and so on. As such one‟s prospects for obtaining each 
individual DDKT depends on one‟s characteristics, the match of one‟s characteristic with 
the donor in question, and the characteristics of other members of the kidney transplant 
waiting list. This situation creates a unique form of social structure which determines 
one‟s prospects for obtaining a DDKT. 
 One‟s prioritization for each donor kidney may be grouped into four tiers. The 
highest priority is given to patients who are a perfect match with the deceased donor on 
both alleles at three different genetic loci, known as the human leukocyte antigen (HLA) 
genes HLA-A, HLA-B, and HLA-DR. Greater similarity between donor and patient at 
these loci helps to prevent kidney rejection post-transplantation, and perfect matches at 
these loci are especially valued. Second, those who have previously served as a living 
donor are prioritized, followed by persons in a local area (known as an organ 
procurement organization catchment area, or OPO) to which the donor‟s area owes a 
kidney of that blood type. If no such persons exist on the waiting list or accept the 
transplant offer, kidneys are offered sequentially to patients in the same OPO as the 
donor in priority order, followed by those in the same region, and then all remaining 
members of other waiting lists.  
 Second, candidates with an identical blood type (coded genetically by the ABO 
gene) as the donor are prioritized, followed by candidates with type B blood if the donor 
is type O, followed by all others with compatible blood types. Blood type is an important 
determinant of post-transplant prospects for the same reason that it is a crucial 
consideration in blood transfusions – in the absence of preventive measures, kidneys 
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transplanted into someone with an incompatible blood type are nearly invariantly and 
immediately rejected by the recipient‟s immune system. Once more, one‟s genetic 
similarity to the DDKT pool serves as an important feature of the social structure of the 
kidney transplantation system. 
 The third tier of the allocation system ranks patients by their age and degree of 
immunological sensitivity (measured by one‟s Panel Reactive Antibody score, or PRA). 
The more presensitized one‟s immune system is, the greater the likelihood that one‟s 
body will reject a randomly transplanted kidney, so patients with greater immunological 
sensitivities are prioritized to partially ameliorate this source of disadvantage. The 
primary determinants of one‟s PRA score are prior transplants, blood transfusions, and 
pregnancy (Leffell et al. 1997), all of which involve the exposure of one‟s immune 
system to another‟s tissue. Therefore one‟s health and reproductive histories, as well as 
one‟s age, are an important determinant of one‟s place in the social structure of kidney 
transplantation. 
 Finally, the fourth tier of prioritization differentiates patients who are otherwise 
identical in the previous tiers of the allocation scheme. First, patients are awarded one 
point for each HLA-DR allele that matches the donor‟s. Second, children younger than 11 
are awarded greater priority than those 11-17, and all children are prioritized over adults 
if the donor is younger than 35 (because many older adults‟ kidneys would not mesh well 
with children‟s physiology). Finally, one is awarded one point per year one has spent on 
the waiting list, and if there are still ties between candidates, the earliest enrollee is 
prioritized. 
Prioritization as Social Structure 
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  Sociology has long concerned itself with the rules of allocation systems (e.g., 
Davis and Moore 1945). For instance, this research tradition considers each job, 
enrollment slot at a university, and role in the family to be a social position which is filled 
with individuals according to a (usually ill-defined) set of social principles. While to date 
there is no consensus on what the allocative „rules‟ by which these positions are filled 
are, sociologists have long found this a useful way to think about society and the 
reproduction of inequality. In the case of transplantation, however, the allocation rules 
are unusually transparent – they are published on the internet5! This feature makes kidney 
transplantation a particularly attractive topic to study from a stratification perspective. 
 Directly and indirectly, these allocative rules are the primary determinants of 
inequalities in kidney transplantation outcomes. Within the current system, there are five 
proximate determinants of deceased donor kidney transplant prospects which are likely to 
vary by race and socioeconomic status: genetic match with the donor pool, geographic 
proximity to the donor pool, mortality hazards, probability of accepting a DDKT offer, 
and place of residence. Of these, racial differences in genetic match, offer acceptance, 
and place of residence all explained a substantial portion of racial inequalities in DDKT 
(Daw 2011).  
Although UNOS cannot directly control whether patients accept a transplant 
offer, they run a system wherein one‟s genetics and place of residence play a major role 
in one‟s transplant prospects. These are not mandatory elements of the kidney transplant 
social structure. In fact, to their credit, over time UNOS has eroded the role of genetic 
compatibility in the allocation algorithm in the interests of promoting racial equity in 
                                                 
5
 See for yourself: http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_7.pdf. Accessed 
8/9/11. 
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outcomes (Port et al. 2004; Roberts et al. 2004). Furthermore, in 1998 then-Department 
of Health and Human Services Secretary Donna Shalala proposed a set of changes 
(known as the Final Rule) to the policies governing organ allocation. These changes 
would have, among other things, required the elimination of the geographic factor in the 
allocation process, instead creating a single national waitlist. However, this change was 
defeated when a group of political leaders raised a furor over this provision, led by the 
governor of Wisconsin, Tommy Thompson, who later became Secretary Shalala‟s 
successor (Healy 2006). 
 These events highlight the fact that transplantation policy is forged at the 
intersection of medicine, immunology, and politics. Conditional on transplantation 
allocation policies, group differences in transplantation outcomes arise as a result of the 
distribution of prioritized characteristics compared to the transplant waiting list and the 
donor pool, as well as the rate at which individuals in different groups engage in 
advantageous behaviors and their odds of dying or rejecting an organ. 
Getting a Living Donor Kidney Transplant 
 In addition to obtaining a DDKT, many patients on the kidney transplant waiting 
list obtain LDKTs. This is possible because all humans have two kidneys, and with 
normal kidney function only one kidney is required to maintain one‟s health. About 88% 
of LDKTs are the result of donation by kin; the remaining 12% nearly always come from 
friends and co-workers. As such the structure and properties of one‟s kinship and social 
networks are primary determinants of one‟s access to LDKTs. Furthermore, patients 
likely vary in the degree to which the health care system promotes, and to which they 
pursue, LDKTs while on the kidney transplant waiting list. 
11 
 
Who is a Suitable Living Donor? 
 Not everyone is permitted to serve as a living kidney donor when they have a 
relative or friend in need. In keeping with medicine‟s commitment to avoid causing harm, 
potential living kidney donors are rigorously evaluated to determine whether they are 
sufficiently healthy and genetically compatible to beneficially donate a kidney to the 
intended recipient, and that they are volunteering to donate free from coercion
6
. 
 Although transplant centers vary in their evaluation process, in 2007 an OPTN 
committee made a set of recommendations for „absolute‟ and „relative‟ contraindications 
for living kidney donation based on a survey of nephrologists‟ evaluation practices7. The 
list of „absolute‟ contraindications include: a) being younger than 18 years old, b) 
hypertension, c) diabetes, d) abnormal glucose tolerance values (a measure of pre-
diabetic health status), e) history of thrombosis or embolism, f) major psychiatric 
conditions, g) extreme obesity, h) coronary artery disease, i) symptomatic valvular 
disease, j) chronic lung disease, k) recent malignancies (or cancers with a long time to 
recurrence), l) urologic abnormalities of the kidney, m) low creatinine clearance rates (a 
measure of kidney function), n) peripheral vascular disease (a major predictor of poor 
health among older persons), o) proteinuria (another indicator of poor kidney function), 
p) HIV infection, q) Hepatitis C infection, and r) Hepatitis B infection. Different 
distributions of these characteristics among the families of members of major social 
groups will therefore tend to influence inequalities in the availability of living donors 
within these groups. 
                                                 
6
 optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PublicComment/pubcommentPropSub_208.pdf 
7
 The report was not accepted but likely reflects typical practices because it was grounded in a survey of 
practicing transplant nephrologists. The document is available for inspection at 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PublicComment/pubcommentPropSub_208.pdf. Accessed 8/9/2011. 
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 Additionally, as in the DDKT allocation algorithm, genetic histocompatibility in 
the ABO, HLA-A, HLA-B, and HLA-DR genes are highly valued because donor-recipient 
similarity at these loci are strongly associated with post-transplantation prospects of graft 
failure and death (Danovitch and Cecka 2003). Although there are only four major red 
blood types (A, B, AB, and O) and each is prevalent in a significant portion of the 
population, there are a great deal more genotypes at the HLA loci, meaning that one‟s 
odds of finding a high quality match with an unrelated person is quite small. Accordingly 
patients interested in an LDKT are encouraged to approach their close genetic relatives 
(such as parents, full siblings, and children) first for evaluation as close relationship types 
offer a high probability of genetic similarity
8
. 
 Finally, as discussed above many individuals have been presensitized to others‟ 
red and white blood cell antigens, producing antibodies to defend the body against these 
apparently threatening cells. Although progress is being made on this front (Haririan et 
al. 2009), LDKTs rarely occur between positively crossmatched candidate-donor pairs. 
Who Has Access to a Suitable Living Donor? 
 This evaluation process suggests that one‟s kinship and social networks‟ structure 
and properties are important determinants of what I elsewhere term the “living donor 
opportunity structure” (Daw 2011), which is defined as the presence and number of 
suitable living kidney donors in one‟s kinship and social networks.  
                                                 
8
 Parents and children share at least half of their genes due to direct descent, so they are guaranteed to have 
a favorable HLA match degree and have a significantly increased chance of being ABO histocompatible. 
While full siblings share half their genes due to common descent as well, this is merely an average. At each 
genetic locus, in fact, there is a 25% chance that they share no alleles, a 50% chance that they share exactly 
1 allele, and a 25% chance that they share both alleles by common descent. Of course, they may also share 
alleles due to chance (when they inherit different copies of the gene but the alleles are the same). 
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These hypothesized determinants are depicted on the left side of Figure 3. First 
and most obviously, all else equal the size of one‟s network is an important determinant 
of the LDKT opportunity structure since every kin 18 years old and over has some non-
zero probability of being a suitable donor. Second, the health of one‟s kinship network is 
a proximate determinant thereof because potential donors with a range of poor health 
conditions are excluded from donation. Third, the structure of one‟s network is an 
important determinant of one‟s LDKT opportunity structure because having a greater 
number of close genetic relatives in one‟s network improves the chances that there is a 
suitable living donor in one‟s network. Fourth, higher PRA values, net of overall genetic 
compatibility, will increase the probability of donor exclusion due to immunological 
crossmatching. 
Fifth, one can share genes with potential donors in one of two ways – by common 
descent (i.e., I share a gene with my brother because we inherited the same copy from my 
mother; this is known as identity by descent, or IBD) and by chance (i.e., I share a gene 
with my brother because we inherited different copies of a gene which happened to be the 
same; this is known as identity by state, or IBS). Although the odds of IBD compatibility 
are identical for all pairs of humans with the same genetic relationship, the odds of IBS 
are directly proportional to the degree of genetic variability in the population at that 
locus. Much research (Liu et al. 2006; Prugnolle et al. 2005a; Prugnolle et al. 2005b) 
shows that African Americans in the U.S. have greater genetic diversity overall and at the 
HLA loci than do whites.  
In summary, one‟s odds of having access to a suitable living kidney donor are 
directly related to one‟s position in the social structure, and particularly the 
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characteristics of one‟s kinship network. Of these factors, my recent research (Daw 2011) 
suggests that, compared to African Americans, white patients on the kidney transplant 
waiting list are primarily advantaged by their lower genetic variability and lower PRA 
scores, while African Americans are advantaged by the larger size of their kinship 
networks. On the whole, African Americans were estimated to have access to suitable 
living kidney donors at rates slightly higher than were whites, yet African Americans 
obtain LDKTs at much lower rates than whites. Why would this be? 
Who Pursues and Obtains Living Donor Kidney Transplants? 
 Although relatively little research has been conducted on this topic directly, 
medical research on transplant candidate behaviors and sociological research on the 
family suggest a range of plausible explanations for this discrepancy which should be 
investigated in future research.  
 A recent study of all patients and potential donors evaluated by a single center 
found that about 49% of their patients brought in one or more potential donors; of these, 
the vast majority brought in two or fewer (Weng et al. 2010). Despite having similar 
numbers of potential donors evaluated among those with any, African American patients 
were less likely to obtain an LDKT (risk ratio=0.67), have a potential donor evaluated 
(RR=.86), and obtain an LDKT conditional on donor evaluation (RR=0.78). Black 
potential donors were more likely to be excluded for donor-related reasons. Another 
study (Lunsford et al. 2007) found that, out of all potential donors evaluated at their 
transplant center, 43% of potential donors were excluded for poor health, 10% were 
excluded due to positive crossmatching, and 30% did not complete the donor evaluation. 
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African American potential donors in this study were more likely to be excluded due to 
immunological incompatibility and due to high BMI (Reeves-Daniel et al. 2009).  
 Given the benefits of LDKT – shorter times on the waiting list and longer survival 
times post-transplantation – why do so few patients have potential donors evaluated? A 
series of ethnographic studies suggest some answers. First, many patients report, 
understandably, that this is a very difficult subject to broach with one‟s friends and 
family (Barnieh et al. 2011; Rodrigue et al. 2008). Another substantial portion says that 
they have no one to ask for a kidney (Barnieh et al. 2011). Nonetheless, based on single-
center studies it appears that approximately 80% of candidates discuss potential donation 
(Barnieh et al. 2011) with others and that about 50% of candidates have a potential donor 
evaluated (Weng et al. 2010). Factors associated with higher odds of having a potential 
donor evaluated included higher perceived benefits of LDKT and positive beliefs 
concerning the appropriateness of requesting donation (Zimmerman et al. 2006), as well 
as younger age, higher income, and being white (Reese et al. 2009). Although most 
patients appear to have kin who offer to be evaluated for donation, only about half of 
these patients agree to this (Gordon 2001). Three major reasons offered explaining these 
refusals include concerns about risks to the potential donor, an emphasis on self-reliance, 
and a willingness to consider the offer if their medical condition became more dire. 
Other Likely Determinants 
The investigations just discussed into patients‟ living donor search behaviors are 
largely limited to behaviors taking place within transplant centers. However, the broader 
literature on racial and socioeconomic differences in participation in the health care 
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system, attitudes and knowledge of medicine, and the family suggest a number of 
additional plausible explanations for this difference in outcomes. 
 The health care system. First, in order for the opportunity for LDKT to be 
translated into an LDKT outcome, full knowledge of the health care options available to 
the ESRD patient must be known, usually provided by the patient‟s health care provider. 
It may be that the likelihood that LDKT is discussed and promoted by patients‟ health 
care providers varies by race and education in a manner that makes LDKT a more likely 
option for whites and those of higher SES than for blacks given their respective LDKT 
opportunity structures. The evaluation of potential living kidney donors is a complicated 
process about which the patient is likely to initially know little, so health care providers 
frequently serve as gatekeepers to the initiation of this process. Related research on the 
determinants of transplant waitlisting has found that whites are significantly more likely 
to complete the waitlisting evaluation process and experience shorter nephrology referral 
delays than blacks (Alexander and Sehgal 2001; Gordon et al. 2010). Furthermore, 
conditional on expert evaluations of the suitability of transplantation, whites were more 
likely to be considered suitable transplant candidates by their physicians than were 
medically similar black patients (Epstein et al. 2000). It could be that differential 
promotion of and guidance in the LDKT process on the part of the health care providers 
could explain this difference. 
 Knowledge of and interest in transplantation. Much medical research on racial 
differences in transplantation focus on the role of racial differences in knowledge of, and 
interest in, transplantation. Recently researchers (Navaneethan and Singh 2006) 
conducted a systematic review of the medical literature on racial disparities in kidney 
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transplantation. Of the eleven articles they focused on, eight focused on the differential 
personal and cultural beliefs of African Americans compared to whites (Alexander and 
Sehgal 1998; Alexander and Sehgal 2001; Ayanian et al. 2004; Epstein et al. 2000; 
Gordon 2001; Hicks et al. 2004; Klassen et al. 2002; Ozminkowski et al. 1998).  
Thus patient preferences and beliefs are a central focus of the medical literature 
on disparities in kidney transplantation and a frequently cited site of potential 
intervention (Rodrigue et al. 2006; Waterman et al. 2006). However, the evidence on 
racial differences in these factors is mixed. For instance, many argue that lower 
awareness of the risks and benefits of transplantation mediates the racial disparity in 
transplant outcomes (Malek et al. 2011). An equally commonly invoked explanation is 
racial differences in beliefs concerning the social and religious appropriateness of 
transplantation (Alexander and Sehgal 2001). Other research finds that blacks are 
interested in transplant at slightly lower rates than whites and are less likely to be certain 
about this preference (Ayanian et al. 1999). Although perhaps overemphasized in the 
medical literature on kidney transplantation disparities, beliefs, preferences, and 
knowledge of transplantation are theoretically plausible mediators of the relationship 
between LDKT opportunity and actual LDKT. 
 Kin relations. Finally, a major and understudied potential mediator of the 
relationship between LDKT opportunity structures and actual LDKTs is the nature of 
family relationships. Transplantation involves a litany of complicated decisions balancing 
one‟s health prospects on one route (dialysis, LDKT, DDKT) versus others, and LDKT 
requires that one request that another incur a small health risk and significant discomfort 
for one‟s uncertain health benefit. As such LDKTs attain the status of a gift, one with an 
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unusual weight of symbolic and instrumental meanings. As with all gifts, LDKTs are 
passed across and potentially shape relations between giver and receiver – for better or 
for worse. While research on the role of kin relations in structuring the probability of a 
living kidney donation is sparse, much research sheds light on patterns of other forms of 
assistance and relationship ties in white and black families. For instance, while it is 
commonly claimed that racial and ethnic minorities have more closely knit kinship 
networks (Aschenbrenner 1975; Martin and Martin 1985; Stack 1974), other work finds 
that whites exchange assistance with greater frequency (Cooney and Uhlenberg 1992; 
Eggebeen 1992; Goldscheider and Goldscheider 1991; Hofferth 1984; Hogan et al. 1993; 
Hoyert 1990; Lee and Aytac 1998; Roschelle 1997), although the pattern differs for 
financial and instrumental support (Lee and Aytac 1998; Roschelle 1997; Sarkisian and 
Gerstel 2004).  
In general, gifts are subject to strong norms of reciprocity, yet rarely can a gift of 
the magnitude of another‟s organ be adequately be repaid, which potentially crates a 
creditor/debtor relationship between the kidney donor and recipient. Fox and Swazey‟s 
(1978, 1992; see also Healy 2006) seminal work on the subject termed this the “tyranny 
of the gift” due to the strains such an extraordinary gift places on the relationship 
between donor and recipient. Transplant candidates‟ willingness to accept such a gift may 
fundamentally depend on their relationships with their kin, the family‟s reciprocity 
norms, and the perceived ability of the recipient to repay the gift in some way. As with all 
requests and offers for assistance, there are patterned expectations for resource exchanges 
(Bengtson et al. 1996; Lindblad-Goldberg 1987; Miller-Cribbs and Farber 2008; 
Neighbors 1997; Nelson 2000; Stack 1974; Tracy 1990), and one‟s ability to fulfill 
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reciprocal exchange relations may influence one‟s willingness to accept assistance. Given 
the substantial evidence that reciprocity norms are of particular importance to African 
Americans (Malson 1983; Martin and Martin 1985; McAdoo 1982; Miller-Cribbs and 
Farber 2008; Testa and Slack 2002),it is likely that group differences in kin relations, 
combined with a lower ability to reciprocate by other means among African Americans, 
could explain group differences in LDKT given the opportunity structure. 
Discussion 
Although the end-stage renal disease medical system is marked by universal 
health insurance and an organizational commitment to equalities in access to 
transplantation therapies, the kidney transplantation system produces large social 
inequalities in outcomes, particularly by race. I have argued that this counterintuitive 
result stems from the confluence of medical, immunological, political, behavioral, and 
familial patterns in American society which UNOS is unable to completely shut out. 
These findings emphasize the widespread influence of major social institutions in the 
situation of race and socioeconomic status in American society. Although lack of access 
to medical care is a major social concern in the U.S., its absence in this system is no 
panacea to health inequalities because social positions are deeply embedded in a network 
of institutions. 
 Kidney transplantation is a complex topic that requires knowledge outside the 
realm of typical sociological training. It is therefore understandable that relatively little 
attention has been paid to this topic in the social sciences (but see Fox and Swazey 1978 
and 1992, Healy 2006, and Sharp 2006 for laudable exceptions). However, technical 
processes are not immune to sociological facts. By investigating topics outside the usual 
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purview of the social sciences, we can advance understanding of social inequalities 
generally and aid those lacking sociological expertise in pursuing their laudable goals of 
equitably relieving the suffering of hundreds of thousands of patients with ESRD. 
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 1.1: The Path from Health to Transplantation 
 
NOTE: „CKD‟ stands for chronic kidney disease; „ESRD‟ refers to end-stage renal 
disease. Each pathway indicates a step involved in the transition from a healthy member 
of the population to kidney disease and the process of obtaining a kidney transplant, or 
not. Boxes from which more than one arrow emerges indicate potentially divergent 
outcomes. Single arrows indicate steps which may or may not be taken. 
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Figure 1.2: The Deceased Donor Kidney Allocation System 
 
NOTE: This figure represents the national kidney allocation priority algorithm since 
2003. This does not represent local variations in allocation policy. Read left to right, each 
subsequent level reflects priorities within categories of the columns to the left, and 
categories closer to the top (for the first three levels) are higher priorities. 
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Figure 1.3: Hypothesized Proximate Determinants of Living Donor Kidney 
Transplantation 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter Two: The Determinants of Racial Inequality in the Kidney Transplantation 
System  
Introduction 
 Much research on the determinants of racial and socioeconomic inequalities in 
health focuses on differential health care outcomes between the insured and uninsured 
(Davidoff et al. 2000; Finkelstein et al. 2011; Ross and Mirowsky 2000; Shi 2001). 
However, three major groups in the U.S. are subject to universal, government-funded 
health insurance: military veterans, the elderly, and those with end-stage renal disease 
(ESRD). Most Americans in the last two groups are eligible for insurance coverage 
through Medicare. Focusing on the latter, kidney transplantation (KT) is the preferred 
treatment for ESRD, yet the kidney transplantation system is beset with startling racial 
inequalities. Compared to whites, African American transplant candidates have been 
about 289% and 76.8% as likely to obtain a have ESRD and obtain a transplant, 
respectively. Comparable but less severe figures are observed for other racial and ethnic 
minority groups. The contrast between universal coverage for ESRD patients and the 
commitment of the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS, the organization charged 
with running the U.S. organ transplantation system) to the equitable allocation of organs 
for transplantation on the one hand, and the large racial inequalities in outcomes on the 
other, is a central puzzle of kidney transplantation in the U.S. This paper investigates the 
major determinants of racial disparities in KT among those on the waiting list since 2000. 
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The prevalence of ESRD is on the rise in the U.S., driven largely by trends in 
diabetes, obesity, and hypertension (Norris and Agodoa 2005). ESRD is treated with 
dialysis, kidney transplantation, or both in succession. KT is the preferred treatment, 
associated with far better outcomes than are observed for comparable persons on dialysis. 
KTs, of course, require a kidney donor, which come in two major forms – deceased and 
living, of which the latter is associated with substantially improved post-transplant 
medical prospects.  
The KT system is subject to increasing pressures. The supply (the number of 
deceased donor kidneys, or DDKs) and demand (the number of persons enrolling in the 
transplant waitlist) have both grown over time, but the latter‟s growth has been far 
disproportionate to the former. Accordingly the waiting list for KTs has grown quickly 
over time – by the end of 2008, the number of patients awaiting kidney transplants had 
grown to 85,440, more than a 500% increase since 1988 and far outstripping U.S. 
population growth. Under these conditions kidney allocation is something of a zero-sum 
game – every DDK allocated to one individual cannot be awarded to another. This means 
that the transplant outcomes of all individuals on the KT waiting list are fundamentally 
interdependent. When one person obtains a living donor kidney transplant (LDKT), this 
potentially frees up a DDK for another member of the waitlist. Morbidly, every patient on 
the KT waiting list who dies before obtaining a transplant marginally increases others‟ 
chances of avoiding this fate. 
Under these conditions and within the current kidney allocation system (described 
below), a number of factors could plausibly influence racial disparities in KT outcomes. 
First, racial differences in waiting list mortality could create this inequality since death 
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precludes transplantation. Second, racial differences in post-transplant kidney rejection, 
known as graft failure, could account for some of this difference because those whose 
bodies reject their kidneys frequently return to the waitlist to seek another transplant, 
increasing competition for kidneys among similar persons. Third, racial differences in 
place of residence could mediate racial and ethnic disparities in outcomes. Waiting lists 
for KTs are organized locally, and kidneys for transplantation are typically allocated 
according to a „local first‟ algorithm, meaning that those living in high-donation, low-
ESRD regions will have better transplantation prospects. 
Fourth, racial differences in LDKTs could account for some portion of racial 
disparities in transplantation overall. LDKTs, compared to DDKTs, are associated with 
improved post-transplant outcomes and are generally obtained more quickly, so this 
could be a significant source of racial differences in transplantation outcomes. Fifth, 
DDKs are offered to waiting list patients in the order that the allocation algorithm ranks 
patients for the kidney, but only about 2% of these offers are accepted by patients and 
their doctors. Racial differences in the probability of accepting a DDK offer could also 
mediate racial disparities in KTs. 
Some additional, biologically-based mechanisms could mediate this relationship. 
A significant component of the kidney allocation algorithm addresses genetic similarities 
between the donor and transplant candidate, reflecting better post-transplant outcomes 
among persons with similar red blood (ABO) and white blood (HLA) types. Both are 
associated with racial and ethnic background and could mediate racial disparities overall 
in transplant prospects. Seventh and finally, KT candidates vary in their degree of 
immunological presensitization, which frequently precludes successful transplantation. 
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Accordingly, racial differences in immunological presensitization could partially mediate 
racial differences in rates of KT overall. 
This paper uses data from the United Network for Organ Sharing on KT 
candidates and donors 2000-2010 and information on the national kidney allocation 
algorithm to examine the major determinants of racial and ethnic inequalities in KT 
outcomes. Unlike previous investigations of the causes of racial inequalities in kidney 
transplantation, the present analysis accounts for the systemic nature of kidney 
transplantation, explicitly incorporating information on the DDK allocation algorithm 
alongside group-specific hazards of LDKT, mortality, and graft failure, thereby 
accounting for the interdependent nature of the kidney allocation system. The results of 
this analysis find that racial differences in living donor transplantation hazards, blood 
types, and place of residence are primarily responsible for racial disparities in KT 
outcomes.  
Why Kidney Transplantation? 
Kidney transplantation is an unusual topic of sociological research (but see Fox 
and Swazey 1992; Healy 2006), yet it highlights many key issues in the sociology of 
racial inequalities in health. First, trends in population health have been driving growth in 
ESRD for decades. While major risk factors for ESRD like diabetes, hypertension, and 
obesity have been relatively well-studied in the sociological (e.g., Boardman et al. 2005; 
Chang and Christakis 2005; Lutfey and Freese 2005), demographic (e.g., Lee et al. 2009; 
van den Berg et al. 2011), and public health (e.g., Finkelstein et al. 2005; McLaren 2007; 
Thomas et al. 2005) literatures, the downstream consequences of these trends have 
received scant attention in these fields. All three are large sources of morbidity in the 
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U.S. population and disproportionately afflict African Americans. The relative dearth of 
research on ESRD means that a major health consequence of these trends has not 
received full social scientific attention. 
Second, the large and fast-growing literature on racial inequalities in health and 
mortality has done an excellent job to date in establishing the basic facts of health 
inequality (e.g., Blackwell et al. 2002; Elo and Preston 1997; Kelley-Moore and Ferraro 
2004; Manton and Gu 2001; Williams and Jackson 2005) and its major social (e.g., 
Williams and Jackson 2005), geographic (e.g., Boardman et al. 2005; King and Bearman 
2011; Morenoff et al. 2007; Roux and Mair 2010; Yao and Robert 2008), and biological 
(e.g., Conley and Bennett 2000; Seeman et al. 2010) mediators. Although the findings of 
this line of research have been invaluable, the very broad perspective on health generally 
adopted in this research limits progress in understanding the mechanisms of health and 
mortality inequalities. Ill health and mortality derive from a variety of causes through a 
variety of outcome-specific mechanisms. By focusing on common, specific causes of ill 
health, as in the present study, the diversity of mechanisms of health and health inequality 
can be better understood and help to enrich theories of racial health disparities. 
Another frequent shortcoming of the literature on the social determinants of 
health is that the policy contexts in which these differential outcomes are produced are 
frequently ignored. Health policy research is too frequently conducted in a separate 
sphere from studies of health and health inequality. By explicitly accounting for kidney 
allocation policies, this analysis enhances knowledge of the mechanisms by which racial 
inequalities in kidney transplantation are created. 
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Finally, the case of racial inequalities in kidney transplantation emphasizes the 
difficulty of constructing a race-neutral institution in a racialized social system (Bonilla-
Silva 1997)
9
. The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), the organization charged 
with implementing the U.S. organ transplant allocation system, pursues the explicit goals 
of efficiency and equity
10
 in the allocation of these limited resources, and Medicare 
universally covers many of the costs of ESRD patient care.  In the last decade, in fact, 
this organization has made significant changes to the kidney allocation system with the 
goal of reducing demographic inequalities in outcomes, with some success (Port et al. 
2004; Roberts et al. 2004). However, large inequalities remain in this system, and this 
persistence highlights the difficulties of achieving institutional equity in a deeply unequal 
society. The most efficient allocation of kidney transplants would shuttle DDKTs to the 
young, the otherwise healthy, and those with the financial and social support resources to 
maximally maintain their health for long periods of time post-transplantation. Of course, 
this would not be an equitable arrangement. However, to the degree that the kidney 
allocation system deviates from such an allocation system in the interests of equity, it 
frequently does so at the expense of efficiency. 
I argue that this tension between efficiency and equity is a general problem in the 
study of limited resource allocation systems. While there are certain to be exceptions, 
often in a stratified society the most efficient use of limited resources – an admissions 
slot at a university, a business contract, or a kidney transplant – leads to the allocation of 
                                                 
9
 Bonilla-Silva (1997) defined a racialized social system as one “in which economic, political, social, and 
ideological levels are partially structured by the placement of actors in racial categories or races” (469). 
Racialized social systems are hierarchical, and one or more racial groups get more than their share across a 
range of arenas in which outcomes are differentiated. 
10
 Efficiency in kidney allocation may be defined as the degree to which the allocation system maximizes 
the healthy life-years added to the ESRD population. Equity is a measure of the degree to which all persons 
with ESRD have a fair and equal opportunity to benefit from this resource. 
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resources to those who are already advantaged. The reason is that any allocation system 
which seeks in part to maximize the efficiency of resource allocation must develop 
criteria by which to do so, and the criteria which will maximize efficiency are frequently 
themselves sources of general advantage, as illustrated by the fundamental cause tradition 
in the sociology of health inequality (Link and Phelan 1995; Phelan et al. 2004). 
Therefore, those who are already advantaged in a social system will frequently benefit to 
the degree that institutional resource allocation emphasizes efficiency, to the detriment of 
equity
11
. 
Racial Inequalities in Health 
Research on racial inequalities in health has thoroughly documented a convincing 
and consistent pattern in population health and health inequality. Broadly speaking, 
African Americans and Native Americans experience substantially worse health 
outcomes overall, are subject to earlier disease onset and greater disease severity, and on 
average have shorter lives than members of other groups (Elo and Preston 1997; 
Williams 2005), while Hispanics often have better health outcomes than whites (Franzini 
et al. 2001). Racial differences in socioeconomic status (e.g., Williams et al. 2010), 
physical and nutritional environments (e.g., Lovasi et al. 2009), lifestyle (e.g., Crespo et 
al. 2000), and health behaviors (e.g., Jackson et al. 2010) are thought to be major 
mediators of racial inequalities in health. 
This literature has served as a helpful window into racial and ethnic health 
disparities and has documented group differences in a variety of health outcomes and 
causes of death. This research demonstrates that there is considerable variation in these 
                                                 
11
 The transplantation community is well aware of this tension in their own arena. However, the argument 
that this principle may apply to many other resource allocation systems is a general one frequently 
discussed in economics (e.g., Okun 1975; Blank 2002). 
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patterns of ill health by cause (e.g., Singh and Siahpush 2002; Smith 2003). For instance, 
although African Americans are subject to higher prevalences of hypertension, diabetes, 
and obesity than whites, whites have higher prevalences of non-diabetic poor kidney 
function, cancer, and peripheral artery disease (Daw 2011). These findings suggest that 
the mechanisms of racial inequalities in health would be better understood if major 
illnesses and causes of death were explored individually and in great detail. Together, 
supplementing the literature on coarse differences in health outcomes by race with 
focused investigations into the mechanisms of illness-specific disparities ill health may 
significantly advance this important field of research. 
Medical Research on Racial Inequalities in Kidney Transplantation 
Although racial inequality in kidney transplantation has received relatively little 
attention in sociology, medical research has investigated it extensively. While there is not 
room to review this literature exhaustively (but see Gordon et al. 2010; Hall et al. 2011; 
Higgins and Fishman 2006; Malek et al. 2011; Young and Gaston 2005), a number of 
major themes deserve brief mention. First, this body of work emphasizes that getting a 
kidney transplant is a multistage process with numerous steps at which racial inequalities 
may arise. Once one has chronic kidney disease (CKD), ESRD may develop. Conditional 
on having ESRD, one may begin dialysis, pursue a KT, or both. If one pursues a KT, one 
must be referred to a transplant nephrologist, be evaluated for transplantation, and enroll 
on the KT waiting list. Finally, one may pursue a DDKT, an LDKT, or both. This 
literature convincingly demonstrates that racial inequalities arise at all stages of this 
process (e.g., Epstein et al. 2000; Hsu et al. 2003; Weng et al. 2010). 
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Although there are a number of exceptions, much medical research on racial 
disparities in kidney transplantation emphasizes the role of race differences in patient 
knowledge, preferences, and biology. Patient knowledge concerning the process of 
transplantation and their transplantation risks and options is associated with race 
(Finkelstein et al. 2008), and is associated with higher odds of firm interest in a KT (e.g., 
Vamos et al. 2009; Zimmerman et al. 2006) and of obtaining a KT (Barnieh et al. 2011). 
However, African Americans are less likely to proceed with transplantation even when 
full information on transplantation risks, benefits, and options are presented (Young and 
Kew 2005). Furthermore, this research frequently claims that that racial differences in 
cultural and religious beliefs lead African Americans to object to transplantation 
(Navaneethan and Singh 2006; Vamos et al. 2009), particularly LDKTs (Gordon 2001; 
Rodrigue et al. 2008; Waterman et al. 2006), and that these factors play a large role in 
racial inequality in KT. Surveys of nephrologists confirm that this is a commonly held 
explanation for racial disparities in KT (Ayanian et al. 2004). Finally, this line of research 
frequently concludes that racial differences in transplantation rates are caused in part by 
racial differences in the distribution of ABO and HLA types (Gebel et al. 2003; Higgins 
and Fishman 2006). 
There is much value in studying these factors. After all, KTs are a voluntary 
treatment modality, so differential views on the propriety of this therapy obviously could 
play a role in racial disparities in KT. Also, although progress has been made in 
overcoming this problem (Montgomery et al. 2011), distributional differences by race in 
HLA and ABO do pose obstacles to equitable transplantation outcomes. However, the 
overemphasis of the medical literature on these topics is an impediment to understanding 
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of the full range of determinants of racial inequality in KT as they are frequently 
insufficiently contextualized to account for patients‟ position in society and the medical 
system. 
Methodologically, this line of research is hampered by insufficient recognition 
that kidney transplantation is a fundamentally interdependent process, and that the nature 
of these interdependencies is sufficient to violate the assumptions of the majority of the 
methods employed in this research. Crucially, the regression models typically used in this 
research assume that individual outcomes are independent from one another (Lee and 
Wang 2003). While this could be justified for post-transplant outcomes, this is an 
untenable assumption in studies of waitlist outcomes in the context of a kidney shortage, 
which means nothing if not that patient outcomes are fundamentally interdependent.  
Furthermore, this research practice generally treats the possible outcomes besides 
those of interest as censoring events rather than competing risks. These models require 
the assumption, however, that censoring events are unrelated to the risk of the event of 
interest (Lee and Wang 2003), which is unlikely to be true in the case of KT. For 
instance, while on the waitlist one is at risk of obtaining a DDKT, and LDKT, and death. 
It may be that rates of LDKT are related to the length of the waitlist such that individuals 
who expect to wait 10 years for a DDKT may pursue an LDKT more vigorously than 
someone who expects to only have to wait one year. Furthermore, there is evidence that 
patients with reservations about LDKT are more likely to consider it if their medical 
condition worsens (Gordon 2001). Similarly, after transplantation one is at risk of graft 
failure and death, and these outcomes are related for obvious reasons. 
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Instead of focusing primarily on the characteristics of individual patients, it is far 
better to study KT as a system. As discussed above, there are a number of steps in this 
system, each with unique social and institutional contexts which may structure individual 
outcomes. In addition to the complicated process by which one enrolls in the KT waiting 
list, a number of other contexts structure one‟s chances of obtaining a KT. Most 
importantly for present purposes, one has a place in the kidney allocation system which 
strongly structures one‟s odds of obtaining a DDKT. In this system (as discussed in 
greater detail below), perfect HLA matches are prioritized above all, followed by prior 
living donation, geographic proximity, and ABO compatibility. Therefore one‟s genetic 
and geographic similarity to the deceased donor population and other transplant 
candidates strongly determine one‟s transplantation prospects, and race/ethnicity is 
related to both. Other social characteristics are relevant to the degree that they influence 
one‟s odds of enrolling in the waiting list, hazards of death and graft failure, and 
probability of obtaining an LDKT. 
In summary, kidney transplantation is best thought of as a social system in which 
the rules of the game are unusually well understood, particularly in the case of deceased 
donor kidney transplantation. However, the major aspects of this system which are 
responsible for racial disparities in the KT system are not. Exploring this question is the 
goal of this paper. 
Background 
 Between 1988 and 2007, more than 420,000 organ transplants were performed in 
the United States with high and steadily improving rates of success. This is more 
impressive when one considers that the first effective immunosuppressant drug, 
41 
 
cyclosporine, was not approved by the FDA until 1984. In the last thirty years, organ 
transplantation has shifted from an experimental and very risky procedure to become the 
therapy of choice for a range of ailments, resulting in numerous improved and extended 
lives. 
Since 1984, in the United States organ allocation decisions have been entrusted 
the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) by the U.S. government, which has done 
so by dividing the task among 11 subsidiary administrative regions. Within these regions 
subsidiary organizations known as Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs) collect and 
allocate organs for transplantation according to national rules, with local variations.  
Unlike other organ failures, for kidney failure there is a stopgap procedure 
(dialysis) which can replicate kidney functions over long periods of time. While 
imperfect, this procedure gives UNOS an opportunity it lacks for other transplant 
settings: the ability to allocate kidneys on the basis of potential long-term benefit rather 
than medical urgency, which is the dominant allocative principle for livers and many 
other organs. 
Human Immunology and Kidney Transplantation 
The role of these different allocation criteria are based on a confluence of politics 
and immunology. A brief introduction to human immunology is required (see Leffell et 
al. 1997; Morris 2001 for a more in-depth introduction to human immunology and organ 
transplantation) to understand the allocation system and its role in the present analysis. 
Antigens and Histocompatibility 
The primary task of an immune system is to defend host cells by destroying those 
foreign cells which might endanger them. To do this, of course, one must be able to 
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differentiate one („own‟ cells) from the other. Among humans and many other species, a 
primary means by which immune systems do so is through the presentation and 
recognition of antigens, molecules on the outside of cells which are recognized by cells in 
the immune system. Cells displaying antigens shared by other host cells are deemed 
„histocompatible‟ and permitted to carry on; cells displaying contradictory antigens 
trigger an immune response. In this sense antigens on cells are analogous to flags on 
ships at sea by which a nation‟s ships recognize another of the same ilk. 
For present purposes two forms of histocompatibility are noteworthy: red blood 
cell (ABO) histocompatibility and white blood cell (HLA) histocompatibility. The first 
should be familiar. Red blood cells display some combination of two antigens, labeled A 
and B, which are determined by the alleles present at the ABO genetic locus. There are 
three alleles at this locus which produce one of four phenotypes through a 
codominance/recessive pattern: A, B, AB, and O. The A and B alleles are codominant 
and the o allele is recessive. Therefore an AA or Ao genotype will result in the same 
phenotype (A antigens), a BB or Bo genotype will results in B antigens, but an AB 
phenotype will result in the presentation of both A and B antigens. An oo genotype, 
finally, displays no antigens. Because only detectable antigen mismatches trigger an 
immune response, an individual with AB blood may receive a blood donation from others 
with any blood type, anyone with O type blood may donate to anyone else, and A and B 
blood typed individuals may receive blood from others with their own blood type or those 
with O type blood.  
A similar system describes white blood cell histocompatibility, governed by the 
human leukocyte antigen (HLA) genes: among others, HLA-A, HLA-B, and HLA-DR, 
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which are collectively comprise part of the major histocompatibility complex (MHC) in 
humans. However, in this instance the situation is considerably more complicated 
because of the considerable degree of polymorphism (allelic variety) found at these loci. 
There are a number of alleles at each locus which produce antigens which are 
„serologically equivalent‟ and therefore histocompatible12. 
Still, the genetic diversity at these loci is of such a high degree that the probability 
of another human leukocyte cell‟s antigens matching one‟s own is vanishingly small 
between unrelated pairs. Any transplanted kidney will carry with it a certain number of 
„passenger‟ white blood cells which, upon transplantation, are detected by the recipient‟s 
immune system. If the leukocyte‟s antigens are not histocompatible with the recipient‟s, 
their presence will trigger an immune function response which frequently leads to the 
eventual destruction of the transplanted organ. For this reason, transplants between 
candidate-donor pairs which were not genetically identical did not achieve widespread 
success until 1984, with the development of immunosuppressant drugs which prevent the 
transplant recipient‟s immune system from destroying the graft to the transplanted organ. 
As immunosuppression regimes using drugs such as cyclosporine and tacrolimus have 
improved the survival of HLA-mismatched transplant candidates, however, the role of 
HLA matching has been decreasingly emphasized in the kidney allocation system over 
the years. The so-called ABO barrier, however, is still rarely crossed in kidney 
transplantation (Morris 2001). 
Sensitization 
                                                 
12
 Although research on this topic is ongoing, the current UNOS list of HLA serological equivalencies, 
summarized in Appendix 3A to UNOS policy 3, approved in September 2007, is used as the authoritative 
list.  This is available for inspection at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/policiesAndBylaws/policies.asp.  
Accessed 8/21/2010. 
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In addition to ABO and HLA histocompatibility, another way in which 
immunology influences transplant success is through presensitization. This occurs when 
the recipient‟s body has already been exposed to the donor‟s non-histocompatible 
antigens, though this does not typically result from exposure to the particular donor‟s 
tissue. Primary sensitization occurs through one of three main mechanisms: 1) pregnancy, 
2) blood transfusions, and 3) previous transplants (Leffell et al. 1997). There is no 
consensus on how long such sensitization persists, but it frequently appears to extend for 
decades. 
 The standard measure of immunological presensitization is the calculated Panel 
Reactive Antibody (PRA) score, a measure of the probability that one has produced 
antibodies to a random person‟s antigens. Those with high PRA scores are among the 
most difficult to match to a suitable kidney because HLA mismatches between the donor 
and candidate are more frequently consequential. When one is presensitized to a donor‟s 
antigens, a „positive crossmatch‟ occurs, in which case the transplant is generally not 
conducted. 
The Kidney Allocation System 
 Figure 1 depicts the current (as of 9/15/09) UNOS standard (high quality) 
cadaveric kidney allocation procedure for organ donors age 35 and older. Similar 
procedures are used for younger donors. This allocation formula does not depict 
subnational variation in allocative procedures due to space limitations. “Expanded 
criteria” donor (ECD, kidneys donated by those who are older or less healthy than those 
typically accepted; see Danovitch and Cecka 2003) organs are allocated on a similar 
basis, but without prioritization of pediatric patients or high-PRA patients. 
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 In the current national allocation system, transplant candidates‟ prioritizations are 
organized into four tiers. In each tier, higher ranking in higher tiers (depicted on the left 
of Figure 1) take precedence over higher rankings in lower tiers (depicted further to the 
right in Figure 1). With some exceptions, one‟s priority ranking fundamentally depends 
on the joint properties of each potential donor-candidate match and one‟s relative match 
degree compared to other transplant candidates. 
 The first tier of prioritization takes precedence over all others. Perfect HLA 
matches are given the highest priority, based on evidence that these matches result in 
substantially improved post-transplant medical outcomes (Morris 2001). Second, those 
who have previously served as living kidney donors are given additional priority, 
followed by matches between candidates and donors between whose OPOs a debtor-
creditor relationship has been previously established. Below these priorities, geography is 
the primary determinant of the first tier: transplant candidates in the same OPO as the 
donor are given priority. If no candidates in the same OPO accept the kidney, candidates 
in the same region are then prioritized, followed by all remaining transplant candidates. 
 Given the difficulty of crossing the ABO barrier, the second priority tier 
emphasizes ABO compatibility between the donor and candidate. Those with the same 
blood type are prioritized, followed by potential matches involving candidates with a B 
blood type and donors with an O blood type (since type B is the rarest in the U.S. 
population and O is histocompatible with all other blood types). Finally, mere ABO 
compatibility is given the lowest priority. Candidate-donor pairs which are not ABO 
histocompatible are rarely awarded transplants. 
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 The third priority tier ranks candidates based on their age and PRA. First, 
candidates in the highest PRA category (80-100%) are prioritized. Second, pediatric 
patients are prioritized over adults, and within these categories additional priority given 
to those with elevated PRA scores (21-79%). Finally, the fourth tier of the allocation 
algorithm distinguishes between patients who are similarly prioritized otherwise. First, 
matches on HLA-DR are awarded one point apiece
13
. Second, pediatric candidates are 
awarded priority (higher for those younger than 11), especially when the donor is 
younger than 35 (because older patients frequently have kidneys too large for pediatric 
patients). Finally, conditional on these factors candidates are prioritized based on their 
waiting time, down to the minute of waiting list enrollment if necessary. One point is 
awarded for each year on the waitlist, and then within-OPO waiting time is ranked in 
order such that no prioritization ties will be observed. 
 Because one‟s prioritization is largely donor-specific, the ranking algorithm for 
kidney allocation is best thought of as a candidate-donor matrix. For each deceased 
donor, kidneys are offered to patients in decreasing priority order until such time as one 
patient, in consultation with their nephrologist, conditionally accepts the offer. The 
patient is then tested for positive crossmatches with the donor, and a medical evaluation 
is conducted to ensure that the patient is sufficiently healthy to undergo transplantation. If 
no crossmatch is detected and the patient is deemed suitably healthy, the transplant 
proceeds. 
                                                 
13
 Previously, HLA-A and –B matches were awarded points as well, but with the increasing potency of 
immunosuppressive regimes these prioritizations have been eliminated in the allocation algorithm except in 
the case of perfect HLA matching across HLA-A, -B, and –DR loci. HLA-DR matching is still prioritized 
because, unlike HLA-A and –B, with modern immunosuppressant drugs matching at this locus is still 
associated with substantially improved post-transplant outcomes. 
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Data and Methods 
United Network for Organ Sharing STAR Files  
Since 1987, the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) has collected detailed 
information on every organ transplant recipient, donor, and candidate in the U.S., 
containing information on the demographic, socioeconomic, medical status, laboratory, 
and medical treatment characteristics of each such person. Importantly, all ESRD patients 
are required to enroll in the kidney transplant waitlist, even if they have already identified 
a living donor. Therefore this database contains information on all legal transplant 
candidates and donors in the U.S. since 1987. Due to limitations in the availability of key 
data, the present analysis employs only transplant candidates enrolled in the KT waitlist 
on 7/1/2000 and all candidates and donors who entered the system subsequently. 
Additional enrollments for candidates already on the waiting list on 7/1/2000 were not 
included in the analytical dataset, and multiple waitlistings were excluded as well. 
When each candidate is added to the kidney transplant waitlist, demographic 
(gender, area of residence, race/ethnicity, citizenship, education, age, etc.), medical, and 
laboratory information is collected on the patient. While the form permits multiple race 
categories to be entered, in the UNOS STAR file race information is coded exclusively in 
the following categories: white, black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, Pacific 
Islander, and multiracial. In the present analysis, these categories were recoded into non-
Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, and „other‟ 
categories. ABO and HLA typing and PRA is performed at the center at which the patient 
is evaluated. Information on the insurance coverage, U.S. citizenship status, educational 
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attainment, date of waitlist enrollment, and a wealth of health status measures were 
collected for all candidates. 
Candidate outcomes are recorded for each of the major outcomes which can 
occur, along with the dates at which this occurred: DDKT, LDKT, mortality, and graft 
failure (kidney rejection). Information on the HLA and ABO genotypes, race, gender, 
date and cause of death (if applicable) and relationship with the donor (if applicable) 
were recorded for all deceased and living donors who entered the system during this time, 
along with a wealth of medical status and history information. 
Missing data in this dataset were addressed by imputation using hotdeck 
imputation (Allison 2001; Reilly 1993) methods based on patient age, ethnicity, gender, 
and education. In hotdeck imputation, discrete groups are assigned to each observation 
(here, the demographic attributes just described), then non-missing values for the missing 
variables are drawn at random from other members of that group, proportionate to their 
representation in that subpopulation. Hotdeck imputation methods are widely used by 
government agencies such as the Census. Although multiple imputation and direct 
maximum likelihood methods are more in vogue in secondary data analysis in sociology, 
the very large size of the datasets involved and the low rates of missingness of key 
variables made hotdecking, which is a computationally more efficient imputation method, 
an attractive option for this study
14
.  
                                                 
14
 Rates of missingness were generally low, and nearly nonexistent for demographic variables. The average 
rate of missingness for the HLA genes, however, was 6.4%, but nearly all participants had at least one valid 
such measure per locus. Missing genetic data were not imputed; instead, following UNOS procedure in 
such cases, such persons were assumed to be homozygous at that locus. Two additional key variables had 
non-trivial rates of missingness in the dataset – OPO (29.1%) and PRA (58.7%). However, no cases were 
missing regional affiliation or key outcomes. 
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Methods 
As described above, analyzing the major determinants of racial inequalities in KT 
poses a number of analytical challenges which render most standard regression-based 
analysis approaches inadequate. First, the outcomes of individual patients are 
interdependent, violating the residual independence assumption of regression methods 
such as Cox proportional hazards models (Lee and Wang 2003). Second, latent risks for 
different outcomes (DDKT, LDKT, and mortality on the waiting list, mortality and graft 
failure post-transplantation) are likely interdependent. Third, if transplant candidates 
obtain a transplant and subsequently experience graft failure, they frequently return to the 
waiting list to seek an additional transplant, meaning that observations are not 
independent from one another. Fourth, hazards for these outcomes, and racial inequalities 
therein, are highly time-dependent, violating the proportional hazards assumption of 
many commonly used survival analysis models. Most importantly, kidney transplantation 
occurs in a dynamic system in which one‟s transplantation prospects depend not just on 
one‟s characteristics, but on the number and characteristics of other transplant candidates, 
deceased kidney donors, and potential living kidney donors in one‟s social network. 
Rather than a mere list of analytical difficulties, however, these characteristics of 
the KT system provide an opportunity. Crucially, the process by which deceased donors 
and transplant candidates are linked is publicly available and algorithmic in nature, 
meaning that it can be computationally reproduced. While this advantage does not apply 
to other key outcomes (LDKT, mortality, graft failure, and kidney offer acceptance), 
these outcomes can be simply analyzed in a manner which captures group-specific risks 
of different outcomes at each stage of the KT process. To account for these 
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characteristics of the KT system, simulation-based methods will be used in this study. 
The goals of this analysis are twofold: first, to reproduce the basic functioning of the KT 
system; and second, to understand the degree to which different proximate determinants 
of KT outcomes are primarily responsible for racial inequalities in the KT system. 
Simulation Methods and the Counterfactual Model of Causality 
Simulation techniques are advantageous and feasible for this study for a number 
of reasons. First, the different potential outcomes of participation in the KT system 
(DDKTs, LDKTs, waitlist mortality, graft failure, and post-transplant mortality) are 
interdependent for individuals over time and between individuals cross-sectionally. No 
standard regression techniques of which the author is aware are appropriate for these 
sorts of process.  
Second, although microsimulation is frequently critiqued for its dependence on 
model assumptions (Ruggles 1993)
15
, in the case of KT the rules of the game are 
unusually well-known. The number of deceased donor kidneys is known, as is the 
number of candidates at all time periods and the process by which kidneys are offered to 
transplant candidates. Although the exact process by which candidates obtain LDKTs, 
accept DDKT offers, die, and reject their organs post-transplantation is not as well 
understood, the group-specific hazards of these outcomes may be incorporated into the 
simulation using life table or other techniques. 
The approach to simulation taken in this analysis is motivated by the 
counterfactual causality tradition (Heckman 2005; Holland 1986; Morgan and Winship 
2007). In brief, the crucial intuition behind the counterfactual approach is to consider all 
observations as having two or more potential outcome states in response to an exogenous 
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 However, note that this is equally true of nearly all statistical analyses. 
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„treatment,‟ as in an experiment.  The effect in such a framework is the gap between the 
outcome state of an observed case under hypothetical treatment and control assignment 
statuses.  Following Holland‟s (1986) exposition, the causal effect of interest in the 
dichotomous predictor case amounts to Yt – Yc, where Yt is the observed outcome under 
the „treatment‟ condition and Yc is the observed outcome under the „control‟ condition of 
the predictor variable of interest (say, an intervention). 
While typical counterfactually motivated methods are inappropriate for this topic, 
counterfactual thinking suggests a solution to understanding the contribution of a variety 
of factors to racial inequalities in the KT system. The key is to think of the KT system as 
such – there are a number of determinants of KT outcomes with differential distributions 
by race. When seeking to understand the contributions of these determinants to racial 
inequalities in the KT system, the system will be simulated under a baseline („control‟) 
condition as well as a series of counterfactual („treatment‟) simulations wherein the 
distribution of a determinant of KT outcomes is equalized. This procedure will be 
conducted for the following seven determinants: place of residence, probabilities of 
DDKT offer acceptance, mortality hazards, living donor hazards, graft failure hazards, 
PRA, and ABO/HLA values. When more than one variable is redistributed (as in 
ABO/HLA, in which ABO type and six HLA alleles are involved), these will be 
redistributed jointly. When a hazard or probability is the property of interest, these will be 
the time- and group-specific hazard estimated for candidates (the estimation procedure is 
described below). Place of residence is measured as the OPO within which candidates are 
nested in the KT system. 
The Kidney Transplantation Simulation 
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 The design of the simulation employed in this study is depicted in Figure 2. First, 
the initial waiting list is established. All transplant candidates who were on the waiting 
list on July 1, 2000 are included on the baseline waiting list. Once the waiting list is 
established for this date, the dynamics thereof are simulated in 90-day increments
16
 
through January 1, 2010.   
Second, periodically new persons join the waitlist. Each person who joined the 
waiting list for the first time since July 1, 2000 is added to the waiting list in the 90-day 
window in which they did so. Third, once on the waiting list one may exit it in one of 
three ways. To begin, one may die. Hazards of waiting list mortality are estimated 
separately for each race- and education-specific group for each 90-day time period 
through approximately the first three years
17
 of waiting list time using life table 
techniques. Hazards thereof for the fourth and fifth years on the waiting list are estimated 
by calculating the race- and education-specific 90-day hazards pooled over those years of 
waiting list time. Finally, waiting list mortality hazards for time spent on the waitlist 
beyond five years are pooled together in the life table procedure. (Identical time period 
breakdowns are used in all subsequent hazard estimations and are not discussed further.) 
Next, one may exit the waiting list by obtaining an LDKT, the risk for which is estimated 
using a procedure identical to that just described for waiting list mortality events. Those 
simulated to die are eliminated from further consideration in the simulation, whereas 
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 Although 90-day increments are somewhat arbitrary, given the computational intensity of this research 
design, a coarsening procedure was necessary in the interests of computationally feasibility. 
17
 Since hazards are modeled in 90-day increments, four such periods add up to only 360 days, not 365. 
„Year‟ is used as a linguistically convenient term for 360 day periods for the duration of this paper. Years 3, 
4, and ≥5 are analyzed jointly a) because similar hazards applied during these time spans and b) to ensure 
sufficient observations for stable estimates. 
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those simulated to obtain an LDKT are moved to the post-transplant stage of the 
simulation, as depicted in Figure 2. 
Additionally, one may exit the waiting list by obtaining a DDKT. These events 
are simulated by reproducing the functioning of the kidney allocation system as described 
above. The priority rankings of each KT candidate for each kidney are converted to 
allocation scores in which higher values represent higher priorities. In the interests of 
simplicity, payback credit obligations and prior living donor statuses are not accounted 
for in this simulation. Additionally, there are a number of subnational variations in the 
allocation system which are not reproduced in this allocation simulation. Finally, the 
allocation algorithm here simulated was only initiated in 2003. As such, the results of this 
simulation may be interpreted as the causes of racial inequality in KT if the present 
national allocation system had been used since July 1, 2000. 
The result of this procedure is a candidate-by-donor matrix of allocation priority 
scores. The rows of this matrix represent each of the transplant candidates simulated to be 
awaiting a transplant (those who have not yet died, received an LDKT, or a previous 
DDKT for this waiting list stint). The columns represent each of the DDKs which were 
transplanted during this 90-day time period. DDKs are sorted left-to-right in the order in 
which they were transplanted, and „offered‟ sequentially to KT candidates in order of 
their priority scores among those who have been simulated to accept the offer if received. 
Probabilities of acceptance are estimated as a function of KT candidate and donor 
characteristics as well as their ABO and HLA histocompatibilities. The regression 
coefficients from a logistic regression model of offer acceptance (in logit form) are 
multiplied by the relevant candidate and donor characteristics and candidate-donor 
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histocompatibilities and summed for each candidate-donor combination in that time 
period, then converted to predicted probabilities of offer acceptance. Predicted 
probabilities are then compared to the value of a random uniform variable to convert 
probabilities into outcomes. Once this procedure has been completed, the probability of 
HLA positive crossmatching is estimated as  
                                                           (  )     (
     
 
)                                             (1) 
where XM is a positive crossmatch, PRA is the panel reactive antibody score for that 
patient, and Mik is the number of HLA matches for that candidate-donor pair. The second 
term adjusts the PRA value proportionate to the proportion of non-equivalent HLA alleles 
for that candidate-donor combination because one cannot be presensitized to one‟s own 
antigens. Transplant candidates simulated to be positively crossmatched to the donor are 
not awarded the transplant. 
 Among the candidates simulated to accept the transplant conditional on being 
offered and who are not simulated to be positively crossmatched with the donor, the 
kidney is awarded to the patient with the highest priority score for that kidney. This 
procedure is repeated for each DDK available during that period, and those candidates 
simulated to receive a DDKT through this procedure are moved to the post-transplant 
condition within the simulation. 
 Once one has received a transplant, one may exit the post-transplant condition 
through one of two ways. First, as before, one may die, in which case one is eliminated 
from the simulation. Hazards for post-transplant mortality are estimated using life table 
techniques on all person-time periods observed 7/1/2000 to 2/26/2010 among those who 
had obtained a kidney transplant, as described above. Second, one may experience graft 
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failure, wherein one‟s body rejects the transplanted kidney. Once this has occurred, one 
may return to the kidney transplant waiting list or return to dialysis. The probability of re-
waitlisting was estimated using logistic regression techniques (not shown), and post-
transplant persons are, conditional on experiencing graft failure, returned to the waiting 
list if the value of a random uniform variable is less than the estimated probability of re-
waitlisting.  
This simulation is repeated for each of the counterfactual conditions described 
above – redistributing place of residence, probabilities of DDKT offer acceptance, 
mortality hazards, living donor hazards, graft failure hazards, PRA, and ABO/HLA 
values. The effects of these counterfactual conditions are then calculated as 
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where  ̅   represents the mean outcome for whites in the baseline simulation;  ̅   
represents the mean outcome for another racial/ethnic group in the baseline simulation; 
 ̅   represents the mean outcome for whites in the counterfactual condition C; and     
may be interpreted as the percentage of the gap between group O and whites for this 
outcome „explained‟ by equalizing the factor C. In other words,     is the percentage of 
the gap between this group and whites which would not be observed if there were no 
racial differences in the counterfactual variable C. 
 Since this method of effect calculation may be unfamiliar, some examples should 
prove helpful. Suppose that the place of residence resulted in an estimated effect of 50 for 
African Americans. This would indicate that 50% of the white-black differential in 
transplantation rates would be eliminated in the absence of residential segregation. Now, 
suppose that the effect were 150 – this would indicate that rates of transplantation are 
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higher for blacks in this condition than for whites, and that the counterfactual black-white 
gap (with a black advantage) is 50% as large as that estimated in the baseline simulation 
(with a white advantage). Finally, suppose that this effect were -50 – this would indicate 
that the white-black differential in transplantation was made 50% larger in this 
counterfactual condition compared to the baseline simulation results. 
 The next section proceeds as follows. First, the degree and nature of racial and 
ethnic inequality in the KT system will be explored descriptively. Second, the 
composition of the KT waiting list will be described. Third, racial differences in the 
proximate determinants of transplantation outcomes will be described. Fourth, the 
performance of the KT simulation will be assessed, and the estimated counterfactual 
effects described. 
Results 
Waiting List Composition 
 During this time period, 332,635 unique persons participated in the KT waiting 
list (Table 1). For all racial and ethnic groups, males are overrepresented compared to 
women. The age distribution is somewhat younger for African Americans than for 
members of other racial and ethnic groups. Racial differences in educational attainment, 
however, are reflected in the waiting list composition – whites and Asians have higher 
average educational attainments than do African Americans and Hispanics. Finally, 
moderate racial differences in PRA are observed. On average, Asians have the lowest 
PRAs, followed by Whites and Hispanics, then African Americans. This last difference is 
substantial – the average African American PRA is nearly 50% higher than that for 
whites. 
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The Degree of Racial Inequality in the KT System 
 The next step of this analysis is to establish the degree of racial and ethnic 
inequalities present in the KT system. Viewed broadly, racial inequalities in the KT 
system may be created at two primary stages – first, racial differences in ESRD and 
seeking kidney transplants, and second, in the likelihood of obtaining a transplant 
conditional on seeking one. Both questions are crudely assessed in Table 2, which 
compares the distribution of racial categories in the U.S. population (measured using 
pooled American Community Survey microdata 2001-2009, provided by IPUMS-USA; 
Ruggles et al. 2010), the transplant waiting list (the distribution of race and ethnicity 
among everyone who has sought a KT between 2000 and 2/26/2010, measured using the 
UNOS STAR dataset), and the pool of persons obtaining a transplant (the distribution of 
race and ethnicity among everyone who has obtained a KT during this same time period). 
To the degree that racial distributions on the waiting list differs from the distribution in 
the population, this suggests racial differences in the ESRD/waitlisting process; to the 
degree that racial distributions in the transplant recipient pool differs from the distribution 
on the waiting list, this suggests racial differences in the transplantation process
18
. 
 The results of this exercise demonstrate that substantial racial inequalities occur at 
both stages of this process. Compared to whites, members of racial and ethnic minority 
groups are greatly overrepresented on the KT waiting list. For instance, African 
Americans are 2.23 times more likely than one would expect based on their population 
distribution to be found on the waiting list, and 2.89 times more likely to be on the KT 
waiting list than are whites based on their population distributions. While Hispanics‟ and 
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 Of course, this is a crude exercise. The racial distribution on the waiting list has evolved over time, so 
differences in the timing of waiting list entry could account for some of these differences. Nevertheless, 
this exercise is revealing of the degree of KT inequality by race/ethnicity in the transplant system. 
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Asians‟ representations on the waiting list are more proportionate to their share of the 
population, the disproportionately low share of whites on the waiting list is a source of 
white-Hispanic and white-Asian inequality at this stage of the transplant process.  
 Similar inequalities are observed in transplantation outcomes comparing whites 
with members of racial and ethnic minority groups. Whites are approximately 12% more 
likely to be represented in the transplant recipient pool than would be expected based on 
their proportion on the KT waiting list, while members of other groups are 
underrepresented. Compared to whites, African Americans, Hispanics, Asians and Pacific 
Islanders, and members of other groups are respectively 23%, 17%, 24%, and 16% less 
likely to be represented in the transplant recipient pool than would be suggested by their 
share of the KT waiting list. 
Trends in Racial Inequalities in Kidney Transplant Outcomes 
 Racial inequalities in outcomes once on the KT waitlist have changed over time. 
Figures 3 and 4 depict time trends in racial inequalities in kidney transplantation 
outcomes. Figure 3 depicts risk ratios of transplantation outcomes by spell for African 
American, Hispanic, Asian, and other groups relative to whites by year of waiting list 
entry. (Years of waiting list entry prior to 2000 are grouped together in the „1999‟ 
category.) Ratios greater than 1 would therefore indicate an advantage of the depicted 
group in that outcome compared to whites; ratios equal to 1 would indicate equal 
prospects to those of whites; and ratios less than 1 indicate disadvantages compared to 
whites. 
 As can be seen, white advantages in transplantation outcomes compared to other 
groups have grown over time, although this could reflect differences due to censoring 
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rather than eventual outcomes. For instance, African Americans experienced roughly 
equal rates of DDKTs compared to whites through the 2004 waiting list cohort, but 
African American members of the 2009 cohort were only about 75% as likely as whites 
to have obtained a DDKT by the end of the present data collection. Similar trends in 
DDKT inequalities are observed for members of other racial and ethnic groups. Even 
starker, however, are racial differences in the proportion obtaining LDKTs before 
censoring. African Americans in the 2000-2004 waiting list cohorts are only about half as 
likely as similar whites to have obtained an LDKT, and this ratio decreases in subsequent 
years. Although racial differences in this outcome are less severe for members of other 
racial and ethnic minority groups, the inequalities have similarly increased with time. 
LDKTs are therefore a major potential proximate determinant of overall racial 
inequalities in the KT system. 
 Figure 4 depicts identically calculated racial disparities in mortality and graft 
failure over time. The results here are somewhat more complex than those for 
transplantation outcomes. First, African Americans are substantially more likely to die or 
experience graft failure while in the KT system than are whites, although in more recent 
cohorts this inequality has been ameliorated. Hispanics of all cohorts experience 
mortality at slightly higher rates than whites, but their rates of graft failure have been 
lower in recent years than whites‟. Asian patients experience mortality at roughly the 
same rates as whites and graft failure at substantially lower rates. Members of other racial 
and ethnic groups, finally, are subject to higher rates of mortality than are whites, and 
approximately equal rates of graft failure (though the latter differences have varied 
substantially by waiting list cohort). In summary, racial and ethnic differences in 
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mortality and graft failure could play substantial roles in explaining overall KT system 
inequality, particularly for African Americans. In contrast, the lower graft failure rates of 
Hispanics and Asians could provide a source of advantage in the overall KT system. 
Racial Differences in Offer Acceptance 
 Table 3 presents selected results from an analysis of DDKT offer acceptance rates 
based on a dataset of all DDKT offers made by UNOS after July 1, 2000 through 
2/26/2010
19
. A series of logistic regression models were estimated examining the 
probability of offer acceptance conditional on candidate demographic characteristics, 
candidate-donor biological match, candidate health, and donor characteristics. All of this 
information is available to transplant candidates and their doctors when deciding whether 
to accept a DDKT offer from UNOS. 
 Model 1 in Table 3 presents the coefficients (in odds‟ ratio form) from a model 
predicting offer acceptance based on candidate demographic characteristics only
20
. Net of 
other demographic controls, the results show that racial and ethnic minorities are more 
likely to accept a DDKT offer than are whites. 
 Models 2-4 in Table 3 examine this relationship with additional controls. Model 2 
adjusts the model for candidate-donor HLA and ABO histocompatibility. Consistent with 
the nephrology‟s emphasis on histocompatibility, HLA and ABO compatibility are highly 
predictive of DDKT offer acceptance.  Compared to none, two HLA-DR or HLA-B 
matches between the donor and candidate are associated with more than 4.5 times the 
odds of acceptance. Consistent with the general finding in nephrology that HLA-A 
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 These data are not part of the standard UNOS STAR file. The author thanks UNOS for generously 
sharing this information. 
20
 Standard errors and significance tests are not shown because this data is a census of all offers made 
during this time period, and therefore there is no population to generalize to. 
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matching is the least important HLA consideration, the effect of perfect matching at this 
locus is less than half of that for HLA-B and –DR. ABO similarity between the donor and 
candidate was also predictive of DDKT offer acceptance – compared to identical matches 
(the most desirable outcome), donors whose blood is merely histocompatible with the 
candidate had only .64 times the odds of acceptance. 
 Additionally, controlling for biological similarity increases the effects of race and 
ethnicity on the odds of offer acceptance. Net of these and other demographic controls, 
African Americans have 1.51 times the odds of acceptance compared to whites. 
Comparable figures for Hispanics, Asians, and others are 1.26, 1.64, and 1.38, 
respectively. Additional controls for candidate health and donor characteristics do not 
appreciably ameliorate these relationships. 
Simulation Results 
Baseline Simulation Validation 
 Table 4 presents the results of the simulation compared to the observed 
distribution of outcomes, and Table 5 presents the results of the counterfactual exercise. 
The simulated figures in Table 4 represent the mean outcomes of a series of 100 
simulations of the baseline condition on ten different imputed datasets of the UNOS data 
(with ten such simulations apiece), with each such simulation estimated on a randomly 
selected 20% subset of the UNOS dataset of KT candidates and DDKs
21
. Table 4 presents 
the proportion of waitlist and post-transplant spells resulting in any transplant, DDKT, 
LDKT, waitlist mortality, graft failure, and post-transplant mortality observed and 
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 Due to the matrix-based nature of the simulation, this 20% subsetting was conducted in the interests of 
computational feasibility. Simulating the full system requires more than 50gb of memory and extremely 
long computational times. The computational time required to simulate subsets of the data is substantially 
less. 
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simulated and the percentage by which the simulation results differ from the observed 
data. A 90% simulation interval, reflecting differences in typical outcomes across the 100 
baseline simulations spread evenly across the ten imputed datasets, is also presented for 
the simulated proportions. Finally, the ratio of outcomes between whites and other races 
and ethnic groups is also presented. 
 The baseline simulation results broadly capture racial differences in outcomes, 
albeit imperfectly. Overall whites are more likely to obtain any transplant, with whites 
slightly less likely to obtain a DDKT than are blacks and Hispanics, and substantially 
more likely to obtain an LDKT compared to other racial and ethnic groups. As in the 
observed data, whites are less likely than blacks and others to experience waitlist 
mortality, with Hispanics and Asians less likely than whites to experience this outcome. 
After obtaining a transplant, whites are less likely than blacks and others to experience 
graft failure, while Hispanics and Asians have the lowest rates of this outcome. Finally, 
whites, blacks, and others experience post-transplant mortality at the highest rates, while 
Hispanics and Asians enjoy lower rates of this eventuality. 
 The simulation model does not perfectly capture all of these dynamics. Rates of 
DDKTs for all groups are somewhat underestimated by the simulation model. Rates of 
LDKTs are overestimated for whites and underestimated for Asians and others, while 
rates of waitlist mortality are overestimated for whites, Hispanics, and Asians. Post-
transplantation, the model underestimates rates of graft failure for blacks, and 
underestimates rates of post-transplant mortality for blacks and others. Improving the 
predictive validity of this model is a priority for future research on this matter. 
63 
 
 However, the model does largely capture racial differences in all of these 
outcomes. Concerning the primary outcome of interest – obtaining a kidney transplant – 
the model very closely approximates racial differences in this outcome with the exception 
of the Hispanic-white comparison, wherein the inequality is somewhat overstated.  Due 
to the underestimation of rates of DDKT for whites in this model, racial differences in 
this outcome are also somewhat exaggerated. Similarly, discrepancies between the model 
results and the simulation also somewhat exaggerate racial disparities in LDKT and post-
transplant mortality. However, differences in waitlist mortality and graft failure closely 
approximate observed racial and ethnic differences in these outcomes. Overall, while 
imperfect, the contours of racial inequality in the simulation and the observed data are 
very similar. 
Counterfactual Simulation Effects 
 With these caveats in mind, the results of the counterfactual simulation exercise 
are useful for identifying the major determinants of racial inequality in the KT system. 
Broadly speaking, racial differences in LDKT rates, genetics, and place of residence 
explain the bulk of racial inequality in the KT system. 
 Equalizing the distribution of ABO and HLA by race results in a 41%, 75%, and 
36% reduction in transplant inequality for blacks, Hispanics, and Asians respectively 
compared to whites, suggesting that racial distributional differences in these important 
determinants of racial inequalities in the KT system. Similarly, equalizing LDKT hazards 
in the simulation results in a 108, 155, and 79% reduction in racial differences in 
transplantation outcomes for blacks, Hispanics, and Asians respectively, such that if 
LDKT hazards were equalized blacks and Hispanics would have higher rates of 
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transplantation overall. Finally, place of residence plays an important role in this system, 
as redistributing this characteristic results in a 13% increase, 12% increase, and 10% 
decrease in inequality in transplant outcomes compared to whites for blacks, Hispanics, 
and Asians respectively. This suggests that place of residence is actually a source of 
advantage for Asians, while serving as a mechanism of white advantage compared to 
Hispanics and blacks. Finally, equalizing PRA scores across members of different racial 
and ethnic groups results in a 14% decrease, 142% increase, and 6% decrease in 
inequality compared to whites for blacks, Asians, and Hispanics respectively. 
 In summary, racial differences in LDKTs are primarily responsible for racial 
differences in transplantation outcomes overall, and racial differences in the distribution 
of ABO and HLA genes play a substantial role in the current allocation system as well. 
Finally, differences in area of residence explains a substantial proportion of the white 
advantage in transplantation vis-à-vis Hispanics and Asians on the KT waiting list, and 
racial and ethnic differences in PRA are a small source of white advantage compared to 
blacks and Asians and a significant source of advantage for Hispanics. 
Discussion 
Any system which allocates resources to participants on the basis of individual 
characteristics will produce group differences in outcomes to the degree that groups differ 
in those characteristics. In the case of kidney transplantation, organs for transplantation 
are obtained from one of two types of donors – living and deceased. One‟s odds of 
obtaining a living donor transplant are strongly associated with race and ethnicity, and 
accordingly racial differences in transplantation outcomes are substantially influenced by 
racial differences in rates of LDKT. Furthermore, one‟s chances of obtaining a deceased 
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donor kidney transplant are primarily structured by geography and genetics. These factors 
substantially explain racial differences in kidney transplant outcomes as well. Finally, 
racial and ethnic differences in PRA scores explain a substantial degree of racial 
inequality in the KT system for Hispanics and whites, while other investigated variables 
play relatively minor roles. 
In modern societies most limited resources are allocated to those who seek them 
according to a set of criteria developed and implemented by institutional actors. For 
instance, enrollment in competitive universities is allocated in part on the basis of test 
scores, high school grades, writing ability, and life experiences, and racial differences in 
these factors helps to explain racial differences in enrollment at prestigious schools. 
These factors are selected in part because they are considered to be efficient use of 
limited space on the theory that those with stronger academic performance will better 
benefit from additional schooling and raise the quality of education for all at the 
university. However, universities frequently recognize that opportunities to develop 
strong academic skills and have useful life experiences are stratified by race and class, 
and accordingly allocate these positions in part on the basis of these factors. 
Those who establish the rules by which to allocate DDKTs are faced with a 
similar task. There are not enough DDKs to provide transplants for all who seek them. 
Therefore UNOS allocates kidneys for transplant to candidates on the basis of a set of 
criteria thought to balance efficiency (seeking to get the maximum population benefit 
from transplantation) with equity (seeking to ensure equal access to this treatment option 
to all strata of society). The trouble is that these two goals are frequently contradictory. 
While allocating kidneys locally ensures that transportation times are minimized and 
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organs are better preserved, residential stratification by race in combination with 
geographic variability in deceased donor kidney availability means that members of 
different races vary in their access to DDKTs. Similarly, family and social network 
structure, characteristics, and dynamics are substantially associated with race and 
ethnicity. For unknown reasons these factors produce racial differences in rates of 
LDKTs. Finally, in the presence of racial distributional differences in ABO and HLA, 
being a racial minority itself is a source of disadvantage. While the incorporation of 
histocompatibility criteria into the kidney allocation algorithm is well justified from an 
efficiency perspective, these efficiency gains come at the cost of inequitable outcomes by 
race. 
These findings highlight the difficulty of achieving racial equity in a racialized 
social system more generally. Many population processes are beyond the control of any 
institution. UNOS cannot influence where transplant candidates live, whether their family 
and friends donate kidneys, or the mating patterns of the population. Yet they do establish 
the rules by which kidneys are allocated to those who seek them for transplantation. By 
selecting the criteria by which these are allocated, UNOS in large part determines the 
nature and causes of the inequalities which will result, in combination with the behaviors 
of doctors, donors, and patients within this framework. 
While the consequences of allocation decisions are constrained by key 
immunological and biological realities, the balance which UNOS strikes between 
efficiency and equity is fundamentally a political decision to which there is no right 
answer. Periodically UNOS has radically altered the allocation system for kidneys, 
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responding to concerns about racial inequalities in access and to changing technological 
conditions which structure the effects on efficiency of prioritizing equity.  
These conditions will continue to change. For the present, however, it is clear that 
a number of steps could be taken to ameliorate racial inequalities in the transplantation 
system. First, research should continue on the causes of racial disparities in LDKTs and 
possible interventions to ethically ameliorate them. Potential living donors may fail to 
donate for a large number of reasons, including insufficient histocompatibility with the 
intended recipient, poor health, the willingness of the candidate to accept an LDKT, and 
so on. The factors which produce racial disparities in LDKT should be identified with 
careful research, whereupon interventions to promote LDKT among groups with 
disproportionately low rates thereof should be designed and implemented. 
Second, the role of geography in the UNOS DDKT allocation system should be 
revisited. This has some precedent - in 1998, then-Department of Health and Human 
Services Secretary Donna Shalala proposed a set of changes to the policies governing 
organ allocation in the United States, which came to be known as the Final Rule.  Among 
other things, these changes would have required the elimination of the geographic factor 
in the allocation process, instead creating a single national waitlist. Certain regions 
benefit disproportionately from a geographically-based system because they have high 
rates of organ donations relative to demand, resulting in large geographic disparities in 
rates of DDKT. The political and medical leaders within these regions led the charge to 
defeat the national list, in which they succeeded when a version of the Final Rule lacking 
this provision was eventually instituted. This political decision should be revisited in light 
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of the role that geographic apportionment of DDKTs plays in the production of racial 
disparities in transplantation outcomes. 
Third, research should continue on immunosuppression and related technologies 
which can facilitate successful transplantation between non-histocompatible donors and 
recipients. Should this technology advance sufficiently, it is possible that, like HLA-A and 
–B before it, the role of HLA-DR histocompatibility in the DDKT allocation system could 
be reduced or eliminated. Though likely more difficult, it is possible that the role of ABO 
in the allocation system could eventually be reduced or eliminated, as well. 
This study improves upon previous research on racial disparities in KT by treating 
KT as a system rather than a collection of individual outcomes. This theoretical and 
methodological improvement highlights the degree to which LDKT rates, genetic 
distributions, and geographic distributions mediate racial disparities in KT outcomes. 
However, this study is subject to a number of important limitations. First, the fit of the 
model to the observed outcomes is imperfect. Future research on this topic should seek to 
improve the predictive validity of this or related models. Second, the hazards of LDKT, 
mortality, and graft failure employed by this model are crude, predicting outcomes 
stratified only by race-education intersections. Future research should refine these 
estimates to adjust post-transplant outcomes by transplant characteristics (e.g., type, 
histocompatibility) and additional individual and institutional characteristics. However, 
the advantage of the life table methodology employed in this study is the freedom from 
distributional assumptions concerning latent individual hazards. The variety of semi-
parametric competing risk models which were previously fit to this data (not shown) 
failed to produce adequate fit and were discarded. Methods capable of adequately 
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analyzing hazards in the KT system while accounting for competing risks of exit should 
be developed to improve understanding of the full set of factors contributing to group 
differences in LDKT, graft failure, and mortality. 
Additionally, the estimates obtained for the effects of the proximate determinants 
of transplantation outcomes are „bivariate‟ in the sense that only one determinant is 
equalized in each simulated counterfactual. Future research should measure the effects of 
each counterfactual while accounting for the remaining factors. Furthermore and perhaps 
more importantly, the estimation strategy employed in this study assumes a ceteris 
paribus relationship between these counterfactuals and the outcomes observed. For 
instance, the effect of place of residence on transplantation outcomes is assumed to be 
unrelated to LDKT hazards, which may not be the case. Additionally, because actors in 
the KT system may adjust their behaviors to account for changing conditions, it is 
unlikely that the present estimates are precisely the differences in outcomes which would 
be observed under the estimated counterfactuals. Future research should investigate how 
changing conditions in the KT system affect key behaviors such as rates of LDKT, re-
waitlisting following graft failure, and DDKT offer acceptance. 
Finally, stating that racial differences in LDKT explain racial differences in KT 
overall raises the obvious question of why members of different racial and ethnic groups 
vary in LDKT outcomes. LDKTs primarily come from family and friends of transplant 
candidates. Although some progress has been made in the medical literature on this topic, 
future research should investigate the distribution of suitable living donor availability by 
race and the processes by which donor availability results in LDKTs, and how these 
processes may contribute to racial differences therein. 
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Conclusion 
 This paper reports on a simulation study on the major determinants of racial 
inequalities in kidney transplants. Crucially, unlike previous research this study accounts 
for the systemic nature of the allocative system and incorporating information on the 
kidney transplant allocation algorithm alongside group differences in hazards of 
mortality, graft failure, PRA, and living donor kidney transplants, and deceased donor 
kidney transplant offer acceptance rates. The findings identify rates of living donor 
kidney transplants, distributions of blood type and HLA genes, PRA, and place of 
residence as major mediators of racial disparities in kidney transplantation outcomes. 
 To date, research on racial disparities in health has largely focused on major 
markers of overall health, self-reported health status, and all-cause mortality. While 
valuable, this literature has been hampered by the generalizations necessary to speak of 
health outcomes as though they had uniformly common causes. By studying a particular 
and important cause of ill health and health inequality and discussing the sociological 
issues raised therein, this study advances the literature on health inequality. 
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 2.1: Deceased Donor Kidney Allocation National Algorithm, 2003-Present 
 
NOTE: This figure represents the national kidney allocation priority algorithm since 
2003. This does not represent local variations in allocation policy. Read left to right, each 
subsequent level reflects priorities within categories of the columns to the left, and 
categories closer to the top (for the first three levels) are higher priorities. 
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Figure 2.2: Simulation Design 
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Figure 2.3: Trends in Racial Inequality in Transplantation Outcomes, 1990-2009 
 
NOTE: Figures plotted are the risk ratio of the indicated racial group to that of whites for 
the outcome in question. Years indicate the year individuals joined the kidney transplant 
waitlist. Those joining the waitlist in 1990 or earlier are collapsed into the first (1999) 
category. Those joining the waiting list in 2010 are omitted.  
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Figure 2.4: Trends in Racial Inequality in Mortality and Graft Failure Outcomes, 
2000-2009 
 
NOTE: Figures plotted are the risk ratio of the indicated racial group to that of whites for 
the outcome in question. Years indicate the year individuals joined the kidney transplant 
waitlist. Those joining the waitlist in 1990 or earlier are collapsed into the first (1999) 
category. Those joining in 2010 are omitted. 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics, Kidney Transplant Waitlist, 2000-2010 
  White (N=171,649) Black (N=95,816) 
Hispanic 
(N=47,031) 
Asian (N=17,010) Other (N=7,038) 
  Mean/% SD Mean/% SD Mean/% SD Mean/% SD Mean/% SD 
Gender 
  
    
  
    
 
  
Male 60.64 -- 56.90 -- 60.16 -- 56.71 -- 54.40 -- 
Female 39.36 -- 43.10 -- 39.84 -- 43.29 -- 45.60 -- 
Age 
  
    
  
    
 
  
0-17 2.57 -- 2.34 -- 4.84 -- 1.85 -- 3.24 -- 
18-25 4.24 -- 5.07 -- 6.20 -- 4.32 -- 4.87 -- 
26-35 12.54 -- 14.41 -- 13.54 -- 12.32 -- 11.81 -- 
36-45 20.43 -- 22.33 -- 18.81 -- 18.58 -- 18.16 -- 
46-55 25.37 -- 27.56 -- 25.47 -- 26.31 -- 28.66 -- 
56-65 23.45 -- 21.51 -- 23.26 -- 25.69 -- 26.12 -- 
66-75 10.44 -- 6.45 -- 7.54 -- 10.51 -- 7.02 -- 
76+ 0.98 -- 0.32 -- 0.35 -- 0.43 -- 0.13 -- 
Education 
  
    
  
    
 
  
None 28.41 -- 27.52 -- 23.97 -- 27.78 -- 21.43 -- 
<HS 2.82 -- 3.56 -- 21.59 -- 6.68 -- 7.13 -- 
HS/GED 32.45 -- 39.00 -- 36.14 -- 25.77 -- 39.47 -- 
SC 18.27 -- 18.64 -- 11.57 -- 16.54 -- 18.85 -- 
BA 12.51 -- 8.43 -- 5.26 -- 15.65 -- 10.13 -- 
>BA 5.54 -- 2.86 -- 1.48 -- 7.59 -- 2.98 -- 
PRA 14.88 (29.60) 21.18 (33.53) 14.31 (28.71) 12.74 (27.03) 12.89 (27.23) 
 
NOTE: Values for demographic categories are percentages; values for PRA are means and standard deviations, as indicated. 
Data on kidney transplant waitlist composition from 7/1/2000 through 2/26/2010. SOURCE: UNOS STAR files. 
  
 
8
2
 
Table 2.2: Racial Inequality in Transplantation 
 RACIAL DISTRIBUTION RACIAL INEQUALITY COMPARISONS 
    Waitlist-ACS Transplant-Waitlist 
 Race ACS Waitlist Transplant Ratio Vs. Whites Ratio Vs. Whites 
White 66.8 51.5 57.4 0.771 -- 1.115 -- 
Black 12.0 26.8 22.9 2.230 2.891 0.857 0.768 
Hispanic 14.5 14.6 13.4 1.004 1.302 0.922 0.827 
API 4.3 5.3 4.4 1.215 1.575 0.842 0.755 
Other 2.4 1.9 1.8 0.798 1.035 0.938 0.841 
NOTE: „ACS‟ stands for American Community Survey, and reflects the individually weighted racial percentage distribution in the 
2001-2009 American Community Survey data, provided by IPUMS-USA. The „Waitlist‟ column is the percentage distribution of 
racial categories for persons entering the UNOS kidney transplant waitlist 2000-2010.  The „Transplant‟ column is the racial 
percentage distribution among those who received any kidney transplant in the 2000-2010 waitlist cohorts. In the racial inequality 
comparisons, the „Ratio‟ column is the ratio of the percentage makeup of the racial/ethnic group in question in the first listed category 
compared to the second, and the „Vs. Whites‟ column is the ratio of the ratio figure for that race compared to the same ratio for whites. 
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Table 2.3: Deceased Donor Kidney Allocation Offer Acceptance Model, 2000-2010 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Demographics 
+ Candidate-
Donor Match 
+ Candidate 
Health 
+ Donor 
Characteristic 
GENDER     
Male (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
Female 1.04 1.03 1.03 1.04 
RACE 
    
White (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
Black 1.14 1.51 1.48 1.49 
Hispanic 1.06 1.26 1.29 1.30 
Asian 1.19 1.64 1.61 1.58 
Other 1.07 1.38 1.42 1.39 
INSURANCE 
    
Private (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
Medicaid 1.16 1.20 1.19 1.17 
Medicare 1.11 1.12 1.09 1.09 
Other Government 1.01 1.01 0.98 0.96 
Self 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.94 
Other 1.04 1.03 1.13 1.09 
CITIZENSHIP 
    
US Citizen (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
Resident Alien 1.17 1.18 1.13 1.16 
Non-Res. Alien 0.93 1.02 0.98 1.05 
AGE 
    
0-17 (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
18-25 0.81 0.66 0.74 0.88 
26-35 0.82 0.67 0.77 0.94 
36-45 0.83 0.68 0.82 1.00 
46-55 0.85 0.71 0.86 1.05 
56-65 0.81 0.67 0.84 1.05 
66-75 0.74 0.62 0.78 0.99 
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76+ 0.67 0.56 0.65 0.89 
EDUCATION 
    
None (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
Grade School 1.21 1.19 1.10 1.16 
HS / GED 1.18 1.15 1.07 1.13 
Some College 1.11 1.08 1.02 1.08 
BA / Associates 1.09 1.07 1.01 1.07 
Post-Bacc. Degree 0.99 0.97 0.92 0.96 
Years on Waitlist 0.56 0.62 0.63 0.65 
PRA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
HLA MATCHES 
    
0 DR Matches (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
1 DR Match -- 1.87 1.88 1.79 
2 DR Matches -- 4.80 4.80 4.32 
0 B Matches (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
1 B Match -- 1.41 1.44 1.41 
2 B Matches -- 4.62 4.41 4.02 
0 A Matches (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
1 A Match -- 1.17 1.16 1.17 
2 A Matches -- 2.06 1.99 2.05 
ABO MATCH 
    
Identical (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
Compatible -- 0.64 0.64 0.66 
Not Compatible -- 0.80 0.79 0.78 
Candidate health controls? No No Yes Yes 
Donor characteristic controls? No No No Yes 
Intercept 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.10 
N 1,189,243 1,189,243 891,552 745,990 
Log Pseudolikelihood -162,199 -148,616 -111,577 -85,989 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.1196 0.1933 0.1942 0.2349 
 
NOTE: Observations in this analysis are each deceased donor kidney offer event. Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. Standard 
errors and statistical significance tests are omitted because these results are based on a census of deceased donor kidney transplant 
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offers 7/1/2000 through 2/26/2010. Smaller sample sizes in columns (3) and (4) reflect observation omissions due to listwise deletion 
for missing data. 
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Table 2.4: Observed and Simulated Outcomes by Race 
    Observed Data Simulation 
Percentage 
Difference 
Outcome Race 
Proportion 
Ratio vs. 
Whites 
Proportion 
Ratio vs. 
Whites 
Waiting List 
Outcomes 
     
Any 
Transplant White 0.362 -- 0.354 (0.350,0.358) -- -2.3 
  Black 0.305 0.843 0.288 (0.282,0.296) 0.805 -5.7 
  Hispanic 0.351 0.969 0.335 (0.317,0.344) 0.906 -4.6 
  Asian 0.315 0.871 0.278 (0.263,0.290) 0.751 -11.9 
  Other 0.334 0.922 0.327 (0.309,0.344) 0.882 -2.2 
DDKT White 0.242 -- 0.199 (0.196,0.203) -- -17.6 
  Black 0.250 1.032 0.230 (0.223,0.238) 1.141 -8.1 
  Hispanic 0.246 1.015 0.237 (0.222,0.249) 1.136 -3.5 
  Asian 0.231 0.954 0.202 (0.188,0.216) 0.962 -12.5 
  Other 0.250 1.032 0.246 (0.227,0.262) 1.161 -1.6 
LDKT White 0.120 -- 0.154 (0.152,0.157) -- 28.5 
  Black 0.056 0.462 0.058 (0.057,0.060) 0.372 5.1 
  Hispanic 0.105 0.877 0.098 (0.094,0.101) 0.617 -7.3 
  Asian 0.084 0.702 0.076 (0.070,0.083) 0.459 -10.1 
  Other 0.084 0.700 0.081 (0.073,0.090) 0.479 -3.8 
Waitlist 
Mortality White 0.179 -- 0.212 (0.209,0.215) -- 18.2 
  Black 0.232 1.294 0.246 (0.242,0.251) 1.156 6.3 
  Hispanic 0.187 1.045 0.210 (0.204,0.216) 0.976 12.1 
  Asian 0.158 0.881 0.190 (0.182,0.199) 0.870 20.7 
  Other 0.219 1.221 0.231 (0.217,0.246) 1.039 5.6 
Post-Transplant 
Outcomes 
     
Graft 
Failure White 0.190 -- 0.182 (0.177,0.187) -- -4.0 
 Black 0.262 1.379 0.235 (0.228,0.244) 1.286 -10.1 
 Hispanic 0.158 0.835 0.158 (0.149,0.169) 0.842 0.0 
 Asian 0.139 0.732 0.137 (0.120,0.152) 0.677 -1.7 
 Other 0.217 1.143 0.238 (0.206,0.271) 1.163 9.8 
Post-
Transplant 
Mortality White 0.120 -- 0.124 (0.120,0.128) -- 3.1 
 Black 0.115 0.957 0.108 (0.100,0.115) 0.837 -6.5 
 Hispanic 0.081 0.669 0.075 (0.069,0.082) 0.575 -6.4 
 Asian 0.073 0.607 0.075 (0.062,0.088) 0.517 2.9 
 Other 0.123 1.021 0.113 (0.091,0.141) 0.757 -7.9 
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NOTE: DDKT stands for deceased donor kidney transplant; LDKT stands for living 
donor kidney transplant. Percentage difference is the percentage by which the simulated 
proportions are different from the observed proportions. 
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Table 2.5: Counterfactual Effects 
    Any Kidney Transplant 
Race Counterfactual 
Proportion 
(90% Interval) 
% Effect 
White None (Baseline) 0.354 (0.350,0.358) -- 
 Genetics 0.342 (0.339,0.347) -- 
  Graft Failure 0.355 (0.351,0.359) -- 
  Living Donor 0.331 (0.327,0.334) -- 
  Mortality 0.355 (0.351,0.358) -- 
  Offer Acceptance 0.354 (0.350,0.358) -- 
 Residence 0.355 (0.352,0.360) -- 
  PRA 0.355 (0.352,0.358) -- 
Black None (Baseline) 0.288 (0.282,0.296) -- 
 Genetics 0.303 (0.298,0.311) 40.7 
  Graft Failure 0.290 (0.283,0.298) 1.5 
  Living Donor 0.336 (0.331,0.341) 108.0 
  Mortality 0.289 (0.284,0.296) 0.4 
  Offer Acceptance 0.288 (0.282,0.296) 0.2 
  Residence 0.281 (0.273,0.292) -12.5 
 PRA 0.298 (0.295,0.301) 14.3 
Hispanic None (Baseline) 0.335 (0.317,0.344) -- 
 Genetics 0.338 (0.323,0.350) 75.1 
  Graft Failure 0.335 (0.321,0.345) -1.4 
  Living Donor 0.341 (0.326,0.350) 154.5 
  Mortality 0.336 (0.315,0.346) 0.0 
  Offer Acceptance 0.335 (0.317,0.344) -0.4 
  Residence 0.334 (0.311,0.348) -11.7 
 PRA 0.309 (0.304,0.314) -141.9 
Asian None (Baseline) 0.278 (0.263,0.290) -- 
 Genetics 0.294 (0.281,0.306) 35.5 
  Graft Failure 0.279 (0.267,0.293) 0.1 
  Living Donor 0.315 (0.302,0.329) 78.9 
  Mortality 0.278 (0.265,0.291) -2.2 
  Offer Acceptance 0.278 (0.263,0.29) 0.1 
  Residence 0.287 (0.274,0.301) 10.0 
 PRA 0.283 (0.270,0.293) 5.6 
Other None (Baseline) 0.327 (0.309,0.344) -- 
 Genetics 0.334 (0.316,0.354) 67.9 
  Graft Failure 0.333 (0.316,0.352) 20.7 
  Living Donor 0.359 (0.342,0.378) 205.6 
  Mortality 0.327 (0.311,0.344) -3.4 
  Offer Acceptance 0.326 (0.308,0.344) -3.0 
  Residence 0.305 (0.278,0.329) -84.8 
 PRA 0.312 (0.301,0.329) -55.4 
NOTE: „% Effect‟ columns are the percentage of the gap in outcomes between the race in 
question and whites eliminated in the counterfactual baseline compared to the baseline 
simulation. 
  
 
 
 
Chapter Three: The Determinants of Educational Inequality in the Kidney 
Transplantation System 
Introduction 
A great deal of research in the social sciences, medicine, and public health is 
concerned with understanding the contours, causes, and consequences of the 
socioeconomic “gradient” in health outcomes in modern societies. Social conditions 
generally are often framed as “fundamental causes” of health outcomes (Link and Phelan 
1995) because of their role in structuring access to resources and exposures which 
influence health outcomes. While much research has addressed socioeconomic disparities 
in mortality and many major causes of ill health, outside of the medical literature 
relatively little attention has been paid in this literature to kidney disease and kidney 
transplantation (but see Shoham et al. 2008). To maintain the field‟s rapid progress (e.g., 
Harris 2010), research should increasingly investigate specific causes of ill-health and 
mortality to better understand the diversity of mechanisms linking socioeconomic status 
(SES) to differences in health and mortality. This is particularly important in light of 
evidence that the association of SES with different causes of death varies widely (e.g., 
Smith 2003). 
 Chronic kidney disease and end-stage renal disease pose a substantial and 
growing threat to population health, and are a site of significant racial, ethnic, gender, and 
socioeconomic disparities in morbidity. Focusing on those with end-stage renal disease 
(in which kidneys fail permanently), this is particularly confounding because, in the 
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United States, the Medicare End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) program provides 
insurance coverage to nearly all patients with ESRD, covering the costs of dialysis and all 
initial costs of transplantation, which is the preferred treatment modality. Although there 
are social differences in the process of medical approval for kidney transplantation 
(Epstein et al. 2000), once on the kidney transplant waiting list there should be no major 
financial constraints on one‟s access to kidney transplantation22. Despite this nearly 
universal insurance coverage for treatment of ESRD, however, socioeconomic disparities 
persist in the kidney transplantation system. The objective of this article is to assess the 
degree and proximate determinants of these socioeconomic disparities. 
  This goal is especially feasible in light of the high quality data available on the 
kidney transplantation system in the U.S. The United Network for Organ Sharing 
(UNOS), which administers the transplantation system under the aegis of the Department 
of Health and Human Services (DHHS), maintains a database of characteristics and 
outcomes of all kidney transplant candidates, recipients, and donors in the U.S. since 
October 1987. Furthermore, the rules by which deceased donor kidneys (DDKs) are 
allocated to transplant candidates are known and analytically reproducible. As such, the 
basic functioning of the kidney transplant system may be analytically reproduced and 
manipulated to better understand the major causes of socioeconomic inequalities in this 
important arena of health care and social inequalities. This analysis improves on previous 
analyses of similar questions by modeling the kidney transplant system in a manner 
which accounts for the interdependency of individual outcomes. By manipulating the 
                                                 
22
 However, if one pursues a living donor kidney transplant, one‟s potential donors may incur substantial 
costs since in most states the foregone wages and discomfort of living donors is not compensated. 
Furthermore, it may be that, given that Medicare covers only three years of immunosuppressant therapy, 
the future costs of pursuing transplantation may be viewed to be prohibitive. 
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distribution of major determinants of kidney transplantation outcomes, this analysis finds 
that educational differentials in kidney transplant outcomes are strongly influenced by 
group differences in place of residence, genetic distributions, mortality hazards, graft 
failure hazards, and odds of obtaining a living donor kidney transplant (LDKT). 
The Kidney Transplant System 
 Between 1988 and 2007, more than 420,000 organ transplants were performed in 
the United States with high and steadily improving rates of success. This is more 
impressive when one considers that the first effective immunosuppressant drug, 
cyclosporine, was not approved by the FDA until 1984. In the last thirty years, organ 
transplantation has shifted from an experimental and very risky procedure to become the 
therapy of choice for a range of ailments, resulting in numerous improved and extended 
lives. 
Since 1984, in the United States organ allocation decisions have been entrusted 
the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) by the U.S. government, which has done 
so by dividing the task among 11 subsidiary administrative regions. Within these regions 
subsidiary organizations known as Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs) collect and 
allocate organs for transplantation according to national rules, with local variations. 
Using these administrative subdivisions, UNOS allocates organs guided by two 
principles: efficiency and justice. Efficiency means that they endeavor to save as many 
lives as possible by matching donated organs to those who are likely to best benefit from 
them. Justice means that this should be done in a manner broadly perceived to be fair to 
the individuals awaiting organs. The exact process by which organs are awarded to 
individuals who need them has changed over the years (and varies by organ) in an 
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attempt to better balance these two principles, and has for some time been implemented 
by a computer system which maximizes some function of medical, biological, and 
geographic factors to make this decision. 
Human Immunology and Kidney Transplantation 
The kidney allocation system is constructed at the intersection of medical and 
political considerations in UNOS‟s attempt to balance the efficiency and equity 
imperatives of their mission. Three key factors in the allocation system – ABO, HLA, 
and PRA – are based on the rapid advances of the field of human immunology during the 
20
th
 century. These advances merit some brief discussion to provide context to the kidney 
allocation system (see Leffell et al. 1997; Morris 2001). 
Antigens and Histocompatibility. The purpose of the immune system is to protect 
the host by attacking foreign cells, viruses, and particulates. The primary means by which 
this is done is through the presentation and scanning of antigens, proteins on the surface 
of cells which vary widely between members of the same species. Cells displaying 
antigens which do not contradict those presented by host cells are deemed 
„histocompatible‟ and provoke no immune response; cells displaying contradictory 
antigens trigger an immune response. 
In kidney transplantation two types of histocompatibility are crucial: ABO and 
HLA histocompatibility.  ABO structures the combination of antigens presented on the 
outside of red blood cells. There are three alleles at this locus which produce one of four 
phenotypes through a codominance/recessive pattern: A, B, AB, and O. The A and B 
alleles are codominant and the O allele is recessive. 
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Leukocyte histocompatibility is similarly governed by the human leukocyte 
antigen (HLA) genes: among others, HLA-A, HLA-B, and HLA-DR. The considerable 
degree of polymorphism at these loci means that odds of histocompatibility with an 
unrelated individual are generally very small. As with ABO, there are a number of alleles 
at each locus which produce antigens which are „serologically equivalent‟ and therefore 
histocompatible
23
. In other words, two different cells displaying antigens governed by 
different alleles may be immunologically indistinguishable. 
 Sensitization. In addition to ABO and HLA histocompatibility, the transplant 
recipient‟s set of antibodies play a major role in the immunology of kidney 
transplantation. If the recipient has previously been exposed to one of the donor‟s non-
histocompatible antigens, they may be presensitized to it, meaning that their body 
produces antibodies designed to target cells displaying these antigens. Presensitization 
occurs through one of three primary mechanisms: 1) pregnancy, 2) blood transfusions, 
and 3) previous transplants (Leffell et al. 1997). Immunological reactions to foreign cells 
to which the host is presensitized are far more rapid and severe than responses to cells to 
which they are not presensitized.  
 There are two common measures of immunological sensitization used in kidney 
transplantation. One, called the Panel Reactive Antibody (PRA) score, is a measure of the 
probability that one has produced antibodies to a random human‟s antigens. Those with 
high PRA scores are among the most difficult to match to a suitable kidney. If one‟s 
blood immediately reacts to a potential donor‟s, this pair is said to be „positively 
                                                 
23
 Although research on this topic is ongoing, the current UNOS list of HLA serological equivalencies, 
summarized in Appendix 3A to UNOS policy 3, approved in September 2007, is used as the authoritative 
list.  This is available for inspection at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/policiesAndBylaws/policies.asp.  
Accessed 8/21/2010. 
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crossmatched,‟ meaning that the candidate is presensitized to the donor‟s antigens. In 
such cases the transplant is generally not conducted. 
The Kidney Allocation System 
 Figure 1 depicts the current (as of 9/15/09) UNOS standard (high quality) 
cadaveric kidney allocation procedure for organ donors age 35 and older. Similar 
procedures are used for younger donors. This allocation formula does not depict 
subnational variation in allocative procedures due to space limitations. “Expanded 
criteria” donor (ECD, kidneys donated by those who are older or less healthy than those 
typically accepted) organs are allocated on a similar basis, but without prioritization of 
pediatric patients or high-PRA patients. 
 In the current national allocation system, transplant candidates‟ prioritizations are 
organized into four tiers. In each tier, higher ranking in higher tiers (depicted on the left 
of Figure 1) take precedence over higher rankings in lower tiers. With some exceptions, 
one‟s priority ranking fundamentally depends on the joint properties of each potential 
donor-candidate match. 
 In the present allocation system perfect HLA matches are given the highest 
priority as they are associated with superior post-transplant outcomes (Morris 2001). 
Second, those who have previously served as living kidney donors are given priority, 
followed by matches between candidates and donors between whose OPOs a debtor-
creditor relationship has been previously established. Afterward geography is the primary 
determinant in the first tier, such that DDKs from a given OPO are allocated first to 
others in the OPO, followed by others in the same region, and finally based on national 
priority. 
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 The second priority tier emphasizes ABO compatibility between the donor and 
candidate. Those with the same blood type are prioritized, followed by pairs involving 
candidates with a B blood type and donors with an O blood type. Finally, mere ABO 
compatibility is given the lowest priority. Candidate-donor pairs which are not ABO 
histocompatible are rarely awarded transplants. 
 The third priority tier ranks candidates based on their age and PRA. First, 
candidates in the highest PRA category (80-100%) are prioritized. Second, pediatric 
patients are prioritized over adults, and within these categories additional priority given 
to those with elevated PRA scores (21-79%). Finally, the fourth tier of the allocation 
algorithm distinguishes between otherwise similar patients. First, HLA-DR matches are 
awarded one point apiece
24
. Second, pediatric candidates are awarded priority, especially 
when the donor is younger than 35. Finally, conditional on these factors candidates are 
prioritized based on their waiting time such that one point is awarded for each year on the 
waitlist, plus an OPO-specific waiting time tiebreaker.  
Socioeconomic Inequalities in Kidney Disease and Transplantation 
 The development of kidney disease and the process of kidney transplantation are 
multistage processes, and socioeconomic disparities may arise at each stage. First, a 
member of the population may develop chronic kidney disease (CKD). Second, chronic 
kidney disease may progress into ESRD. Third, those with ESRD may seek treatment 
with dialysis, kidney transplantation, or both. Fourth, those who seek a kidney transplant 
may or may not be referred to a nephrologist for transplant evaluation, may or may not be 
                                                 
24
 Previously, HLA-A and –B matches were awarded points as well, but with the increasing potency of 
immunosuppressive regimes these prioritizations have been eliminated in the allocation algorithm except in 
the case of perfect HLA matching across HLA-A, -B, and –DR loci. HLA-DR matching is still prioritized 
because, unlike HLA-A and –B, with modern immunosuppressant drugs matching at this locus is still 
associated with substantially improved post-transplant outcomes. 
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deemed a suitable candidate for transplantation, and if deemed suitable for transplant may 
or may not successfully enroll on the kidney transplant waiting list. Among those on the 
kidney transplant waiting list, some individuals will obtain a kidney transplant (from 
either a deceased or living donor), while others will die before this occurs. Finally, 
among patients obtaining a kidney transplant, some will experience graft failure (better 
known as organ rejection), in which case they may or may not re-enroll on the kidney 
transplantation waiting list, and still others will die from a rejection episode or from 
unrelated causes. Social inequalities can potentially arise at any of these stages; indeed, 
there is evidence that they do so at all of them. 
Chronic Kidney Disease and End-Stage Renal Disease Development 
 Chronic kidney disease is typically measured as low estimated glomerular 
filtration rates or else by albuminuria. CKD is strongly related to increasingly prevalent 
health conditions such as diabetes mellitus, hypertension, and overweight. ESRD occurs 
when one‟s kidneys permanently fail to function. Studies of the development of CKD and 
ESRD uniformly find that socioeconomic status, variously measured, is inversely related 
to these outcomes (Shoham et al. 2008; Ward 2008; Young et al. 1994).  
Transplant Evaluation and Waiting List Enrollment 
 A number of studies find that ESRD patients from lower SES backgrounds are 
less likely to successfully enroll in the kidney transplant waiting list (Patzer et al. 2009; 
Schaeffner et al. 2008; Schold et al. 2011; Winkelmayer et al. 2001). Perhaps most 
revealing is a study (Furth et al. 2003) which used a vignette nephrologist survey design. 
Comparing children with identical medical conditions, nephrologists in the survey were 
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48% more likely to recommend transplantation for children of college educated parents 
than children whose parents did not finish high school. 
 Furthermore, socioeconomic differences in the timing of waitlisting are 
consistently observed. Shorter times on dialysis, preferably none at all, are associated 
with improved post-transplant outcomes, and patients with college or postgraduate 
educations are significantly more likely to enroll „preemptively‟ without initiating 
dialysis first (Keith et al. 2008). Additionally, UNOS permits enrollment in whichever, 
and as many, local kidney transplant waiting lists one desires. Patients from higher SES 
backgrounds are significantly more likely to do both (Axelrod et al. 2010; Merion et al. 
2004). 
Obtaining a Kidney Transplant 
 Research on the association of socioeconomic status with one‟s odds of obtaining 
a kidney transplant is relatively sparse compared to other fields of research, perhaps due 
to the lack of a full range of SES measures in the UNOS administrative dataset. However, 
evidence suggests that SES is associated with significantly improved odds of obtaining a 
kidney transplant (Axelrod et al. 2010; Gaylin et al. 1993; Ozminkowski et al. 1998). 
Ozminkowski and colleagues (Ozminkowski et al. 1998) found that the effect of SES on 
kidney transplant outcomes is sufficiently large that eliminating this effect would shift 
30-65 transplants from higher to lower SES patients. Axelrod and colleagues (Axelrod et 
al. 2010) found that a significant component of the SES advantage in kidney 
transplantation occurs in living donor kidney transplants (LDKTs), for which patients in 
the highest SES quartile have a 76% higher likelihood compared to the lowest SES 
quartile. 
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Post-Transplant Outcomes 
 After one receives a kidney transplant one is subject to hazards of graft failure and 
death, the latter due either to kidney disease or unrelated causes. Higher socioeconomic 
status is associated with lower hazards of graft failure (Goldfarb-Rumyantzev et al. 2006; 
Stephens et al. 2010) and patient mortality (Axelrod et al. 2010; Goldfarb-Rumyantzev et 
al. 2006). This may be explained by the negative association of SES immunosuppressant 
adherence (Garg et al. 1999; Gordon et al. 2008). Additionally, higher SES is associated 
with shorter times on dialysis pre-transplantation (Kasiske et al. 1998; Keith et al. 2008) 
and higher odds of LDKT, both of which are associated with improved post-
transplantation outcomes. 
Limitations of this Literature 
 Research on socioeconomic disparities in kidney transplantation has been 
hampered by a failure to account for the dependencies of this process. First, in the context 
of a shortage of deceased donor kidneys for transplantation, individual prospects for 
transplantation are inherently interdependent, violating the assumptions of all regression-
based analytical techniques used in most research on this topic (Lee and Wang 2003). 
Furthermore, at both the waiting list and post-transplant stages of the kidney transplant 
process, patients are subject to competing risks – while on the waiting list, of LDKT, 
DDKT, and death; post-transplantation, of graft failure and death – which also violate the 
assumption of standard survival modeling strategies.  
 Finally, standard regression analysis techniques generally treat survival times as a 
black-box process whose timing is associated with a range of time-variant and –invariant 
covariates. While this may be the best that can be expected in many cases, in the case of 
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kidney transplantation it is far more informative (and uniquely feasible) to model this 
process directly to understand the role of different factors in the allocation algorithm and 
kidney transplant system. 
Data and Methods 
United Network for Organ Sharing STAR Files  
Since 1987, the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) has collected detailed 
information on every organ transplant recipient, donor, and candidate in the U.S., 
containing information on the demographic, socioeconomic, medical status, laboratory, 
and medical treatment characteristics of each such person. Importantly, all ESRD patients 
are required to enroll in the kidney transplant waitlist, even if they have already identified 
a living donor. Therefore this database contains information on all legal transplant 
candidates and donors in the U.S. since 1987. Due to limitations in the availability of key 
data, the present analysis employs only transplant candidates enrolled in the KT waitlist 
on 7/1/2000 and all candidates and donors who entered the system subsequently. 
Additional KT candidate enrollments after 7/1/2000 were not included in the analytical 
dataset. 
When each candidate is added to the kidney transplant waitlist, demographic 
(gender, area of residence, race/ethnicity, citizenship, education, age, etc.), medical, and 
laboratory information is collected on the patient. While the form permits multiple race 
categories to be entered, in the UNOS STAR file race information is coded exclusively in 
the following categories: white, black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, Pacific 
Islander, and multiracial. These categories were recoded into non-Hispanic white, non-
Hispanic black, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, and „other‟ categories. Education is 
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measured in the following categories: none, some but no high school diploma, high 
school diploma or equivalent, college attendance but no college degree, baccalaureate or 
associate‟s degree, and post-graduate education. ABO and HLA typing and PRA are 
calculated at the center at which the patient is evaluated. Information on the insurance 
coverage, U.S. citizenship status, educational attainment, date of waitlist enrollment, and 
a wealth of health status measures were collected for all candidates. 
Candidate outcomes are recorded for each of the major outcomes which can 
occur, along with the dates at which this occurred: DDKT, LDKT, mortality, and graft 
failure (kidney rejection). Information on the HLA and ABO genotypes, race, gender, 
date and cause of death (if applicable) and relationship with the donor (if applicable) 
were recorded for all deceased and living donors who entered the system during this time, 
along with a wealth of medical status and history information. 
Missing data in this dataset were addressed by imputation using hotdeck 
imputation methods based on patient age, ethnicity, gender, and education (e.g., Allison 
2001; Reilly 1993). In hotdeck imputation, discrete groups are assigned to each 
observation (here, the demographic attributes just described), then non-missing values for 
the missing variables are drawn at random from other members of that group, 
proportionate to their representation in that subpopulation. Hotdeck imputation methods 
are widely used by government agencies such as the Census. Although multiple 
imputation and direct maximum likelihood methods are generally preferable, the very 
large size of the datasets involved and the low rates of missingness of key variables made 
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hotdecking, which is a computationally more efficient imputation method, an attractive 
option for this study
25
.  
Methods 
As described above, analyzing the major determinants of socioeconomic 
inequalities in KT poses a number of analytical challenges which render most standard 
regression-based analysis approaches inadequate. Rather than a mere list of analytical 
difficulties, however, these characteristics of the KT system provide an opportunity. 
Crucially, the process by which deceased donors and transplant candidates are linked is 
publicly available and algorithmic in nature, meaning that it can be computationally 
reproduced. While this advantage does not apply to other key outcomes (LDKT, 
mortality, graft failure, and kidney offer acceptance), these outcomes can be simply 
analyzed in a manner which captures group-specific risks of different outcomes at each 
stage of the KT process. To account for these characteristics of the KT system, 
simulation-based methods will be used in this study. The goals of this analysis are 
twofold: first, to reproduce the basic functioning of the KT system; and second, to 
understand the degree to which different proximate determinants of KT outcomes are 
primarily responsible for socioeconomic inequalities in the KT system. 
The Kidney Transplantation Simulation 
 The design of the simulation employed in this study is depicted in Figure 2. First, 
the initial waiting list is established. All transplant candidates who were on the waiting 
                                                 
25
 Rates of missingness were generally low, and nearly nonexistent for demographic variables. The average 
rate of missingness for the HLA genes, however, was 6.4%, but nearly all participants had at least one valid 
such measure per locus. Missing genetic data were not imputed; instead, following UNOS procedure in 
such cases, such persons were assumed to be homozygous at that locus. Two additional key variables had 
non-trivial rates of missingness in the dataset – OPO (29.1%) and PRA (58.7%). However, no cases were 
missing regional affiliation or key outcomes. 
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list on July 1, 2000 are included on the baseline waiting list. Once the waiting list is 
established for this date, the dynamics thereof are simulated in 90-day increments
26
 
through January 1, 2010, adding unique candidates as they joined the waiting list for the 
first time in this time window. 
Once on the waiting list one may exit it in one of three ways – death, DDKT, or 
LDKT. Hazards of waiting list mortality are estimated separately for each race- and 
education-specific group for each 90-day time period through approximately the first 
three years
27
 of waiting list time using life table techniques. Hazards thereof for the 
fourth and fifth years on the waiting list are estimated by calculating the race- and 
education-specific hazards pooled over those years of waiting list time, as are hazards for 
time periods beyond the fifth year. Hazards of obtaining an LDKT are identically 
calculated. Those simulated to die are eliminated from the simulation, whereas those 
simulated to obtain an LDKT are moved to the post-transplant stage. 
Third, one may exit the waiting list by obtaining a DDKT. These events are 
simulated by reproducing the functioning of the kidney allocation system as described 
above. The priority rankings of each KT candidate for each kidney are converted to 
allocation scores in which higher values represent higher priorities. Payback credit 
obligations and prior living donor statuses are not accounted for in this simulation, nor 
are subnational variations in the allocation system or the specific rules for ECD kidneys. 
An additional limitation of this analysis is that the allocation algorithm simulated here – 
                                                 
26
 Although 90-day increments are somewhat arbitrary, given the computational intensity of this research 
design, a coarsening procedure was necessary in the interests of computationally feasibility. 
27
 Since hazards are modeled in 90-day increments, four such periods add up to only 360 days, not 365. 
„Year‟ is used as a linguistically convenient term for 360 day periods for the duration of this paper. Years 3, 
4, and ≥5 are analyzed jointly because a) similar hazards applied during these time spans and b) to ensure 
sufficient observations for stable estimates. 
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as such, the results of this simulation may be interpreted as the determinants of 
inequalities if the present national allocation system had been used since 2000. 
The result of this procedure is a candidate-by-donor matrix of allocation priority 
scores. The rows of this matrix represent each of the transplant candidates simulated to be 
awaiting a transplant, and the columns represent each of the DDKs which were 
transplanted during this 90-day time period. DDKs are „offered‟ sequentially to KT 
candidates in order of their priority scores among those who have been simulated to 
accept the offer if received. 
Probabilities of offer acceptance are estimated using a logistic regression 
procedure, as a function of KT candidate and donor characteristics as well as their ABO 
and HLA histocompatibilities. The regression coefficients are multiplied by the relevant 
candidate and donor characteristics and candidate-donor histocompatibilities, and then 
converted to predicted probabilities of offer acceptance. These predicted probabilities are 
then compared to a random uniformly distributed variable to generate acceptance 
outcomes. Once this procedure has been completed, the probability of HLA positive 
crossmatch is estimated as  
                                                           (  )     (
     
 
)                                             (1) 
where XM is a positive crossmatch, PRA is the panel reactive antibody score for that 
patient, and Mik is the number of HLA matches for that candidate-donor pair. The second 
term adjusts the PRA value using the proportion of non-equivalent HLA alleles for that 
candidate-donor combination. Transplant candidates simulated to be presensitized to the 
donor are not offered the DDK. 
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 Among the candidates simulated to accept the transplant conditional on being 
offered and who are not simulated to be positively crossmatched with the donor, the 
kidney is awarded to the patient with the highest priority score for that kidney. Those 
candidates simulated to receive a DDKT through this procedure are moved to the post-
transplant condition within the simulation.  
 Once one has received a transplant, one may exit the post-transplant condition 
through one of two ways – death and graft failure. Hazards of both outcomes are 
estimated as described above for waiting list mortality. Those who die exit the 
simulation, but those who experience graft failure may or may not return to the waiting 
list to seek another transplant. The probability of re-waitlisting was estimated using 
logistic regression techniques (results not shown), and post-transplant persons are, 
conditional on experiencing graft failure, returned to the waiting list proportionally the 
resultant predicted probabilities. 
This simulation is repeated for each of the counterfactual conditions described 
above – equalizing place of residence, probabilities of DDKT offer acceptance, mortality 
hazards, living donor hazards, graft failure hazards, PRA, and ABO/HLA values. The 
effects of these counterfactual conditions are then calculated as 
                                               
( ̅    ̅  )  ( ̅    ̅  )
( ̅    ̅  )
                                          ( ) 
where  ̅   represents the mean outcome for the reference education category (high 
school education) in the baseline simulation;  ̅   represents the mean outcome for 
another educational group in the baseline simulation;  ̅   represents the mean outcome 
for the reference education group in the counterfactual condition C; and     may be 
interpreted as the percentage of the gap between group O and the reference education 
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group for this outcome „explained‟ by equalizing the factor C. In other words,     is the 
estimated percentage of the gap between this group and the reference education group 
which would not be observed if there were no educational differences in the 
counterfactual variable C. 
Results 
Educational Inequalities in Outcomes over Time 
Figure 3 shows educational patterns of transplantation outcomes over time by 
yearly cohorts on the kidney transplant waiting list. In each panel, the risk ratio of the 
indicated educational group for deceased donor and living donor kidney transplants is 
shown relative to those with post-graduate educational attainments for the waiting list 
cohort in question. A consistent pattern is observed – rates of LDKT are substantially 
higher for higher educated groups, and rates of DDKT are substantially higher for lower 
educated groups. While there are cohort fluctuations in this relationship, this pattern has 
been relatively stable over time. 
 Although one might characterize this as socioeconomic equality through 
divergent mechanisms, this pattern of transplantation outcomes is a substantial source of 
advantage for better educated transplant candidates. One typically has to wait for less 
time for an LDKT than for a DDKT, and LDKTs are associated with improved post-
transplant outcomes compared to DDKTs. Although these divergent patterns result in 
similar rates of transplantation, not all transplants yield equal benefit, and higher 
educated persons are disproportionately obtaining the preferred type of transplant. 
 Figure 4 shows patterns, identically calculated, of mortality and post-transplant 
graft failure outcomes. Mortality outcomes on the waiting list and post-transplant are 
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combined for this figure. This figure reveals an additional source of socioeconomic 
advantage in the kidney transplantation system – higher educated persons generally have 
lower hazards of mortality and graft failure than do their lower educated peers. Although 
this relationship is subject to considerably greater yearly fluctuations than those for 
transplantation
28
, the overall pattern suggests that the lower mortality and graft failure 
rates of higher educated persons are a source of substantial advantage among those in the 
ESRD population. 
Kidney Transplant Waiting List Demographic Composition 
 Table 1 presents the distribution of hotdeck imputed demographic and PRA 
characteristics of the kidney transplantation waiting list by educational attainment
29
. As 
can be seen, males, older persons, and African Americans are substantially 
overrepresented on the kidney transplant waiting list. Racial patterns of educational 
attainment are largely preserved, with whites and Asians composing a larger proportional 
share of the better educated groups than do black and Hispanic patients. Finally, a stark, 
inverted-U relationship is observed between educational attainment and PRA scores, such 
that those with high school or equivalent educational levels have the highest average 
PRA values while those in the no and the maximum education have the lowest average 
PRA values. 
 These patterns suggest two major demographic sources of advantage for better 
educated persons in the kidney transplant system. First, whites are more likely to be 
                                                 
28
 The sharp upticks in graft failure risk ratios in the final year of the graph likely reflect educational 
differences in rates of acute rejection, which generally happens much more quickly than chronic rejection 
episodes post-transplantation. This difference should be interpreted in light of the very short followup time 
observed for patients entering the kidney transplant waiting list in 2009. 
29
 A few of the age-education intersections in this table are unlikely, such as the small percentage of 0-17 
year olds shown to have a college degree. These differences are the result of the hotdeck procedure. 
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better educated in this subpopulation as in the general population, and whites have a 
higher average probability of favorable HLA and ABO matching in the DDKT system 
(Daw 2011). Second, because of their lower average PRA scores better educated persons 
are less likely to positively crossmatch with potential DDKT or LDKT donors, which 
would generally preclude transplantation. 
Deceased Donor Kidney Offer Acceptance Model 
 For various reasons most DDKT offers are not accepted by the designated 
recipient. Furthermore, the probability that such an offer will be accepted varies 
substantially by the characteristics of the transplant candidate, the histocompatibility 
between the donor and candidate, the candidate‟s health, and the medical history of the 
deceased donor. Table 2 presents the result of a logistic regression model of offer 
acceptance behaviors, the results of an analysis of every DDK offer made to candidates 
between 7/1/2000 and 2/26/2010. The results of this analysis are presented in four 
different models. Model 1 presents the results of an analysis conditional on the 
characteristics of transplant candidates only; Model 2 adds controls for candidate-donor 
histocompatibility; Model 3 also controls for indicators of candidate health; and Model 4 
adds controls for the deceased donor‟s characteristics. 
 The results of this analysis show that lower educated persons are typically more 
likely to accept a DDK offer than are better educated candidates. Those with some 
schooling but no high school diploma are the most likely to accept an offer, followed by 
those with a high school diploma, some college, a bachelor‟s or associate‟s degree, no 
education, and those with a post-graduate degree. These differences are partially 
mediated by the distribution of ABO and HLA matches – group differences are reduced 
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overall in this model, though the post-baccalaureate differentials is slightly increased. 
Adding controls for candidate health substantially reduce these differences, as well, 
although these once again accentuate the difference between those with post-
baccalaureate degrees compared to those with no education. Finally, the results of Model 
4 reveal that group differences in DDK characteristics partially suppress these 
differences. 
 Although the lower average health status of lower educated patients partially 
mediate this difference, transplant candidates differ substantially in their odds of 
accepting a DDK offer, such that those with the highest educational attainment are the 
least likely to accept an offer, followed by those with no education, those with bachelor‟s 
or associate‟s degrees, some college, a high school diploma or equivalent, and those with 
some education but no high school diploma. These findings have at least two important 
implications for the present analysis. First, in terms of one‟s odds of getting a DDKT 
while on the waitlist, this suggests that offer acceptance probabilities are a source of 
advantage for less educated patients on the kidney transplantation waiting list. Second, 
however, these results may indicate that worse educated persons are less selective in the 
DDKT offers they are willing to accept, perhaps because of their worse overall health 
condition on average compared to their higher educated counterparts. 
Baseline Simulation Results 
  Table 3 compares the proportions of different transplantation outcomes in 
members of three different educational groupings (high school or equivalent, some 
college, and those with a college degree or higher), comparing the observed data to the 
simulated outcomes per waiting list or post-transplant spell. (Those with no education or 
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less than high school education are omitted because of the confounding of age with 
education, which masks the socioeconomic gradient in outcomes.)  The proportion in 
each group observed and simulated to have each outcome is listed, as well as the risk 
ratio of that outcome compared to the BA+ category in both the simulation and the 
observed data. Finally, the percentage by which that group‟s outcome is under or 
overestimated is listed for each outcome and grouping. 
The model does have some limitations. First, overall rates of transplantation are 
underestimated, driven largely by substantially lower rates of DDKTs in the high school 
and above education categories. Second and relatedly, rates of waiting list mortality are 
overestimated for all groups, and post-transplant mortality rates are relatively imprecise 
for the bachelor‟s degree and post-bachelor‟s educational categories. 
Although imperfect, the simulation model does capture educational differences in 
waiting list outcomes. As in the observed data, those with some college experience or a 
four-year degree are slightly comparably likely as those with a high school education 
only to obtain any kidney transplant, somewhat less likely to obtain a DDKT, and 
substantially more likely to obtain an LDKT. Similarly, rates of mortality for these 
groups are lower than for those with only high school educations, both while on the 
waiting list and post-transplant. Finally, group differences in post-transplant outcomes are 
relatively well captured, with the exception of the bachelor‟s-high school comparison for 
post-transplant mortality 
However, some differences in outcomes are to be expected in the simulation 
compared to the observed data. First, the simulation uses only the national allocation 
scheme, ignoring subnational variations. To the degree that these subnational variations 
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in the allocation scheme shuttle kidneys to members of different racial groups within 
educational categories (which is the purpose of some of these programs), educational 
differences in the odds of post-transplant outcomes will be biased. Second, differences in 
the observed data versus the simulation in one area will influence others. For instance, the 
overestimation of waitlist mortality may be the direct result of the underestimation of 
DDKT rates in these educational strata, which may be the result of the failure of the 
simulation to account for subnational variations in the DDK allocation algorithm. Future 
research will attempt to ameliorate these discrepancies between the observed and 
simulated outcomes.  
However, by and large the baseline simulation does capture group differences in 
major kidney transplantation outcomes, and differences in the counterfactual effects of 
different proximate determinants of these outcomes should still prove informative. 
Counterfactual Effects 
 The counterfactual estimates calculate the percentage of the educational 
inequalities in kidney transplant outcomes explained by equalizing different proximate 
determinants of kidney transplantation outcomes (Table 4). Seven different 
counterfactuals are considered – genetics (ABO and HLA distributions), graft failure 
hazards, living donor hazards, mortality hazards, probabilities of offer acceptance, PRA, 
and place of residence. 
 The results show that educational differences in hazards of LDKT, place of 
residence, and PRA are the major causes of socioeconomic differences in transplantation 
rates. All else equal, equalizing LDKT hazards results in a substantial increase in 
educational disparities in outcomes, as lower educated persons are disadvantaged in this 
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outcome compared to other groups. Similarly, equalizing genetic distributions would 
increase approximately the gap between the lowest educated and higher educated groups 
by 18% (some college), 36% (four-year degree), and 26% (post-baccalaureate degree), 
showing that those in higher educated strata are advantaged by the inclusion of these 
factors in the kidney allocation system.  
 By comparison, higher educated groups are disadvantaged by their places of 
residence and lower average PRA scores. Equalizing the distribution of OPO 
memberships by education would result in a 47% (some college), 95% (four-year 
degree), and 107% (post-baccalaureate) reduction in simulated outcomes compared to the 
high school only education group. Even larger effects are observed for PRA scores, the 
equalization of which would result in a reversal of educational differences in transplant 
outcomes for those with a college degree or higher, and a substantial amelioration (80%) 
for those with some college experience. Although this finding is counterintuitive in light 
of the lower average PRA scores of higher educated persons, it should be kept in mind 
that in the simulation model the effect of PRA scores interact with the degree of HLA 
match degree between donor-candidate pairs, so the effects of this equalization are not 
straightforwardly interpretable. 
Discussion 
 Chronic kidney disease and end-stage renal disease are large and increasing 
sources of ill-health in American society and an increasing site of socioeconomic 
inequalities in health. Although a great deal of attention has been paid to socioeconomic 
gradients in health in a wide variety of outcomes, kidney disease has received relatively 
little attention (Shoham et al. 2008). A major downstream process associated with the 
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increasing prevalence of CKD and ESRD is the increasing pressures in the kidney 
transplantation system. The present study investigates the nature and proximate 
determinants of socioeconomic inequalities in this system. 
In terms of whether one obtains a kidney transplant, socioeconomic inequalities in 
this system are small – a transplant candidate with a college degree or higher is only 
about 5% more likely to obtain a transplant than someone with only a high school 
diploma. Yet transplant candidates with different levels of education have highly 
divergent experiences in the kidney transplantation system, and these differences have 
large implications for the degree of suffering and risk of further ill health and mortality to 
which participants in this system are subject. Those with higher educational attainments 
have slightly higher rates of transplantation compared to their less educated counterparts, 
are more likely to obtain an LDKT, substantially less likely to obtain a DDKT, and less 
likely to die or experience graft failure while in the kidney transplantation system. 
Educational differences in transplantation outcomes are marked by divergent sources of 
advantage and disadvantage for each educational group.  The higher rates of LDKT for 
higher educated persons are a major source of advantage for these groups, as is their 
greater average genetic similarity to the DDKT donor pool. However, lower educated 
persons generally live in areas with shorter waiting times, and equalizing PRA scores 
result in advantages for lower educated persons in this kidney transplantation system. 
 These findings suggest future directions for the literature on socioeconomic 
inequalities in health generally. First, the absence of large disparities in the end result of a 
health process does not mean that SES is irrelevant for that health outcome. In the case of 
kidney transplantation, the differences in the odds of obtaining a kidney transplant are 
 113 
 
comparatively minor, but higher educated and lower educated patients reach this result 
with very different processes. Second, these findings highlight the fact that health is not 
an indivisible thing with respect to socioeconomic status. Even restricting our view to 
kidney disease alone, SES disparities in the development of CKD are far larger than those 
associated with kidney transplant outcomes once one joins the waiting list. 
 Third, this research highlights the likelihood that there is no uniform set of 
mechanisms linking socioeconomic status to health. Although I agree with others (e.g., 
Adler and Rehkopf 2008) that identifying these mechanisms are an important challenge 
facing this literature, it is unlikely that the mechanisms of inequality identified in this 
research – particularly, geography and histocompatibility genes – mediate other SES-
health relationships. Instead of looking for a single set of mediators, we should 
investigate the diversity of mechanisms linking SES and other measures of social position 
with health outcomes. 
 Of course, the ability of this study to capture the major mechanisms of 
socioeconomic inequality in kidney transplant outcomes is unlikely to be universally 
available to studies of other health inequality processes. A major advantage of this study 
was the availability of high quality data on all participants in a relatively closed system in 
which the proximate determinants of outcomes were relatively well-defined. Although 
researchers should continue to seek out such opportunities, the quality of data and 
information on the kidney transplantation system is unlikely to be found in most areas of 
health research. 
 Like all studies, the findings of this investigation raise additional questions. This 
analysis did not account for the role of multiple waitlisting, family financial hardships 
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post-transplantation, preemptive waitlisting, family and social network dynamics and 
characteristics, local waiting list dynamics and transplant center position in the kidney 
exchange network, the process of DDKT offer acceptance, and other likely mechanisms 
of social inequalities in sub-processes within the kidney transplant system. Future 
research should continue to investigate the contributions of these factors to the disparities 
in waiting list and post-transplant outcomes documented here. 
 A key goal of this analysis was to maintain maximum simplicity in the simulation 
of the kidney transplant system. However, viewed in another light the simplicity of the 
model is also a limitation. For instance, demographic variation in mortality, graft failure, 
and LDKT besides those associated with the intersections of race and education are not 
accounted for in this analysis. Similarly, the role of OPO paybacks and debts and rates of 
previous living donation – both key factors in the kidney allocation algorithm – are not 
accounted for in this analysis. Future research should seek to incorporate these additional 
processes into studies of the kidney transplantation system. 
 Finally, although the simulation models presented in this paper capture 
socioeconomic inequalities in the kidney transplant system reasonably well, they are not 
perfect. Future research should seek to fine tune this model to better represent the system 
and its dynamics. In conclusion, this study documents the degree and proximate 
determinants of educational inequalities in the kidney transplant system between 2000 
and 2010. The results indicate that while group differences in receipt of any kidney 
transplant are small, differences in the means by which members of different groups 
obtain this result are large. Higher educated persons in this system are advantaged by 
their greater odds of obtaining a living donor kidney transplant and their higher 
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probability of genetic matching with the deceased kidney donor pool. In contrast, lower 
educated persons are advantaged primarily by their residential geography and the effect 
of immunological sensitivities. Future research on kidney transplantation can further the 
contributions of this study by accounting fully for the systemic nature of kidney 
transplantation. 
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 3.1: Deceased Donor Kidney Allocation National Algorithm, 2003-Present 
 
NOTE: This figure represents the national kidney allocation priority algorithm since 
2003. This does not represent local variations in allocation policy. Read left to right, each 
subsequent level reflects priorities within categories of the columns to the left, and 
categories closer to the top (for the first three levels) are higher priorities. 
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Figure 3.2: Simulation Design 
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Figure 3.3: Trends in Educational Inequality in Transplantation Outcomes, 1990-
2009 
 
NOTE: Figures plotted are the risk ratio of the indicated educational group to that of 
those with post-graduate degrees for the outcome in question. Years indicate the year 
individuals joined the kidney transplant waitlist. Those joining the waitlist in 1990 or 
earlier are collapsed into the first (1999) category. Those joining in 2010 are omitted.  
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Figure 3.4: Trends in Educational Inequality in Mortality and Graft Failure 
Outcomes, 2000-2009 
 
NOTE: Figures plotted are the risk ratio of the indicated educational group to that of 
those with post-graduate degrees for the outcome in question. Years indicate the year 
individuals joined the kidney transplant waitlist. Those joining the waitlist in 1990 or 
earlier are collapsed into the first (1999) category. Those joining in 2010 are omitted. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics, Kidney Transplant Waitlist, 2000-2010 
  
None 
(N=194,859) 
<HS (N=26,273) 
HS/GED 
(N=167,097) 
SC (N=88,594) BA (N=55,162) >BA (N=22,218) 
  Mean/% SD Mean/% SD Mean/% SD Mean/% SD Mean/% SD Mean/% SD 
Gender 
            
Male 59.14 -- 60.04 -- 59.02 -- 57.60 -- 58.72 -- 66.42 -- 
Female 40.86 -- 39.96 -- 40.98 -- 42.40 -- 41.28 -- 33.58 -- 
Age 
            
0-17 3.87 -- 17.91 -- 2.43 -- 0.07 -- 0.01 -- 0.04 -- 
18-25 6.26 -- 2.22 -- 6.00 -- 6.13 -- 2.35 -- 0.58 -- 
26-35 19.01 -- 6.14 -- 14.53 -- 16.45 -- 14.21 -- 8.16 -- 
36-45 25.44 -- 12.57 -- 22.19 -- 24.33 -- 24.68 -- 17.28 -- 
46-55 23.79 -- 22.46 -- 25.24 -- 26.42 -- 29.16 -- 29.44 -- 
56-65 16.51 -- 27.21 -- 21.00 -- 19.44 -- 21.32 -- 29.53 -- 
66-75 4.86 -- 10.93 -- 8.08 -- 6.68 -- 7.52 -- 13.37 -- 
76+ 0.27 -- 0.56 -- 0.53 -- 0.49 -- 0.77 -- 1.60 -- 
Race 
            
White 58.06 -- 26.94 -- 50.50 -- 56.20 -- 63.52 -- 67.46 -- 
Black 25.61 -- 17.28 -- 30.03 -- 28.43 -- 21.09 -- 17.67 -- 
Hispani
c 
10.53 -- 47.79 -- 13.68 -- 8.80 -- 6.54 -- 4.63 -- 
Asian 4.29 -- 5.54 -- 3.53 -- 4.49 -- 7.05 -- 8.80 -- 
Other 1.50 -- 2.46 -- 2.26 -- 2.07 -- 1.81 -- 1.44 -- 
PRA 12.00 26.06 13.26 27.18 20.71 34.04 16.24 30.19 13.12 27.23 12.63 26.13 
NOTE: Values for demographic categories are percentages; values for PRA are means and standard deviations, as indicated. 
Data on kidney transplant waitlist composition from 7/1/2000 through 2/26/2010. SOURCE: UNOS STAR files.
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Table 3.2: Deceased Donor Kidney Allocation Offer Acceptance Model, 2000-2010 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Demographics 
+ Candidate-
Donor Match 
+ Candidate 
Health 
+ Donor 
Characteristic 
GENDER     
Male (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
Female 1.04 1.03 1.03 1.04 
RACE 
    
White (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
Black 1.14 1.51 1.48 1.49 
Hispanic 1.06 1.26 1.29 1.30 
Asian 1.19 1.64 1.61 1.58 
Other 1.07 1.38 1.42 1.39 
INSURANCE 
    
Private (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
Medicaid 1.16 1.20 1.19 1.17 
Medicare 1.11 1.12 1.09 1.09 
Other Government 1.01 1.01 0.98 0.96 
Self 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.94 
Other 1.04 1.03 1.13 1.09 
CITIZENSHIP 
    
US Citizen (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
Resident Alien 1.17 1.18 1.13 1.16 
Non-Res. Alien 0.93 1.02 0.98 1.05 
AGE 
    
0-17 (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
18-25 0.81 0.66 0.74 0.88 
26-35 0.82 0.67 0.77 0.94 
36-45 0.83 0.68 0.82 1.00 
46-55 0.85 0.71 0.86 1.05 
56-65 0.81 0.67 0.84 1.05 
66-75 0.74 0.62 0.78 0.99 
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76+ 0.67 0.56 0.65 0.89 
EDUCATION 
    
None (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
Grade School 1.21 1.19 1.10 1.16 
HS / GED 1.18 1.15 1.07 1.13 
Some College 1.11 1.08 1.02 1.08 
BA / Associates 1.09 1.07 1.01 1.07 
Post-Bacc. Degree 0.99 0.97 0.92 0.96 
Years on Waitlist 0.56 0.62 0.63 0.65 
PRA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
HLA MATCHES 
    
0 DR Matches (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
1 DR Match -- 1.87 1.88 1.79 
2 DR Matches -- 4.80 4.80 4.32 
0 B Matches (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
1 B Match -- 1.41 1.44 1.41 
2 B Matches -- 4.62 4.41 4.02 
0 A Matches (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
1 A Match -- 1.17 1.16 1.17 
2 A Matches -- 2.06 1.99 2.05 
ABO MATCH 
    
Identical (Ref.) -- -- -- -- 
Compatible -- 0.64 0.64 0.66 
Not Compatible -- 0.80 0.79 0.78 
Candidate health controls? No No Yes Yes 
Donor characteristic controls? No No No Yes 
Intercept 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.10 
N 1,189,243 1,189,243 891,552 745,990 
Log Pseudolikelihood -162,199 -148,616 -111,577 -85,989 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.1196 0.1933 0.1942 0.2349 
 
NOTE: Observations in this analysis are each deceased donor kidney offer event. Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. Standard 
errors and statistical significance tests are omitted because these results are based on a census of deceased donor kidney transplant 
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offers 7/1/2000 through 2/26/2010. Smaller sample sizes in columns (3) and (4) reflect observation omissions due to listwise deletion 
for missing data. 
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Table 3.3: Observed and Simulated Outcomes by Education 
    Observed Data Simulation 
Percentage 
Difference 
Outcome Education 
Proportion 
Ratio vs. 
BA+ 
Proportion 
Ratio vs. 
BA+ 
Waiting List Outcomes      
 Any 
Transplant HS/GED 0.376 -- 0.294 (0.257,0.313) -- -21.9 
  
Some 
College 
0.377 1.001 0.273 (0.250,0.286) 0.913 -27.6 
  BA 0.392 1.040 0.281 (0.265,0.293) 0.937 -28.1 
 >BA 0.383 1.017 0.276 (0.258,0.291) 0.929 -28.0 
DDKT  HS/GED 0.279 -- 0.200 (0.160,0.219) -- -28.5 
  
Some 
College 
0.258 0.924 0.158 (0.135,0.172) 0.784 -38.7 
  BA 0.252 0.902 0.148 (0.129,0.160) 0.731 -41.4 
 >BA 0.227 0.813 0.129 (0.108,0.143) 0.653 -43.1 
LDKT  HS/GED 0.097 -- 0.094 (0.090,0.099) -- -3.1 
  
Some 
College 
0.119 1.224 0.115 (0.112,0.119) 1.202 -3.4 
  BA 0.140 1.438 0.134 (0.127,0.140) 1.409 -4.3 
 >BA 0.156 1.602 0.146 (0.136,0.156) 1.570 -6.1 
Waitlist 
Mortality  HS/GED 0.189 -- 0.227 (0.221,0.240) -- 20.0 
  
Some 
College 
0.167 0.884 0.198 (0.193,0.204) 0.849 18.4 
  BA 0.142 0.748 0.175 (0.17,0.181) 0.755 23.8 
 >BA 0.145 0.765 0.170 (0.163,0.180) 0.748 17.4 
Post-Transplant 
Outcomes 
     
Graft HS/GED 0.213 -- 0.209 (0.197,0.217) -- -1.9 
  
 
1
2
8 
Failure 
 
Some 
College 
0.190 0.893 0.179 (0.170,0.186) 0.856 -5.7 
 BA 0.164 0.770 0.155 (0.144,0.166) 0.763 -5.5 
 >BA 0.161 0.755 0.150 (0.134,0.166) 0.764 -6.5 
Post-
Transplant 
Mortality  HS/GED 0.116 -- 0.108 (0.103,0.111) -- -7.0 
  
Some 
College 
0.104 0.896 0.098 (0.093,0.106) 0.952 -5.7 
 BA 0.094 0.809 0.110 (0.101,0.119) 1.066 17.3 
  >BA 0.104 0.897 0.091 (0.081,0.106) 0.953 -12.5 
NOTE: DDKT stands for deceased donor kidney transplant; LDKT stands for living donor kidney transplant. Percentage difference is 
the percentage by which the simulated proportions are different from the observed proportions. 
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Table 3.4: Counterfactual Effects 
  Any Kidney Transplant 
Education Counterfactual 
Proportion 
(90% Interval) 
% Effect 
HS/GED None 0.300 (0.275,0.312) -- 
 Genetics 0.299 (0.271,0.312) -- 
 Graft Failure 0.301 (0.277,0.313) -- 
 Living Donor 0.314 (0.290,0.325) -- 
 Mortality 0.301 (0.262,0.313) -- 
 Offer Acceptance 0.300 (0.275,0.312) -- 
 Residence 0.277 (0.249,0.289) -- 
 PRA 0.257 (0.252,0.260) -- 
Some College None 0.278 (0.259,0.289) -- 
 Genetics 0.273 (0.250,0.283) -17.60 
 Graft Failure 0.278 (0.256,0.288) -2.95 
 Living Donor 0.280 (0.260,0.291) -53.71 
 Mortality 0.278 (0.259,0.288) -2.70 
 Offer Acceptance 0.278 (0.258,0.289) 0.11 
 Residence 0.266 (0.248,0.277) 46.83 
 PRA 0.253 (0.247,0.258) 80.38 
BA None 0.288 (0.272,0.297) -- 
 Genetics 0.283 (0.265,0.293) -35.58 
 Graft Failure 0.288 (0.277,0.297) -1.81 
 Living Donor 0.272 (0.256,0.283) -251.09 
 Mortality 0.289 (0.278,0.298) 1.50 
 Offer Acceptance 0.288 (0.274,0.297) 0.31 
 Residence 0.277 (0.264,0.288) 95.08 
 PRA 0.268 (0.265,0.272) 189.43 
>BA None 0.282 (0.267,0.295) -- 
 Genetics 0.277 (0.260,0.290) -26.43 
 Graft Failure 0.283 (0.268,0.295) 2.59 
 Living Donor 0.254 (0.239,0.266) -237.62 
 Mortality 0.283 (0.266,0.295) -2.93 
 Offer Acceptance 0.282 (0.267,0.295) 0.08 
 Residence 0.279 (0.263,0.295) 107.11 
 PRA 0.265 (0.257,0.276) 143.75 
 
NOTE: „% Effect‟ columns are the percentage of the gap in outcomes between the 
educational group in question and the HS/GED group eliminated in the counterfactual 
baseline compared to the baseline simulation. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four: Racial Inequality in the Living Donor Kidney Transplant 
Opportunity Structure 
Introduction 
End-stage renal disease places a large and increasing burden on the health of the 
U.S. populace and disproportionately affects African Americans, primarily the result of 
African Americans‟ higher prevalence of diabetes, hypertension, and overweight (Norris 
and Agodoa 2005). Primary treatments for ESRD include dialysis and kidney 
transplantation, of which the latter is the medically preferred treatment (e.g., Danovitch 
and Cecka 2003). Among those receiving transplants, living donor kidney transplantation 
(LDKT) is associated with substantially better medical outcomes than deceased donor 
kidney transplants (DDKTs; Davis and Delmonico 2005; Kasiske and Bia 1995; Mange 
et al. 2001). The kidney transplantation system has long produced substantial racial 
inequalities in rates and timing of kidney transplants, particularly for LDKTs – in recent 
years, African Americans have been less than half as likely as whites to experience this 
outcome (Meier-Kriesche et al. 2000). Although the majority of LDKTs come from 
recipients‟ kin, to date no research on the determinants of racial inequality in LDKT has 
examined the role of kinship structure and attributes in the production of racial 
differences in LDKT.  
 Obtaining an LDKT is a four-step process. First, one must have access to a 
medically suitable living donor. One‟s LDKT opportunity structure – the distribution of 
suitable potential kidney donors – is based on one‟s kinship and friendship networks. 
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Second, a given alter must be agree to be evaluated for donation once they and the 
candidate have discussed the possibility of donation. Third, the potential donor must be 
deemed psychologically, medically, and genetically suitable to donate a kidney to the 
patient. Finally, conditional on a favorable evaluation, the donation must actually occur. 
 Kinship structure and characteristics influence patients‟ LDKT opportunity 
structure in a number of ways. First and most obviously, larger families include more 
potential kidney donors. Second, donors are evaluated in part by their degree of genetic 
match with the transplant candidate, so the proportion of close genetic relatives will 
influence one‟s transplant prospects. Third, donors must be sufficiently healthy to donate. 
Race is well known to be related to family structure (Angel and Tienda 1982; Cohen and 
Casper 2002; Hofferth 1984) and a wide range of health statuses (Blackwell et al. 2002; 
Elo and Preston 1997; Kelley-Moore and Ferraro 2004; Manton and Gu 2001; Williams 
2005), so these represent candidate mechanisms to explain black-white differences in 
living donor transplantation. 
 Some additional genetic and immunological mechanisms embedded within 
kinship structures may help to explain racial inequalities in LDKT as well. In the U.S., 
black populations have greater overall genetic diversity than whites (Liu et al. 2006; 
Prugnolle et al. 2005a; Prugnolle et al. 2005b), which could lower the probability of a 
sufficient genetic match between a patient and kin conditional on their expected genetic 
relationship. Finally, racial differences in immunological reactivity (Cooper et al. 1995), 
which influences the chances of immediate rejection, could partially explain black-white 
differences LDKT. 
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This paper investigates black-white differences in the opportunity structure for 
LDKT, estimating group differences in kinship size, genetic relationship structure, kin 
health statuses, immunological sensitivity, and the probability of a genetic match by race. 
Based on data on the characteristics of kidney transplant candidates, other population 
data, and a simulation exercise, the present results suggest that blacks and whites actually 
have approximately the same probability (60%) of having one or more suitable living 
donors in their kinship networks. While each white kin is more likely to be a suitable 
donor, the larger average size of black kinship networks counterbalances this difference. 
These results suggest that far fewer ESRD patients are obtaining LDKTs than could do 
so, and that factors influencing the commencement and nature of the living donor search 
process are likely responsible for black-white differences in rates of LDKT. Finally, 
given the relatively sparse number of potential donors typically evaluated for donation 
(Weng et al. 2010), the higher probability that a given white alter will be deemed a 
suitable donor may help explain white-black living donor differentials. 
Background 
Racial Inequality in the Transplantation System 
Kidney disease is an increasing source of morbidity and mortality in the U.S., 
driven in large part by population increases in the prevalence of hypertension, diabetes, 
and overweight (Daumit and Powe 2001; Malek et al. 2011; Norris and Agodoa 2005). 
Kidney transplants necessarily involve a donor and a recipient, and there are two major 
types of donors – the deceased and the living. Although the number of both types of 
transplants has grown since the beginning of widespread transplantation in the mid-
1980s, the number of transplants has not kept pace with the number of transplant 
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candidates. Under these Malthusian conditions, the kidney transplant waiting list has 
grown with the prevalence of ESRD, resulting in quickly lengthening waitlists for 
kidneys for transplantation. By the end of 2008, the number of patients awaiting kidney 
transplants had grown to 85,440, more than a 500% increase since 1988 and far 
outstripping U.S. population growth. 
Living donor kidney transplants (LDKTs) are associated with substantially better 
post-transplant outcomes than are deceased donor kidney transplants (DDKTs; Davis and 
Delmonico 2005; Kasiske and Bia 1995; Mange et al. 2001; Reese et al. 2009). Whereas 
deceased donor kidneys are allocated to ESRD patients on a transplant waitlist according 
to a priority algorithm, LDKTs are obtained more informally, typically from a donor in 
the candidate‟s kinship or friendship networks who is sufficiently healthy and genetically 
compatible with the intended recipient to donate a kidney. In addition to the advantages 
of LDKTs (compared to DDKTs) for patient survival and organ rejection, they also 
typically involve a much shorter waiting period.  
The burden of the increasing difficulty of obtaining a kidney transplant has fallen 
disproportionately on African Americans, who are more likely than whites to need a 
kidney transplant, and much less likely to obtain one. African Americans are less likely to 
be evaluated for transplantation if they develop ESRD, are less likely to be placed on the 
waitlist if they are evaluated, and typically have far longer waits for a deceased donor 
transplant than do white transplant candidates (Epstein et al. 2000; Hall et al. 2011). 
Longer periods of dialysis are associated with worse post-transplantation outcomes and 
higher pre-transplant mortality rates (Eckhoff et al. 2007; Gordon et al. 2010), 
contributing to African American disadvantages in the kidney transplantation system 
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(Malek et al. 2011). Finally, African Americans are far less likely than whites to obtain a 
living donor kidney transplant. Compared to white patients, black patients are less likely 
to have a potential donor evaluated for donation, and are less likely to obtain a living 
donor transplant if they do have a potential donor (Weng et al. 2010). In fact, a recent 
analysis (Daw 2011) suggests that in the last decade racial differences in rates of LDKT 
are primarily responsible for overall racial inequality in transplantation rates. 
Studies of Living Kidney Donation 
 Research on racial disparities in LDKT has focused on the determinants and 
outcomes of potential kidney donors who were brought into particular transplant centers 
for evaluation. First, much work investigates who has a potential donor evaluated for 
donation (Barnieh et al. 2011; Gordon 2001; Rodrigue et al. 2008; Zimmerman et al. 
2006). These studies find that many candidates do not believe that they have anyone to 
discuss donation with (Barnieh et al. 2011). Additionally, while many candidates do have 
relatives and friends offer to be evaluated for donation, the majority of these offers are 
refused (Gordon 2001). A major concern among those who refuse such offers is concern 
for the risks posed to the potential donor. However, another study (Reese et al. 2009) find 
that younger candidates and those with higher yearly incomes were more likely to have a 
potential donor evaluated, and that whites were more than twice as likely as blacks to 
have had a potential donor evaluated. Furthermore, most candidates who do have a donor 
evaluated have two or fewer potential donors evaluated (Weng et al. 2010), suggesting 
that the vast majority of transplant candidates do not explore the full range of their 
kinship networks when seeking an LDKT. 
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 Once a candidate-potential donor pair agrees to be evaluated for transplantation, 
here are two major obstacles to be overcome in this process: medical and immunological 
barriers, and procedural barriers. Concerning the latter, a recent study (Clark et al. 2008) 
found that the potential donors of patients with higher levels of instrumental social 
support were more likely to complete the full living donor evaluation process, which is a 
major site of racial inequality in LDKT. For those who are evaluated, many are excluded 
for poor health or poor immunological compatibility with the potential recipient, and 
African American potential donors are more likely to have this result (Lunsford et al. 
2007; Reeves-Daniel et al. 2009).  
 These findings suggest a number of potentially important mechanisms of racial 
inequality in LDKT rates. First, they strongly indicate that transplant candidates do not 
have their full networks evaluated for transplantation. Only about half of transplant 
candidates have any donors evaluated, and the majority of those who do so have only one 
evaluation. Second, this suggests that racial differences in kin health could play a major 
role in white and black transplant candidates‟ transplantation prospects, as could donor 
evaluation completion rates, racial differences in the probability of immunological 
compatibility, and the probability of having any potential donors evaluated. 
 However, these studies share some major limitations. Most importantly, none 
contain indications of the full distribution of kinship ties and disqualifying conditions for 
donation among the social networks of white and black transplant candidates. Although it 
is unlikely that racial differences in this „opportunity structure‟ explain the entirety of 
racial differences in LDKT, this should be the starting point for any analysis of racial 
inequality in the LDKT system. 
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Determinants of the Living Donor Kidney Transplant Opportunity Structure 
Because the vast majority of LDKTs involve kin donors, racial differences in the 
properties of their kinship networks are a prime candidate to explain racial differences in 
LDKT. Figure 1 illustrates the factors hypothesized to influence the probability of LDKT. 
This figure separates the mechanisms influencing the living kidney donation process into 
two major categories: factors influencing the LDKT opportunity structure, and factors 
influencing the probability of LDKT given one‟s opportunity structure. Although this 
research investigates the first set of determinants only, in the following section the 
relevance of each of these factors for one‟s LDKT opportunity structure will be discussed 
alongside previous findings on racial differences in these factors. 
Factors Influencing the LDKT Opportunity Structure 
Kinship network size. First, the number of living alters in one‟s kinship network 
will be positively related to one‟s prospects for an LDKT. All else equal, larger families 
will be associated with a more favorable LDKT opportunity structure, and racial 
differences in the distribution of kinship size are a potential explanatory mechanism for 
racial differences in LDKT. However, the literature on racial differences in kinship 
network structure is surprisingly sparse. The vast majority of the literature on race and 
kinship explores differences in household co-residence (e.g., Angel and Tienda 1982; 
Hofferth 1984), contact (e.g., Raley 1995), and support (e.g., Mazelis and Mykyta 2011; 
Sarkisian and Gerstel 2004) instead of the entire kinship structure itself. Although all of 
these variables may be related to kinship size and are important in their own right, in 
absence of a detailed literature on these factors this connection cannot be assumed. 
Nonetheless, given that African Americans have larger households on average (Choi 
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1991; Kamo 2000; Peek et al. 2004), and higher fertility rates (Census 2011), it is likely 
that African Americans have larger kinship networks on average than whites, which 
could prove a source of advantage in the LDKT opportunity structure. 
Genetic structure of kinship. Second, because two forms of genetic similarity (red 
blood type and human leukocyte antigen compatibility, discussed below in detail) are 
associated with better transplantation outcomes and are used by medical staff to 
determine donor suitability, the structure of genetic relationships in one‟s kinship 
networks is also an important determinant of one‟s opportunity for LDKT. One has a 
higher probability of sharing genes in common with close genetic relatives (e.g., full 
siblings) than more biologically distant ones (e.g., cousins). Although the sparseness of 
the literature on racial differences in kinship structures limits what is known, the 
likelihood of larger average kinship networks among African Americans would also 
suggest that they have more close genetic relatives on average than whites. 
Kin Health Status. Third, before an LDKT can occur, potential living donors are 
evaluated on a range of medical and psychological factors to determine their suitability 
for donation. The goal of these evaluations is to ensure that the potential donor is capable 
of making the donation decision, is doing so without coercion, and can donate a kidney 
with minimal risk to the donor and maximum potential benefit to the recipient. Racial 
patterns of psychiatric conditions and morbidity are more complicated than is often 
recognized. Although African Americans are subject to greater mortality rates (Rogers 
1992) and higher morbidity overall (Fiscella et al. 2000; Williams and Collins 1995), 
there is considerable variability in racial disparities associated with specific medical 
conditions. For instance, although African Americans have higher prevalences of 
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hypertension (Hajjar and Kotchen 2003), diabetes (Cowie et al. 2006), and obesity (Ford 
et al. 2011), whites have higher prevalences of many psychiatric disorders (Kessler et al. 
1994), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (Bang et al. 2009), asthma (McHugh et al. 
2009), and breast cancer (Ward et al. 2004). Furthermore, these diseases are not 
independent and are rarely studied jointly. However, due to the overall greater burden of 
morbidity on African Americans, a black disadvantage in rates of kin contraindications 
for donation is predicted. 
Genetic compatibility. Fourth, African Americans are known to have greater 
genetic diversity than do whites in the United States, a result of historical migration 
patterns (Liu et al. 2006; Prugnolle et al. 2005a; Prugnolle et al. 2005b) and maintained 
by ongoing racial homogamy in the U.S., which could result in a disadvantage for blacks 
in their LDKT prospects. For kidney transplantation, two types of genetic compatibility 
are especially relevant – red blood cell type (measured by one‟s ABO genotype), and 
white blood cell type (measured by one‟s HLA-A, HLA-B, and HLA-DR genotypes). 
These genes play key roles in the human immune system and accordingly structure the 
probability of organ rejection, in which a transplanted kidney is attacked by the body‟s 
immune system.  
These genotypes structure the production of red blood cell (ABO) and white 
blood cell (HLA) antigens, which the immune system employs to differentiate host from 
foreign cells. Cells whose antigens do not contradict the host‟s are „histocompatible‟ and 
trigger no immune response; cells whose antigens differ from the host‟s do trigger a 
response. Furthermore, certain pairs of ABO and HLA genotypes are „serologically 
equivalent,‟ meaning that the immune system cannot differentiate them. A familiar 
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example is O type blood, which is the „universal donor‟ blood type because it produces 
no antigens and therefore triggers no immune response when given to others in blood 
transfusions. 
Racial differences in the distribution of ABO and HLA genes are thought to 
explain some portion of racial inequality in the cadaveric transplantation system (Higgins 
and Fishman 2006; Malek et al. 2011; Navaneethan and Singh 2006; Vamos et al. 2009). 
Although progress is being made in overcoming it, the „ABO barrier‟ is a major obstacle 
to successful transplantation, sometimes triggering an immediate and devastating immune 
response when crossed (Nelson et al. 1992). While the effects of HLA mismatch are less 
severe with modern immunosuppression technology (Murphey and Forsthuber 2008; Su 
et al. 2004), higher HLA matches are nonetheless associated with improved post-
transplantation survival prospects. Accordingly, racial differences in the probability of 
genetic similarity conditional on overall genetic relationship could partially explain racial 
differences in LDKT.  
Immunological presensitization. Fifth, ESRD patients vary widely in the 
probability that another person‟s cells will trigger a severe immune response, known as 
hyperacute kidney rejection. In the transplantation literature this probability is defined by 
Panel Reactive Antibody, or PRA, scores, which are a proxy for the probability of a 
positive crossmatch. Positive crossmatching occurs when a transplant recipient has 
antibodies to foreign antigens in the donated organ. As a primary mechanism of disease 
immunity, antibodies are produced by the body as a defense against cells displaying 
specific antigens. When cells displaying these antigens are encountered again, antibodies 
attack them much more rapidly and effectively than the body‟s baseline immune 
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responses. As such, until recently transplanting a kidney into an ESRD patient who has 
already produced antibodies to the donor‟s antigens resulted in nearly guaranteed and 
immediate kidney rejection. Lately therapies designed to avert this outcome have shown 
some promise (Haririan et al. 2009) but still lag far behind non-crossmatched transplants 
in patient and graft survival prospects. 
African Americans on average have higher PRA scores than whites – in one early 
study, African Americans ESRD patients had an average score of 15% whereas white 
patients averaged 6%. Several factors may help to explain this. As with all antibodies, 
antigen presensitization is associated with prior exposure to foreign antigens. The 
primary mechanisms through which this occurs are prior transplantations, blood 
transfusions, and pregnancy (Leffell et al. 1997). Blood transfusion history may represent 
a major source of immunological presensitization disadvantage for African Americans 
(Kerman et al. 1992). Similarly, prior transplantation creates a higher likelihood of 
presensitization (Cooper et al. 1995). Finally, higher fertility, especially with different 
partners (Census 2011; Harknett and Knab 2007), could create racial differences in PRA 
as well. 
In sum, I expect that African American transplant candidates will on average have 
larger kinship networks with higher counts of close genetic relatives, providing a source 
of advantage in the LDKT opportunity structure. However, I also expect that white 
transplant candidates will have healthier kin on average, a higher probability of HLA and 
ABO histocompatibility with their kin, and a lower probability of positive crossmatches. 
How these factors combine to structure racial differences in the LDKT opportunity 
structure is the subject of this research. 
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Factors Influencing the Probability of LDKT Given the LDKT Opportunity Structure 
 A number of processes likely mediate the translation of opportunity structures 
into LDKT outcomes. While these processes are not directly explored in the present 
analysis, they will prove helpful in understanding racial differences in LDKT conditional 
on opportunity structure. 
 The health care system. First, in order for the opportunity for LDKT to be 
translated into an LDKT outcome, assistance in navigating the bureaucracies and 
processes available in the kidney transplantation system will usually be required. For 
instance, a recent retrospective study found that black patients were less likely to recruit 
potential donors and, conditional on recruitment, less likely to complete a LDKT (Weng 
et al. 2010). It could be that differential promotion of and guidance in the LDKT process 
on the part of the health care providers could explain this difference. 
 Knowledge of and interest in transplantation. Much medical research on racial 
differences in transplantation focus on the role of racial differences in knowledge of, and 
interest in, transplantation (Navaneethan and Singh 2006). Thus patient preferences and 
beliefs are a central focus of the medical literature on disparities in kidney transplantation 
and a frequently cited site of potential intervention (Rodrigue et al. 2006; Waterman et al. 
2006). However, the evidence on racial differences in these factors is mixed (Alexander 
and Sehgal 2001; Ayanian et al. 1999; Malek et al. 2011). Although perhaps 
overemphasized in the medical literature on kidney transplantation disparities, beliefs, 
preferences, and knowledge of transplantation is a theoretically plausible mediator of the 
relationship between LDKT opportunity and actual LDKT. 
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 Kin relations. Finally, a major and understudied potential mediator of the 
relationship between LDKT opportunity structures and actual LDKTs is the nature of 
family relationships. Sociologically, LDKTs are a gift, and an unusually meaningful one. 
As with all gifts, LDKTs are passed across and potentially shape relations between giver 
and receiver and are usually subject to norms of reciprocity. Research on social support 
in black and white families suggests that they differ in the character and degree of 
support. For instance, while it is commonly claimed that racial and ethnic minorities have 
more closely knit kinship networks (Aschenbrenner 1975; Martin and Martin 1985; Stack 
1974), other work finds that whites exchange assistance with greater frequency (Cooney 
and Uhlenberg 1992; Eggebeen 1992; Goldscheider and Goldscheider 1991; Hofferth 
1984; Hogan et al. 1993; Hoyert 1990; Lee and Aytac 1998; Roschelle 1997), although 
the pattern differs for financial and instrumental support (Lee and Aytac 1998; Roschelle 
1997; Sarkisian and Gerstel 2004). There is also evidence that black families tend to 
emphasize same-generation ties more than whites, while white families place greater 
emphasis on cross-generational ties (Johnson 2000; Johnson and Barer 1990; Johnson 
and Barer 1995). These relationship patterns by race may structure the probability of 
seeking or accepting LDKTs from one‟s kinship network. 
In general, gifts are subject to strong norms of reciprocity, yet rarely can a gift of 
the magnitude of another‟s organ be adequately be repaid, which potentially crates a 
creditor/debtor relationship between the kidney donor and recipient. Fox and Swazey‟s 
(1978, 1992; see also Healy 2006) seminal work on the subject termed this the “tyranny 
of the gift” due to the strains such an extraordinary gift places on the relationship 
between donor and recipient. Transplant candidates‟ willingness to accept such a gift may 
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fundamentally depend on their relationships with their kin and their belief in their ability 
to weather such potential tyrannies. As with all requests and offers for assistance, there 
are patterned expectations for resource exchanges (Bengtson et al. 1996; Lindblad-
Goldberg 1987; Miller-Cribbs and Farber 2008; Neighbors 1997; Nelson 2000; Stack 
1974; Tracy 1990), and one‟s ability to fulfill reciprocal exchange relations may 
influence one‟s willingness to accept assistance. Furthermore, there is substantial 
evidence that these familial exchange norms are of particular importance to African 
Americans due to traditional norms of mutual family support in impoverished 
circumstances (Malson 1983; Martin and Martin 1985; McAdoo 1982; Miller-Cribbs and 
Farber 2008; Testa and Slack 2002). If these patterns are reproduced for social relations 
of kidney exchange, this suggests a potential mechanism of LDKT inequality. It could be 
that the lower ability of African Americans to reciprocate such important gifts, combined 
with stronger norms of reciprocal exchange, could lead African Americans to decline 
these gifts at higher rates than whites. 
Analytical Strategy, Data, and Measures 
 Studying racial differences in the LDKT opportunity structure presents a number 
of analytical difficulties, the foremost of which is that the requisite information is not 
available in a single dataset. However, with some assumptions many of these factors may 
be explored using existing data. The goal of this study is to measure demographically 
typical kinship networks and health status patterns, accurately assign probabilities of 
genetic and immunological compatibility, and then calculate the number of suitable 
available living donors in candidates‟ simulated kinship network. To illustrate, figure 2 
presents a hypothetical kinship structure (represented as a modified ore graph) where the 
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black dot represents the ESRD patient, each pie graph represents a member of their 
kinship network, and the blue slice in each pie graph represents the probability that that 
member of the network is a suitable living kidney donor for the ESRD patient. Once this 
kinship structure and its attributes is constructed, simulating the patient‟s LDKT 
opportunity structure is relatively simple, as discussed below. To reach this goal the 
analysis proceeds in a number of steps, drawing separately on information on 
demographic patterns of transplantation-relevant genes, biologically-informed kinship 
structure, and health statuses which would disqualify one as a living kidney donor.  
The Living Donor Kidney Transplant Opportunity Structure Simulation 
 To generate a data-driven simulation of white-black differences in the LDKT 
opportunity structure, 100 simulations (ten each for each imputation of the UNOS 
dataset, described below) were conducted to measure simulated opportunity structures 
while allowing for random noise from the simulation process. 
Information on Transplant Candidates 
First, demographic, genetic, and immunological information on transplant 
candidates were employed to obtain estimates of the race-specific distribution of ABO 
and HLA genotypes and to calculate the probability of positive crossmatches between 
donors. Demographic characteristics (race, age, education, and gender) are conserved for 
use in probabilistically matching transplant candidates to other needed attributes, as 
discussed below. 
Dataset: United Network for Organ Sharing STAR Files. Since 1987, the United 
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) has collected detailed information on every organ 
transplant recipient, donor, and candidate in the U.S., containing information on the 
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demographic, socioeconomic, medical status, laboratory, and medical treatment 
characteristics of each such person. Importantly, all ESRD patients are required to enroll 
in the kidney transplant waitlist, even if they have already identified a living donor. 
Therefore this database contains information on all legal transplant candidates in the U.S. 
since 1987. 
Although this dataset contains information on the social (and sometimes 
biological) relationship LDKT recipients had with their donors, information on the full 
social networks of transplant candidates is lacking. Nonetheless, it is useful in analyzing 
the distribution of demographic, genetic, and immunological characteristics of persons on 
the kidney transplant waitlist in the U.S. Whites and blacks only were used in the present 
analysis due to sampling frame limitations of the kinship data used, as discussed below. 
ABO and HLA typing and antibody screening is performed at the center at which the 
patient is evaluated. 
Ten different imputations were produced from this file using hotdeck imputation 
methods based on patient age, ethnicity, gender, and education. In hotdeck imputation, 
discrete groups are assigned to each observation (here, the demographic attributes just 
described), then non-missing values for the missing variables are drawn at random from 
other members of that group, proportionate to their representation in that subpopulation. 
Hotdeck imputation methods are widely used by government agencies such as the 
Census. Although multiple imputation and direct maximum likelihood methods are more 
in vogue in secondary data analysis in sociology, the very large size of the datasets 
involved and the low rates of missingness of key variables made hotdecking, which is a 
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computationally more efficient imputation method, an attractive option for this study. 
Ten simulations were conducted on each imputed dataset for a total of 100 simulations.
30
 
Calculating genetic compatibility probabilities. One may have the same alleles at 
a locus in the genome with another through one of two mechanisms. First, as a result of 
basic processes of genetic descent one is guaranteed to share at least one gene at each 
locus in the genome with each of one‟s parents at birth because parents‟ genes combine 
to constitute one‟s own genome. By extension, other genetic relatives who may be 
reached through parent-child network ties have a defined baseline probability of 
matching one‟s genes at each locus in the genome. This form of genetic similarity is 
known as identity by descent (IBD) and is easily mathematically specifiable. For instance, 
one has a 50% chance of sharing a particular copy of a gene IBD with one‟s sibling, a 
25% of doing so with one‟s half sibling, and so on. However, one may also share genes 
with related and unrelated alters through a process directly related to the population 
distribution of genes at each locus. For instance, if a gene does not vary at all in a 
population, one is guaranteed to match on this gene with all others in that population, and 
if 75% of all members of that population have the same allele one has an excellent chance 
of matching unrelated strangers on that gene, as well. This is known as identity by state 
(IBS). Both forms of genetic matching are important when predicting the availability of 
suitable living donors in one‟s kinship network. 
This stage of the analysis requires the assumption that, conditional on race, the 
ABO and HLA distributions of kidney transplant candidates are representative of the 
                                                 
30
 Although additional simulations would be preferable, the very large memory requirements of this study 
and the computational intensiveness of the simulation limited the number of simulations which were 
feasible for this study. Additionally, as discussed below the distribution of simulated characteristics was 
very tight in this study, suggesting that additional simulations would not substantively change the primary 
results of this investigation. 
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general population, and that all families are racially homogenous. Under this assumption, 
the probability that a member of one‟s kinship network has a compatible blood type with 
the transplant candidate may be calculated as follows (Kanter and Hodge 1990): 
                            (    )                         
                                          ( ) 
where P(Cijk) is the probability of blood type compatibility, i indexes ego, j indexes alter, 
and k indexes racial/ethnic group.        is defined as the probability of sharing x alleles 
IBD at the ABO locus for a dyad with the i-j pair‟s genetic relationship degree. Parent-
child relations necessarily share exactly 1 allele at a locus due to common inheritance, so 
for these relations T1=1 and T2=T0=0. For all other relationship types, the T values may 
be calculated by taking the average genetic relationship, r, for that genetic relationship 
type
31
, and calculating T2=r
2
, T1=r(1-r), and T0=(1-r)
2
. Finally, qk is defined as the 
percentage of the racial/ethnic group that has a compatible blood type with i‟s ABO 
phenotype, as measured in the ABO distribution among transplant candidates in the 
UNOS dataset. This component of the formula represents the probability of IBS 
matching. Blood type compatibility (as used in the qk values) is defined as follows: 
 A B AB O  
 
                                                        (2) 
A 1 0 0 1 
B 0 1 0 1 
AB 1 1 1 1 
O 0 0 0 1 
where recipient blood type is on the rows, donor blood type is on the columns, and blood 
type compatibility is defined as the matrix equaling 1 for the i,j cell of the compatibility 
matrix. Thus O is the universal donor, AB is the universal recipient, and otherwise all 
blood types are compatible with themselves. 
                                                 
31
 r=.5 for full siblings, r=.25 for half siblings, grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces, and 
nephews, r=.125 for first cousins and similarly distant relations, and r=0 for alters who are not genetically 
related 
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 A similar procedure is used to calculate HLA compatibility probabilities, but this 
calculation is necessarily more complicated because of the greater polymorphism at these 
loci and the fact that there are three such genes under consideration instead of one. To 
calculate HLA compatibility probabilities, the proportion of HLA haplotypes which are 
compatible  with a given haplotype on one, two, or three loci was calculated and added to 
the following formulas: 
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where    is defined as the HLA match degree (out of 6) for person i in race k,    
 
 and 
   
  are defined as the probability of x matches with an unrelated member of race k for 
haplotypes 1 and 2 respectively, and    
  is the probability of x matches for a randomly 
chosen haplotype with an unrelated member of race k. As with the simpler ABO formula 
above, these formulas are designed to combine the ways in which a given match degree 
can be attained through two different routes – IBD matching (represented by the Tx 
components) and IBS matching (represented by the q components). For these 
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calculations, HLA compatibility was defined using the current list of HLA serological 
equivalencies
32
.  
Calculating positive antigen crossmatch probabilities. PRA is measured as the 
percentage of a representative set of HLA antigens to which the intended recipient‟s 
blood displays an immunological reaction, indicating antibodies for the antigens in 
question. However, by definition one cannot be crossmatched with antigens serologically 
equivalent to one‟s own, so the probability of a positive crossmatch is inversely 
proportionate to one‟s HLA match degree with the alter in question. Allowing for this, 
the probability of positive crossmatch is calculated as: 
                                                           (  )     (
     
 
)                                             (4) 
where XM stands for crossmatch,    represents the simulated number of HLA 
equivalencies, and 6-    indicates the number of mismatched HLA antigens with that 
donor pair. In other words, a transplant candidate‟s PRA is adjusted to reflect the 
probability of crossmatch among the mismatched HLA antigens only. 
Information on Kinship Structures 
 In order to predict the LDKT opportunity structure for transplant candidates in the 
U.S., information is employed on the distribution of genetically-defined kinship ties for 
demographically similar individuals in the U.S. It is important to define these kinship ties 
genetically rather than socially because genetic compatibility is a crucial determinant of 
donor suitability. 
Dataset: Panel Study of Income Dynamics Family Information Mapping System. 
It is equally crucial to define candidates‟ kinship structure as broadly as possible. The 
                                                 
32
 This is available for inspection at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/policiesAndBylaws/policies.asp. 
Accessed 8/21/2010. 
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Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is one of the premier longitudinal studies of 
families in the U.S. In 1968 the PSID began following a representative sample of about 
4,800 households. Subsequently the PSID re-interviewed the original families frequently 
(every year through 1997; every other year thereafter) and followed descendant families 
as households split and were formed. As such the PSID includes a strong genealogical 
component, as much of this household formation consisted of children growing up, 
moving out of the house, and forming families of their own. Some lineages now include 
as many as four generations. 
 Helpfully, the PSID now provides biologically-informed linkage files, known as 
the Family Identification Mapping System (FIMS), by which parent/child and sibling ties 
are defined among all members of the PSID sample. FIMS differentiates between 
biological and adoptive ties as well as permitting differentiation between full, half, and 
step-siblings. As such the PSID is now the premier source of population representative, 
longitudinal information on multigenerational black and white families in the U.S
33
.  
For the present analysis all members of the PSID who were alive in 1999 and had 
at least one measured biological kin tie were included in the analysis. Persons who died 
before 1999 were included when defining biological kinship networks but excluded 
thereafter. Each included person was assigned a biologically-informed ego kinship 
network as described below. 
                                                 
33
 While Latinos are included in the sampling design as well, over time with high rates of Latin American 
migration into the U.S. the Latino sample became increasingly unrepresentative of the U.S. Latino 
population. While the PSID has since supplemented the original sample with additional Latino families, the 
later date of this sampling procedure means that information is available on fewer generations of these 
families, and would not permit a valid comparison of the kinship structure of Latinos with whites and 
African Americans. As such only white and black families are examined in this study. Additionally, the 
PSID sample design does not permit the identification of kinship linkages among those not directly 
descended from the originally sampled households through procreation, adoption, marriage, or co-
residence. This is a major limitation of this dataset for present purposes because this means that key 
members of one‟s kinship networks are excluded. 
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Characterizing kinship ties. Parental ties may be defined as PNxN, where Pij=1 if 
the individual on column j is the parent of the individual on row i and =0 otherwise. This 
matrix is non-symmetrical because one is not one‟s parents‟ parent. Similarly, full sibling 
ties may be defined as FSNxN, where FSij=1 if the individual on column j is the sibling of 
the individual on row i and =0 otherwise. Of course, this matrix is symmetrical. Using 
these matrices only and adapting the formulas in Batagelj and Mrvar (2006; see Goldstein 
1999 for a similar approach), biological kin relations may be calculated in matrix terms 
as follows (where X’ is defined as the transpose of matrix X): 
 Child: C=P’         (5) 
 Half sibling: HS*=1 if P*P’=1 and =0 otherwise 
 Grandparents: GP=P*P 
 Grandchildren: GC=P’*P’ 
 Aunt/Uncle: AU=P*FS 
 Niece/Nephew: NN=AU’, where child ties are set to 0. 
 Cousin: P*P*P’*P’, where the resultant diagonal is set to 0. 
Non-biological kinship ties are defined as the absence of any of these ties within a 
lineage. 
Information on Health Statuses 
 In addition to genetic match degree and positive HLA antigen crossmatches, 
another reason a member of an ESRD patient‟s kinship network may not be a suitable 
living kidney donor is due to a health condition which would endanger the kidney donor 
or recipient should an LDKT take place. These conditions are known as contraindications 
for kidney donation. Although there is no uniform standard for medical evaluations of 
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LDKTs, in 2007 an OPTN committee made a set of recommendations for „absolute‟ and 
„relative‟ contraindications for living kidney donation based on a survey of nephrologists‟ 
evaluation practices. The list of „absolute‟ contraindications include: age less than 18 
years old, hypertension, diabetes, abnormal glucose tolerance test, history of thrombosis 
or embolism, major psychiatric conditions, extreme obesity (BMI>35), coronary artery 
disease, symptomatic valvular disease, chronic lung disease, recent malignancies (or 
cancers with a long time to recurrence), urologic abnormalities of the kidney, low 
creatinine clearance rates, peripheral vascular disease, proteinuria, HIV infection, 
Hepatitis C infection, and Hepatitis B infection . Although some transplant centers surely 
deviate in various manners from this list, for present purposes insofar as possible this list 
of statuses and conditions is treated as the full list of contraindications for living kidney 
donation. 
Dataset: National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys (NHANES) 1999-
2008. Collected since 1959, the NHANES studies have long served as the nation‟s most 
detailed population representative survey of the health of the U.S. populace. In addition 
to household, socioeconomic and demographic information, NHANES collects a full 
medical history, detailed medical examination by a physician, and an impressive 
collection of laboratory measures assessing the prevalence of major chronic health 
conditions in the U.S. population. Since 1999, NHANES has been collected in 
consecutive two-year cycles, with data available for 1999-2000, 2001-2, 2003-4, 2005-6, 
and 2007-8. 
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Medical contraindications. Hypertension was defined as having an average blood 
pressure greater than 130/90 on average over four separately measurements
34
. Diabetes 
was measured as reporting ever being diagnosed with diabetes. Abnormal glucose 
tolerance was define as a 2-hour glucose tolerance test score greater than 140. Psychiatric 
conditions were defined using survey-based measures of panic disorder, major 
depression, and generalized anxiety disorder. Although survey-based measures are not 
ideal measurements of psychiatric conditions, the measures used were well-validated 
measures of DSM-defined criteria. Furthermore, this is not an exhaustive list of 
potentially disqualifying psychiatric conditions; however, these were the only ones 
available in the NHANES data. 
 Obesity was assessed as a calculated BMI score greater than 35
35
. Coronary artery 
disease was based on respondent reports of previous diagnoses of coronary artery disease. 
Chronic lung disease was assessed by having ever been diagnosed with asthma, 
emphysema, or having current bronchitis. Cancer history excludes one from kidney 
donation if one has ever had breast cancer or had any cancer in the last ten years. 
Creatinine clearance rates (eCCR) were assessed using the Cockcroft-Gault formula for 
estimated creatinine clearance rates (Cockcroft and Gault 1976), and poor kidney 
function was defined as eCCR<80. 
 Peripheral artery disease was defined as having a right or left ankle-brachial index 
score (Hirsch et al. 2006) of less than 0.9 (Criqui and Denenberg 1998). Proteinuria was 
measured as having an albumin-creatinine ratio of ≥17 for men and ≥25 for women 
                                                 
34
 While this is not the standard cutoff for hypertension, this is the recommended cutoff for evaluating 
blood pressure as a contraindication for living kidney donation. 
35
 Similarly, although BMI of 30 is the standard research cutoff for obesity, a BMI of 35 is the cutoff 
recommended by the OPTN committee. 
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(Mattix et al. 2002). HIV diagnoses were based on HIV antibodies in the respondent‟s 
blood (McQuillan et al. 2010). Hepatitis B diagnoses were based on the result of a 
hepatitis B surface antigen test (Ioannou 2011), and hepatitis C diagnoses were based on 
the results of a hepatitis C antibody test (Armstrong et al. 2006). 
 Measures were not available in NHANES 1999-2008 for history of thrombosis or 
embolism, symptomatic valvular disease, or urologic kidney abnormalities. Furthermore, 
all measures used in this analysis were not available in all years and were not always 
available for the full sample or persons of all ages. The following steps were taken to 
address these data limitations. First, if data were not available for all years of NHANES 
data, the same demographic patterns of that contraindication were assumed for all years. 
Second, HIV, Hepatitis B, and Hepatitis C, and all psychiatric measures were not 
available for NHANES respondents over 50. This analysis assumes that the prevalences 
of these diseases for persons aged 51 and older are the same as for persons aged 36-50. 
Finally, measures of peripheral artery disease were not available for persons younger than 
35. This analysis assumes that this prevalence is 0. 
Combining Information on Transplant Candidates, Kinship Structures, and 
Population Health Distributions 
 For this simulation, information on kinship structure and kinship health statuses 
was assigned in two steps. First, medical contraindications were assigned to members of 
measured kinship networks proportionate to the probability of having a medical 
contraindication among demographically similar members of the health status dataset. 
Second, kinship networks and health statuses were assigned to transplant waitlist 
members using an original weighted matching algorithm designed by the author. 
Assigning medical contraindications to kinship alters 
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For the purposes of this study all variables measuring medical contraindications 
for living kidney donation in NHANES were combined into a single indicator for medical 
contraindications and probabilistically assigned to members of the PSID based on the 
weighted proportion of persons with any contraindication in that person‟s race, age, 
education, and gender categories. Race was defined as being either white or black, by 
self-report. For matching purposes age was coarsened into the following categories: age 
0-20, 21-35, 36-50, 51-65, and 66+. Education was recoded into the following categories: 
less than a high school education, high school education or equivalent, some college 
courses but no four-year degree, and a four-year college degree or higher. Gender was 
measured as being either male or female. When members of the PSID dataset were 
missing information on any of these variables, contraindications were assigned 
proportionate to demographic categories on which the respondent had complete 
information only. After probabilities of having a contraindication were assigned to all 
members of the PSID, their contraindication status was determined by comparing the 
value of a uniform random variable to their assigned probability of having any of the 
measured medical contraindications. 
Assigning Kinship Networks to Transplant Candidates 
Individuals‟ kinship structures are strongly related to age, and somewhat less so, 
race, education, and gender. In the first case, one cannot be a grandparent if one is 10 
years old and is unlikely to have a living parent if one is 90 years old. Similarly, due to 
fertility and mortality differences by race and education, kinship structure will be related 
to these factors as well. Although based on available data one cannot know the kinship 
structures of persons on the kidney transplant waiting list, one can probabilistically 
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reproduce the distribution of measured kinship ties in PSID interactively by age, race, 
education, and gender, recoded as described above. 
Kinship network assignment was conducted based on a weighted matching 
algorithm designed by the author, which functions as follows (and is illustrated in Figure 
3). First, members of the kidney transplant waitlist and the PSID were assigned groups 
for all combinations of race, education, gender, and age. This assignment was identical 
for both datasets. Second, individual sampling weights in the PSID were transformed as 
follows: 
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In other words, individual weights were transformed into the proportion of total 
individual weights represented in group k. Thus the transformed weights all summed to 
one within each of the demographic groups observed. Third, the    
  values were 
transformed so that each individual was assigned a range of the 0-1 probability space 
equal to their value of    
 . Fourth, individuals on the kidney transplant waitlist were each 
assigned a uniform random variable ~U(0,1), which was compared to the values of this 
transformed weight variable so that kidney transplant candidates were assigned kinship 
networks for persons with identical demographic characteristics proportionate to their 
weights using a many-to-one matching algorithm.. 
 To aid the reader in understanding this unfamiliar method, Figure 3 illustrates this 
process in simplified form. In this figure, ten hypothetical members of the kidney 
transplant waiting list are shown in the spreadsheet to the left, and 20 members of the 
PSID (two of which have identical demographic characteristics as each of the waitlisted 
persons) are depicted to the right. In addition to the demographic characteristics, a weight 
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column and range column are assigned to the observations in the hypothetical PSID 
spreadsheet. The weight column is    
 , and the range column is the transformed version 
of this variable described above, constructed so that each PSID sample member is 
assigned a probability space equal to their value of    
 . Because more than one PSID 
sample member matches the characteristics of each transplant waiting list member, these 
range values are used to assign kinship networks for demographically identical persons in 
the PSID proportionally to such persons‟ share of the target population of the PSID. The 
u column in the waiting list spreadsheet is used to determine which kinship network is 
actually assigned, and rows which are assigned to waiting list members are highlighted in 
gray in the spreadsheet on the right, with arrows linking the merged observations. So, for 
instance, observation 1 in the waiting list spreadsheet in this illustration is assigned the 
kinship network of observation 1 in the PSID spreadsheet because their value of u was 
between 0 and 0.4, the range associated with that member of the PSID, and the 
observations otherwise match on demographic characteristics. If this person‟s u value had 
been .7 instead, the kinship network of observation 2 would have been assigned to them. 
 The virtue of this approach is to assign kinship networks to members of the 
kidney transplant waitlist based on one‟s kinship-relevant demographic characteristics, 
and also assigns kinship network directly proportionally to the sampling weights 
associated with the PSID observation in question. While imperfect, this procedure assigns 
observed kinship networks in a manner which preserves the association of demographic 
characteristics with kinship structure and maintains the population representativeness of 
the kinship distributions conditional on these demographic characteristics. 
Calculating the Opportunity Structure Distribution 
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 The procedures just described were used to assign kinship structures to transplant 
candidates, and probabilities of HLA and ABO histocompatibility, positive crossmatch, 
and medical contraindications to kinship network alters. These are the full list of 
proximate determinants of LDKT opportunity structure. As a final step, the joint 
distribution of these properties was calculated for each transplant candidate to generate a 
distribution of suitable living kidney donor ties within each assigned network. Each kin 
that meets the following conditions was counted as a suitable living kidney donor: a) 
ABO histocompatibility, b) two or more HLA matches, c) no positive crossmatch, d) no 
medical contraindication, and e) the kin is 18 years old or above. 
 Using this calculation, each transplant candidate was assigned the number of kin 
that meet these transplant suitability conditions, and also a dichotomous variable 
measuring whether they had any suitable donors in their kinship network. These were the 
primary dependent variables of the present analysis. Additionally, the distribution of 
living kidney donor suitability, and reasons for exclusion if not suitable, were preserved 
for each kin in the patient‟s kinship network. 
Calculating Counterfactual Effects 
 The procedures just described are sufficient, contingent on the assumptions of the 
simulation, to estimate the LDKT opportunity structure for whites and blacks on the 
kidney transplant waitlist. However, because these characteristics are jointly simulated, 
the role of each factor in producing differential LDKT opportunity structures will not be 
clear. To address this shortcoming, a series of counterfactual microsimulations were 
produced for each simulation run, in which the distributions of each proximate 
determinant of the LDKT opportunity structure (ABO and HLA match, PRA, kinship 
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structure, and medical contraindications) are redistributed at random across all kidney 
transplant candidates and then re-simulated. 
 Blacks and whites in the different datasets employed here enter the simulation 
with different distributions of the proximate determinants of the LDKT opportunity 
structure. By re-assigning these characteristics at random from the original distribution, 
irrespective of the other characteristics of the observed person, LDKT opportunity 
structures may be estimated in the absence of the baseline differences in these 
characteristics. The estimated effect of the distributional differences in the proximate 
determinant is then calculated as: 
                                           {
[(       )  (       )]
(       )
}                                           ( ) 
where    is the estimated percentage of the racial gap in LDKT opportunity structures 
explained,      and     are the median simulated values of the dependent variable in the 
non-counterfactual (baseline) simulation for races 1 and 2 respectively (where the group 
with the higher median value of the dependent variable is substituted into    ), and     
and     are the same median simulated values of the dependent variable when 
counterfactual simulations for X are conducted.  
The resultant value from this calculation may be interpreted as the percentage of 
the baseline simulation difference in the dependent variable explained by equalizing 
variable X. If    = 50, for instance, this means that the racial gap in the dependent 
variable is 50% smaller in the counterfactual condition than in the baseline simulation, 
suggesting that the group with the lower baseline median value of Y is disadvantaged by 
characteristic X. Additionally,     may take on negative values or values greater than 
100. In the former case, this is interpreted to mean that equalizing this factor increases the 
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simulated difference in the dependent variable by race, suggesting that the group with the 
lower median value of Y derived some advantage from racial differences in X. In the 
latter case,    >100 suggests that, not only is characteristics X a source of disadvantage 
for race 2, but that equalizing it would result in the disadvantaged group having an 
overall advantage in Y.  
Results 
Kidney Transplant Waitlist: Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the demographic composition of the U.S. 
population based on American Community Survey estimates 2001-2009 (Ruggles et al. 
2010), the same figures on the composition of the kidney transplant waitlist from July 1, 
2000 through February 26, 2010, and the ratio of their representations.  All figures are 
subsetted to include only white and black persons. The ratio column crudely measures the 
degree to which members of that demographic group are over- or under-represented on 
the kidney transplant waitlist during this time relative to their share of the population. 
Finally, the distribution of PRA for each group is presented. 
 The results of the ACS-UNOS demographic comparisons reveal the degree to 
which members of the American populace are overrepresented on the kidney transplant 
waitlist. Young persons are much less common than older persons to be on the kidney 
transplant waitlist, and persons aged 36-65 are much more likely to be on the waitlist. 
Educational patterns are also revealing – although those with less than a high school 
education are less likely than others to be on the waitlist, this is likely due to the 
association of this educational attainment with younger ages. For all other educational 
categories, higher education is associated with lower rates of transplantation waitlisted. 
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Additionally, males are much more likely than females to be on the transplant waitlist. 
Finally, African Americans are greatly overrepresented on the transplant waitlist – 
approximately 2.57 times more likely to be on the waitlist than their representation in the 
population. 
 Table 1 also reveals appreciable demographic patterns of PRA among those on 
the kidney transplant waitlist. While the average PRA score is .175, patients aged 51-65, 
less educated persons, women, and African Americans have substantially higher PRA 
scores on average than their age, education, gender, and racial counterparts. The 
remainder of this section is organized around a series of questions the present analyses 
are designed to answer. 
Could Patterns of Medical Contraindications Explain Racial Differences in LDKT? 
 Table 2 presents the demographic distribution of contraindications for living 
kidney donation, as estimated using NHANES 1999-2008 data. The „All‟ column 
describes the joint distribution of contraindications and the remaining columns describe 
their individual distribution. Age exclusions are represented in the „All‟ column only. 
According to these estimates, 77.5% of whites and 81.6% of blacks are excluded from 
living kidney donation for medical or demographic reasons. These results suggest health 
condition disadvantages for African Americans when pursuing an LDKT.  
However, the results also show substantial variability in the racial patterns of 
medical exclusions. African Americans have higher prevalences of hypertension, 
diabetes, obesity, albuminuria, hepatitis B, hepatitis C, and HIV than whites. However, 
whites are subject to higher prevalences of abnormal glucose tolerance, psychiatric 
disorders, coronary artery disease, chronic lung disease, cancer, low creatinine clearance 
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rate, and peripheral artery disease exclusions. On balance the joint distribution of these 
characteristics produce a moderate disadvantage for African Americans when pursuing an 
LDKT. 
Could Race Differences in Kinship Structure Explain Racial Differences in LDKT? 
Table 3 presents the distribution of biologically-informed kinship ties, as assigned 
to members of the kidney transplant waitlist using the weighted matching algorithm 
described above. These results suggest that African Americans on the kidney transplant 
waiting list are likely to have larger kinship networks on average as well as greater 
variability in their distribution of kinship ties. Furthermore, this difference holds for 
every measured kinship type. Together, these results indicate that the LDKT opportunity 
structures of African Americans are advantaged by the overall size of their networks and 
the number of close genetic relatives therein. 
Could Race Differences in Histocompatibility Probabilities Explain Racial 
Differences in LDKT? 
Table 4 presents the distribution of ABO and HLA histocompatibility by race and 
genetic relationship with alters of the same race, calculated as described above. For 
members of both races, the probability of ABO histocompatibility is higher for close 
genetic relatives than for more distant genetic relatives and unrelated alters. However, the 
probability of ABO histocompatibility is moderately high (>40%) for even unrelated 
alters of both races. This analysis also shows evidence that the probability of ABO 
histocompatibility is slightly higher for whites than for blacks for all genetic relationship 
types, and this race difference grows with decreasing genetic relationships with the alters 
in question. So, for instance, the probability that a white person is ABO compatible with 
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their full sibling is only 2% higher for whites than for blacks, but this difference is 4.2% 
for unrelated alters. 
Similar patterns are observed for probabilities of HLA histocompatibility degree. 
For members of both races, parents and full siblings offer the best chance for a strong 
HLA match degree. Parents are guaranteed to share three or more HLA alleles with their 
children, but the marginal probability of additional matches beyond three decreases 
rapidly. In contrast, full siblings have a moderately high chance (approximately 25%) of 
being a full HLA match with one another. On the other end of the genetic relationship 
spectrum, unrelated alters have greater than a 50% of having no HLA matches with the 
transplant candidate, reflecting the high degree of polymorphism in the HLA-A, -B, and –
DR loci.  
These calculations also reveal that whites are more likely to have a high degree of 
HLA match with their kinship alters conditional on genetic relationships, and that this 
difference grows with declining genetic relationships with the alters. Altogether, these 
results demonstrate that whites have a higher probability of genetic histocompatibility 
with given members of their kinship network conditional on genetic relationship with that 
alter. 
How do Kinship Structure, Health Patterns, and Histocompatibility Probabilities 
Jointly Shape the LDKT Opportunity Structure by Race? 
Table 5 presents the simulated distribution of suitable living donors, as defined 
above. The results suggest that whites are actually somewhat less likely to have at least 
one suitable living donor in their kinship networks than are blacks. 58.2% of white ESRD 
patients are simulated to have a suitable living kidney donor in their kinship network, 
whereas this is true of 62.5% of black ESRD patients. Furthermore, among those 
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simulated to have a suitable donor in their network, blacks on average are simulated to 
have more such donors than are whites. 
The results also illustrate racial differences in this difference by genetic 
relationship type. For instance, whites are slightly more likely to have a suitable sibling 
or child living kidney donor whereas blacks are more likely to have at least one suitable 
such donor in all other genetic relationship categories. Children are the relationship 
category in which patients are most likely to have a suitable donor, followed, 
surprisingly, by non-biological kin. This latter effect is a result of the fact that most 
kinship networks have a very large number of kin with no defined biological tie to the 
reference person. 
Taken together, these results suggest that African American patients on the kidney 
transplantation waitlist are more likely to have a suitable living kidney donor in their 
kinship network, and more likely to have more than one such suitable donor, than are 
white persons. 
What is the Probability that Each Member of One’s Kinship Network Will Be a 
Suitable Living Kidney Donor? 
 While Table 5 presented the distribution of suitable living donors from the 
waitlisted patient‟s perspective, Table 6 describes the probability that each individual 
member of one‟s kinship network will be a suitable living donor, stratified by race and 
genetic relationship type. Table 6 also provides the probabilities of living donor 
exclusions for HLA histocompatibility, ABO histocompatibility, medical or age 
contraindication, or positive crossmatch reasons. (These outcomes do not add up to 100% 
because a donor can be excluded for more than one reason.) 
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 These results suggest that a random member of a white person‟s kinship network 
is more likely to be a suitable living donor than a random member of a black person‟s 
kinship network. On average, 6.4% of white kinship alters are simulated to be a suitable 
living donor, while this is true for only 5.4% of black kinship alters. Black kinship alters 
are more likely than white kinship alters to be excluded for HLA, ABO, medical 
contraindication, and positive crossmatch reasons. 
 These results also suggest considerable variability in the probability that a given 
kinship alter will be a suitable living donor by genetic relationship. Whites‟ full siblings, 
parents, children, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, first cousins, and unrelated kin are more 
likely than comparable black alters to be a suitable living donor, whereas black half 
siblings are more likely than whites‟ half siblings to be an appropriate living donor. 
Finally, the probability of living donor suitability varies proportionately with the genetic 
relationship degree – full siblings, children, and parents are the most likely suitable living 
donors, whereas non-biological kin have a very low probability of being a suitable living 
donor. 
What are the Contributions of Genetics, Kinship Structure, Health, and PRA to 
Racial Differences in LDKT Opportunity Structures? 
 To answer this question, counterfactual microsimulations were estimated in which 
each of four factors – genetic distributions, kinship structures, health statuses, and PRA – 
were re-assigned to the appropriate individuals at random while preserving their overall 
distributions. The results of this exercise confirm the findings of the previous analyses 
(Table 7). Genetics are a source of LDKT opportunity structure for whites – equalizing 
the probability of genetic match degree results in a 14.5% increase in black opportunity 
structure advantage in the proportion of patients with suitable living donors in their 
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kinship network, as well as a 40.6% increase in their advantage in the average number of 
suitable living donors. Health distributions are a very small source of white advantage, 
and equalizing this factor adds only .8% and 1.5% to the black advantage in the 
proportion with a suitable donor and the number of donors respectively. PRA differences 
by race are also a source of white advantage in the LDKT opportunity structure. 
Equalizing this factor results in an 18.7% increase in the black advantage in the 
proportion with suitable donors and a 20.4% increase in the average number of donors. 
Finally, all factors were equalized simultaneously to confirm that this equalizes the 
LDKT opportunity structure. It does – whites and blacks have equivalent LDKT 
opportunity structures when all four factors are equalized. 
 In summary, whites transplant candidates are on average expected to be 
advantaged in the LDKT opportunity structures by their higher probability of genetic 
histocompatibility, favorable health status, and lower probability of antigen crossmatch. 
In contrast, the African American advantage in the LDKT opportunity structure stems 
from their larger average kinship structures. Equalizing this factor gives whites on 
average a higher proportion of kinship structures including a suitable living donor and a 
higher average number of such donors than blacks.  
What Proportion of Suitable Living Donors Contribute Kidneys for 
Transplantation? 
 As a crude analysis of the answer to this question, the proportion of white and 
black transplant candidates who actually obtained an LDKT transplant is compared to the 
proportion estimated to have a suitable donor in their kinship structure in Table 8. The 
results suggest that, conditional on having a suitable donor in one‟s kinship structure, 
whites are more likely to obtain an LDKT than are blacks. Although a higher proportion 
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of black patients are estimated to have a suitable donor, they are less than half as likely to 
actually obtain an LDKT as are whites. Furthermore, the proportion of members of both 
races actually obtaining an LDKT is substantially lower than the proportion estimated to 
have a suitable donor in their network. 
Discussion 
 This paper investigates racial differences in the opportunity for LDKT in the 
kinship structures of whites and blacks on the kidney transplant waitlist. By matching 
data on the distribution of kinship ties, medical contraindications for living kidney 
donation, the probability of HLA and ABO histocompatibility degrees, and the 
probability of positive crossmatches between candidates and kin, this research examines 
how kinship structures, health conditions, and genetic and immunological factors shape 
the opportunity for LDKT. If whites and blacks substantially differ in their LDKT 
opportunity structures, this could partially explain racial differences in LDKT rates.  
 The results show that this is not the case. If anything, blacks are likely to have 
suitable living kidney donors in their kinship structures at higher rates than whites, and 
have more such kin in their network conditional on having any. However, each individual 
white kin has a higher probability of being a suitable living donor than comparable black 
kin. 
 In light of research on the living donor search behaviors of kidney transplant 
candidates and their kin, however, these results suggest a mechanism by which LDKT 
opportunity structures could produce racial disparities in LDKT. According to one study, 
only about half of transplant candidates bring in any potential donors for evaluation, and 
of those who do so, the large majority bring in two or fewer potential donors (Weng et al. 
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2010). Furthermore, black potential donors are less likely to complete the evaluation 
process and are more likely to be excluded for medical, genetic, or immunological 
reasons, conforming to the patterns observed here. Therefore, because transplant 
candidates do not have their full social networks evaluated for donation, it may be that 
the probability that a given alter is a suitable donor is the more important determinant of 
LDKT outcomes than the number of suitable donors in one‟s total network. 
 Additional factors which are hypothesized to moderate the relationship between 
LDKT opportunity structures and LDKTs may shed additional light on the causes of 
racial inequalities in LDKT. First, racial differences in kin relations could structure the 
probability that kin are evaluated for donation and proceed with donation conditional on a 
positive evaluation. Second, racial differences in beliefs concerning the appropriateness 
and benefits of LDKT could influence these differences. However, racial differences in 
the rates at which potential donors are evaluated for donation are minor (Weng et al. 
2010) and are unlikely to play a major role in the explanation of these differences. 
 Racial differences in interactions with the health care system may also play a 
substantial role in the mediation of the effect of the LDKT opportunity structure on 
LDKT rates. If medical providers differentially promote and support living donor 
evaluation among whites and blacks, this could potentially explain racial differences in 
the rates at which donors are brought in for evaluation, complete evaluations, and donate 
kidneys conditional on positive evaluations. Racial differences in knowledge of 
transplantation could play a similar role in the mediation of this difference. 
 Many of the factors which can preclude kidney donation are subject to potential 
interventions. Progress in techniques to ameliorate the effects of positive crossmatching, 
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HLA mismatching, and the ABO barrier may affect racial differences in the LDKT 
opportunity structure in the future. Although none of these techniques offer candidate and 
graft survival rates equivalent to those for more ideal kidney donor-candidate 
combinations, should progress continue to be made on these fronts it may be that these 
may undermine racial differences in the LDKT opportunity structure. 
 Furthermore, many health conditions which preclude living kidney donation are 
linked to lifestyle and environmental differences which are potentially modifiable. For 
instance, diabetes, abnormal glucose tolerance, and obesity prevalences have been 
growing in the general population, particularly for African Americans, and are linked to 
quality of diet and exercise. Should these trends be reversed in an equitable fashion this 
could raise rates of LDKT and ameliorate racial inequalities therein. 
 The results of this analysis also suggest that white and black patients are 
underutilizing their LDKT opportunity structures, although blacks do so to a greater 
degree. In principle, these results suggest that rates of LDKT could be increased by a 
factor of three for whites and seven for blacks. While an increase on this scale is unlikely, 
this suggests that there is room for higher LDKT rates among whites and blacks, and that 
if whites and blacks searched throughout the entirety of their kinship networks, racial 
inequalities in LDKT could be eliminated or reversed.  
Finally, efforts to increase the rate at which white and black transplant candidates 
search throughout their full kinship networks could serve to improve transplantation 
prospects for those without suitable living donors in their kinship networks. Because 
there is a shortage of kidneys compared to the kidney transplant waitlist, each additional 
LDKT implies a marginally improved transplant prospect for all others on the waitlist. Of 
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course, any efforts to increase the rate at which LDKT opportunity structures are 
converted into transplants should be conducted in a non-coercive manner. 
 This research is subject to a number of limitations, the foremost of which is that 
direct data on the kinship networks of kidney transplant candidates is unavailable except 
for those alters who actually donate kidneys. Although this study is conducted using high 
quality data on kidney transplant candidates and on the distribution of biologically-
informed kinship ties by race and patterns of relevant health conditions, the simulations 
discussed here require a number of strong assumptions. The most important of these 
assumptions are that: a) conditional on race, kidney transplant candidates ABO and HLA 
genes are representative of the population; b) conditional on race, age, education, and 
gender, members of the kidney transplant waitlist are subject to similar distributions of 
kinship ties to that of the general population; and c) conditional on race, age, education, 
and gender, the kin of members of the kidney transplant waitlist are subject to identical 
probabilities of medical contraindications to that of the general population. The degree to 
which these assumptions are consequentially violated should be a subject of future 
research
36
. 
Conclusion 
 This paper reports on a simulation analysis of the distribution of suitable living 
kidney donors in the kinship networks of white and black kidney transplant candidates. 
The goal was to investigate the possibility that racial differences in the availability of kin 
                                                 
36
 Although it would be preferable to attempt to surmise the effects of likely violations of these 
assumptions, the complex nature of the problem precludes typical reasoning about this problem. For 
instance, the HLA genes are qualitative variables with numerous categories. Thinking in terms of 
directional bias in anticipating the biasing effects of the assumption that transplant candidates‟ genotypes 
are representative conditional on race is unhelpful in such a case. However, the conclusions of this paper 
are bolstered by the conformity of its findings to that implied by much of the medical literature on racial 
disparities in transplantation. The primary advantage of the present study is that the effects of these factors 
may be quantitatively estimated rather than merely hypothesized. 
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who would be suitable kidney donors could explain racial differences in LDKT rates. To 
the contrary, however, the results of the analysis suggest that blacks and whites have 
approximately the same probability of having a suitable living donor in their kinship 
network, although the probability that an individual member of the kinship network is a 
suitable living donor is somewhat higher for whites than for blacks. While white kidney 
transplant candidates are advantaged by their higher probabilities of genetic similarity 
with their kin, their lower probabilities of positive crossmatching therewith, and slightly 
advantaged in the health characteristics of their kin, the larger typical size of black 
kinship networks ameliorates this advantage. 
 Demographers and sociologists have much to contribute to the understanding of 
racial inequalities in kidney transplantation. Racial differences in kinship structures, kin 
relations, interactions with medical care providers, beliefs and knowledge concerning 
transplantation, and genetic and immunological factors may go far in explaining racial 
disparities in deceased and living donor kidney transplantation. Social scientists know 
much about these topics. Although the present results do not explain racial differences in 
LDKT directly, they do suggest a major role for well-studied social processes in the 
production of these disparities. By engaging with medical researchers in the analysis of 
this important and growing problem, social science can do much to improve 
understanding of racial disparities in kidney disease and transplantation. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 4.1: US Population and Kidney Transplant Waitlist Characteristics, 2000-
2010 
     Percentages  PRA 
Variable Category ACS UNOS Ratio Mean SD 
Overall -- -- -- -- 0.175 (0.31) 
Age 0-20 28.09 7.92 0.28 0.129 (0.30) 
 21-35 19.64 12.72 0.65 0.175 (0.34) 
 36-50 22.69 32.25 1.42 0.167 (0.27) 
 51-65 17.20 34.97 2.03 0.198 (0.35) 
 66+ 12.38 12.13 0.98 0.161 (0.31) 
Education <HS 33.62 22.13 0.66 0.127 (0.27) 
 HS 29.30 37.25 1.27 0.232 (0.28) 
 SC 18.33 21.47 1.17 0.168 (0.32) 
 BA+ 18.75 19.15 1.02 0.129 (0.31) 
Gender Male 48.95 59.15 1.21 0.127 (0.33) 
 Female 51.05 40.85 0.80 0.244 (0.29) 
Race White 86.00 64.07 0.75 0.152 (0.27) 
 Black 14.00 35.93 2.57 0.218 (0.36) 
NOTE: PRA means „Panel Reactive Antibody,‟ a measure of immunological 
presensitization scaled 0-1, representing the proportion of the US populace for whose 
HLA antigens one‟s immune system has already generated antibodies. ACS figures are 
weighted percentages in these categories in the 2001-2009 American Community Survey 
IPUMS 1% samples among blacks and whites only. UNOS figures are percentages in 
these categories on the UNOS waitlist 7/1/2000 through 2/26/2010 among blacks and 
whites only. Ratio is the ratio of the UNOS percentage divided by the ACS percentage 
and is interpreted as a measure of the degree to which this category is over- or under-
represented on the kidney transplantation waitlist relative to its share of the population.
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Table 4.2: Percentage Distribution of Contraindications by Demographic Categories and Contraindication Type 
Variable Category Contraindications 
  All HYP DIAB GLTT PSYC OBES COAR CHLD CANC CRCL PARD ALBM HEP 
Race White 77.50 2.17 6.61 20.46 13.63 7.55 4.00 9.50 6.50 19.65 3.99 0.18 1.99 
  Black 81.58 3.23 7.18 10.09 8.97 10.37 1.10 7.88 1.97 10.04 2.90 0.39 2.98 
Gender Male 78.12 3.17 6.91 16.45 10.46 6.41 3.92 7.50 4.94 13.83 3.39 0.33 2.99 
  Female 79.99 1.99 6.75 16.54 13.20 10.80 1.87 10.24 4.59 18.06 3.75 0.20 1.76 
Education <HS 77.97 5.16 18.59 31.06 15.45 14.80 7.52 13.62 9.61 38.07 9.51 0.89 5.79 
  HS 70.21 4.31 12.18 27.64 15.64 13.67 5.14 9.47 8.72 28.98 6.73 0.37 4.33 
  SC 65.53 4.71 9.45 23.46 14.14 15.08 4.40 10.56 7.39 22.14 5.05 0.27 3.60 
  BA+ 60.54 3.85 7.23 22.10 14.10 9.14 3.68 7.92 8.59 22.67 4.35 0.27 2.66 
Age 0-20 91.24 0.10 0.54 4.35 8.05 2.83 0.00 6.99 0.02 1.00 0.00 0.03 0.17 
  21-35 37.28 1.88 2.00 7.94 8.78 12.93 0.11 8.24 1.25 2.47 0.00 0.05 1.47 
  36-50 60.83 6.77 6.88 16.76 16.44 15.77 1.01 9.62 3.41 7.32 2.95 0.35 5.94 
  51-65 77.95 6.58 17.52 26.61 16.08 17.39 6.13 11.80 8.20 21.65 5.95 0.63 5.01 
  66+ 95.94 3.55 20.22 49.44 17.96 8.71 12.30 11.87 19.39 71.54 15.18 0.74 4.29 
NOTE: Figures in cells are shown as percentages. The following abbreviations for kidney donation contraindications are used: 
HYP: hypertension; DIAB: diabetes; GLTT: glucose tolerance test; PSYC: psychiatric disorders; OBES: obesity; COAR: 
coronary artery disease; CHLD: chronic lung disease; CANC: cancer; CRCL: creatinine clearance; PARD: peripheral artery 
disease; ALBM: albuminuria; HEP: Hepatitis B, C, or HIV. See Appendix ___ for the measures and cutoffs used to define 
each contraindication in this study. The following abbreviations are used for educational categories: <HS: less than high 
school; HS: high school or GED; SC: some college but no four year degree; BA+: four year college degree or more. 
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Table 4.3: Measured Biological Kinship Tie Distribution, by Race 
  WHITES BLACKS 
  Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation 
Kinship Type Median 90% Interval Median 90% Interval Median 90% Interval Median 90% Interval 
All 20.11 (19.99,20.23) 16.09 (15.96,16.23) 27.93 (27.63,28.35) 21.63 (21.36,21.93) 
Full Siblings 0.63 (0.61,0.65) 1.32 (1.30,1.34) 0.75 (0.72,0.81) 1.88 (1.81,1.94) 
Half Siblings 0.22 (0.21,0.22) 0.80 (0.78,0.81) 0.73 (0.70,0.80) 1.73 (1.68,1.82) 
Parents 0.66 (0.65,0.70) 0.89 (0.88,0.90) 0.69 (0.67,0.72) 0.82 (0.82,0.83) 
Children 1.91 (1.84,1.93) 1.43 (1.42,1.45) 2.23 (2.17,2.26) 1.88 (1.86,1.95) 
Grandparents 0.14 (0.13,0.20) 0.47 (0.46,0.57) 0.18 (0.16,0.23) 0.49 (0.47,0.56) 
Grandchildren 1.59 (1.51,1.66) 2.75 (2.69,2.81) 2.09 (1.97,2.17) 3.34 (3.25,3.42) 
Aunts/Uncles 0.12 (0.11,0.19) 0.65 (0.63,0.82) 0.17 (0.15,0.25) 1.00 (0.93,1.19) 
Nieces/Nephews 0.95 (0.89,0.97) 2.59 (2.52,2.63) 1.07 (0.98,1.16) 3.05 (2.92,3.16) 
1st Cousins 0.28 (0.27,0.45) 1.53 (1.48,1.89) 0.67 (0.61,0.91) 2.77 (2.61,3.21) 
Non-Biological Kin 13.58 (13.46,13.69) 13.83 (13.72,13.97) 19.32 (19.08,19.70) 18.62 (18.43,18.84) 
NOTE: Standard deviation columns indicate the average within-group standard deviation in the number of indicated kinship 
ties. 90% Interval columns indicate the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles of these values across simulations.
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Table 4.4: Percentage Distribution of ABO Compatibility and HLA Match Degree 
by Race and Genetic Relationship 
    
ABO 
Compatible 
HLA Matches (Out of 6) 
Genetic 
Relationship 
Race (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Parent-
Child  
White 64.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 71.6 24.3 3.8 0.3 
Black 63.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 75.9 21.7 2.2 0.1 
r=.500  
White 68.8 12.8 8.8 2.8 36.4 12.2 1.9 25.2 
Black 66.8 14.4 8.2 2.0 38.3 10.9 1.1 25.0 
r=.250  
White 55.4 25.5 17.5 5.6 36.9 12.3 1.9 0.2 
Black 52.4 28.8 16.5 4.1 38.5 10.9 1.1 0.0 
r=.125  
White 50.7 38.3 26.3 8.5 19.6 6.3 1.0 0.1 
Black 47.1 43.3 24.7 6.1 19.8 5.5 0.6 0.0 
r=0  
White 46.0 51.1 35.0 11.3 2.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Black 41.8 57.7 33.0 8.1 1.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
NOTE: HLA match percentages are gray scaled such that darker cells indicate higher 
match probabilities. ABO and HLA matches are defined as having alleles which are 
either identical or serologically equivalent to one‟s alleles. Probabilities were calculated 
using genetic probability theory and the ABO and HLA-A, -B, and –DR distributions on 
the kidney transplantation waitlist – see text for details. No parents or children were 
excluded for HLA reasons because all parents and children share at least three HLA 
genes in common.
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Table 4.5: Distribution of Simulated Donor Supply, by Race and Genetic 
Relationship 
    Number of Donors: 
Genetic 
Relationship 
Race (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5+) 
All  
White 41.8 30.4 15.4 6.8 3.0 2.7 
Black 37.5 30.4 16.8 8.0 3.7 3.7 
Full Siblings  
White 89.6 8.0 1.9 0.4 0.1 0.0 
Black 90.3 6.8 2.0 0.6 0.2 0.1 
Half Siblings  
White 98.3 1.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Black 94.4 4.6 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Parents  
White 91.7 7.6 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Black 91.6 7.9 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Children  
White 67.8 23.2 7.3 1.4 0.2 0.0 
Black 68.0 23.0 6.9 1.6 0.3 0.2 
Grandparents  
White 99.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Black 98.9 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Grandchildren  
White 93.3 5.6 0.9 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Black 91.4 7.2 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 
Aunts/ 
Uncles  
White 98.7 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Black 98.7 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Nieces/ 
Nephews  
White 94.8 3.8 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 
Black 94.1 4.1 1.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 
1st Cousins  
White 98.7 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Black 97.4 2.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Non-Biological 
Kin  
White 82.6 13.9 2.7 0.6 0.2 0.1 
Black 79.5 16.0 3.4 0.8 0.2 0.1 
NOTE: Numbers in cells are expressed as percentages.
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Table 4.6: Percentage Simulated Living Donor Evaluation Outcome, by Race and 
Genetic Relationship 
      Exclusions 
Genetic 
Relationship 
Race Donor HLA ABO 
Contra- 
indication 
Positive 
Cross-
match 
All 
White 6.43 62.48 48.50 69.05 11.59 
Black 5.44 64.31 52.57 69.87 15.12 
Full Siblings 
White 21.00 21.91 31.38 58.72 7.10 
Black 18.18 21.92 33.27 62.77 9.06 
Half Siblings 
White 8.72 43.84 44.92 69.49 10.69 
Black 9.17 43.87 47.79 65.41 13.38 
Parents 
White 13.45 0.00 35.40 77.63 7.11 
Black 12.88 0.00 37.11 77.47 9.07 
Children 
White 22.30 0.00 35.17 63.20 6.85 
Black 18.87 0.00 37.07 66.98 9.14 
Grandparents 
White 6.21 43.88 44.90 78.38 10.55 
Black 6.19 43.90 47.90 76.76 12.80 
Grandchildren 
White 5.22 43.87 44.58 81.92 9.87 
Black 5.09 43.85 47.85 80.83 13.96 
Aunts/ 
Uncles 
White 11.84 43.77 44.99 58.88 10.32 
Black 9.30 43.86 47.98 65.38 12.45 
Nieces/  
Nephews 
White 7.44 43.87 44.94 74.06 10.79 
Black 7.63 43.91 47.86 71.07 13.79 
1st Cousins 
White 5.37 65.82 49.78 66.08 12.23 
Black 4.87 65.84 53.28 66.13 14.78 
Non-Biological 
Kin 
White 1.67 87.74 54.26 67.02 13.60 
Black 1.40 87.73 58.54 68.63 17.61 
NOTE: The „Donor‟ column is the percentage of kin of that relationship type simulated to 
be a suitable living donor – i.e., at least two HLA matches, a compatible ABO blood 
type, no contraindication health conditions, and no positive crossmatch. The remaining 
columns are the percentage of kin of that type excluded for the indicated reason. These 
categories are non-exclusive – if a family member was excluded for multiple reasons they 
are included in the numerator for all such reasons. No parents or children were excluded 
for HLA reasons because all parents and children share at least three HLA genes in 
common.
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Table 4.7: Estimated Percentage Race Gap Explained, by Simulation 
Counterfactual 
ANY DONOR 
  Whites Blacks % Race Gap 
Explained Counterfactual Mean 90% Interval Mean 90% Interval 
Baseline 0.58 (0.57,0.59) 0.63 (0.61,0.64) -- 
Genetic 0.59 (0.58,0.60) 0.64 (0.63,0.65) -14.48 
Kinship 0.60 (0.59,0.61) 0.59 (0.58,0.60) 123.26 
Health 0.58 (0.57,0.59) 0.62 (0.61,0.64) -0.81 
PRA 0.58 (0.57,0.59) 0.63 (0.62,0.64) -18.72 
All 0.61 (0.60,0.61) 0.61 (0.60,0.61) 95.84 
NUMBER OF DONORS 
  Whites Blacks % Race Gap 
Explained Counterfactual Mean 90% Interval Mean 90% Interval 
Baseline 1.10 (1.08,1.11) 1.25 (1.20,1.29) -- 
Genetic 1.07 (1.06,1.09) 1.29 (1.25,1.33) -40.59 
Kinship 1.18 (1.16,1.20) 1.10 (1.07,1.13) 150.76 
Health 1.09 (1.07,1.11) 1.25 (1.21,1.29) -1.53 
PRA 1.08 (1.06,1.11) 1.27 (1.24,1.30) -20.39 
All 1.15 (1.12,1.17) 1.15 (1.13,1.17) 97.23 
NOTE: 90% interval columns indicate the range in the indicated figure for the 5
th
 and 95
th
 
percentiles of simulations for the indicated counterfactual condition. The „% Race Gap 
Explained‟ column is the percentage degree to which the race gap between blacks 
(higher) and whites (lower) is ameliorated in the counterfactual condition. Negative 
values in this column indicate an increase in this gap; values between 0 and 100 indicate 
a partial amelioration, and values greater than 100 indicate a reversal of the inequality.
  
 
Table 4.8: Ratio of Living Donor Transplants to Simulated Available Living Donors, 
by Race 
Race 
Living Donor Transplant 
(Observed) 
Available Living Donor 
(Simulated) 
% Available 
Transplanted 
White 0.192 0.585 32.8 
Black 0.088 0.618 14.2 
NOTE: „% Available Transplanted‟ is calculated as (Transplant / Available)*100, and 
interpretable as the estimated percentage of suitable living donors who actually donate a 
kidney for transplantation. Observed living donor transplant rates by race are subsetted to 
candidates on the waiting list 2000-2007 only to adjust for censoring differences by race. 
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Figure 4.1: Theoretical Framework 
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of Research Design 
 
NOTE: The black circle indicates the reference transplant candidate; other circles 
represent kin. The blue sections of each kin circle represent the probability that a person 
of that relationship type will be a medically and genetically suitable living donor for the 
reference person. The black X indicates that this person is deceased. This figure is for 
illustrative purposes only. 
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Figure 4.3: Illustration of Kinship Network Matching Algorithm 
 
NOTE: This figure is for illustrative purposes only. The spreadsheet on the left represents 
the kidney transplant waiting list data. The „u‟ column in this spreadsheet represents 
values drawn from a uniform random distribution. The spreadsheet on the right represents 
persons in the PSID data, from which kinship ego networks will be probabilistically 
assigned to waiting list candidates. The rows highlighted in dark indicate the PSID 
observations whose kinship networks were simulated to be assigned to waiting list 
candidates, and the arrows link the merged observations. Observations are merged based 
on identical race, education, age, and gender combinations, then PSID observations 
meeting these requirements are assigned proportionate to their sample weights, using the 
uniform random draw assigned to the kidney transplant candidates („u‟) compared to the 
weight range assigned to the PSID candidate („Range‟ column). The range column is 
constructed to have a range equal to the proportion of total weights for demographically 
identical persons represented by the observation‟s weight. Further details are provided in 
the text of the paper. 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five: Conclusion 
Despite the attention which has been lavished on the topic of social inequalities in 
health in recent years, relatively little research has investigated disparities in kidney 
disease and transplantation outside of medical and public health circles (but see Fox and 
Swazey 1978; Fox and Swazey 1992; Healy 2006; Lock 2002; Sharp 2006; Shoham et al. 
2008). In this dissertation, I have argued that a sociological perspective on the allocation 
of kidneys for transplantation improves our understanding of this important topic. 
Furthermore, I argue that the case of social inequalities in kidney transplant could 
improve sociological understanding of allocative systems as well. 
The Value of a Sociological Perspective on Kidney Transplantation 
 A sociological approach to social inequalities in the kidney transplantation system 
offers a number of insights. First, a sociological perspective emphasizes that kidney 
transplantation is a social system with a set of rules governing kidney allocation. The 
facets of this allocation system evolve over time in response to increasing knowledge of 
immunology and surgical techniques, as well as changing political pressures and the 
system‟s self-understanding. The primary function of UNOS from a stratification 
perspective is to establish “the rules of the game” (Schwalbe 2007) by which transplant 
candidates seek and obtain kidney transplants. These rules are primarily established 
through the practices governing waitlisting, deceased donor allocation, and potential 
living donor evaluation. Changing the rules over time, as UNOS does periodically, 
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evolves the structure of this social system, determining in part which biosocial 
differences between subpopulations will serve as the mechanisms of social inequality. 
 Second, a sociological perspective highlights the permeability and limitations of 
this system. Although UNOS has great power to shape the fates of transplant candidates 
and recipients, and although it uses this power in large part to promote social equity in 
the transplantation system, it has little power to influence the social structure outside of 
its institutional confines. Distributional differences in immunological genes, places of 
residence, kinship patterns and access to salubrious socioeconomic resources are outside 
of its purview. This dynamic highlights the difficulties of constructing a just allocation 
system in a deeply stratified society. So many facets of social life in the U.S. are subject 
to social inequalities that even objectively justifiable allocative rules will tend to result in 
relatively poor outcomes for traditionally disadvantaged groups.  
 Third, the findings of this research highlight the limitations of taking a primarily 
medically-based, individualistic approach to understanding social disparities in 
transplantation outcomes. A great deal of medical research on social disparities in the 
transplantation system emphasizes the role of group differences in genetic, 
immunological, and attitudinal factors (e.g., Navaneethan and Singh 2006; Ting and 
Edwards 2004)
37
. While the findings of the present research agree that at least the first 
two factors play a key role, a sociological perspective emphasizes that many other factors 
are important, particularly in waitlisting behavior and pursuit of a living donor kidney 
transplant. In the first case, it is likely that local waiting list dynamics, geography, and 
socioeconomic resources are important determinants of one‟s ability to enroll in multiple 
waiting lists and enroll in the waiting list preemptively, which other research has shown 
                                                 
37
 This literature is certainly not limited to these factors, but they do predominate. 
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to be an important mediator of socioeconomic disparities in transplantation outcomes 
(Ardekani and Orlowski 2010; Axelrod et al. 2010; Kasiske et al. 1998; Keith et al. 2008; 
Merion et al. 2004). In the second case, the confluence of kinship structure and 
characteristics with the network of family relationships and attitudes will likely explain 
much concerning racial disparities in LDKT. To their credit, many medical researchers 
have recently begun to think about the problem in this way, as well (Arthur 2002; Clark 
et al. 2008; Fathi-Ashtiani et al. 2007), although much of their conceptualization of social 
network effects is limited to factors such as information diffusion, marital quality, and 
social support. A notable exception to this tendency is provided by a recent paper (Ladin 
and Hanto 2010), which argues for a fuller conceptualization of social network effects, 
and anticipate my research on the living donor kidney transplant opportunity structure
38
. 
 Taking a sociological perspective when investigating social disparities in 
transplantation also has methodological implications. For one, it emphasizes that 
individual outcomes are not individualistic – rather, who gets a transplant and when is 
fundamentally dependent on candidates‟ own history as well as the characteristics and 
outcomes of other transplant candidates and deceased donors. The typical regression-
based methodologies applied to the study of inequalities in kidney transplantation are ill-
equipped to account for this important facet of this system and likely result in substantial 
coefficient biases. In addition to these methods‟ technical shortcomings for this topic, 
such research misses a key opportunity to directly model the rules of the game. Because 
                                                 
38
 They write, “From an ethical perspective, if we find that Black patients exhibit low rates of LDKT due to 
the ineligibility of their social network (e.g. high prevalence of hypertension, diabetes, or obesity in social 
network), this presents a significant disparity between chances of Whites, who can rely on social contacts, 
and Blacks whose only option may be wait listed. Identifying which social networks contain eligible donors 
and how those networks might be approached and strengthened is critical to increasing successful LDKT” 
(Ladin & Hanto 2010:476). 
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the allocation algorithm for kidneys is publicly available, by modeling this process 
directly we are able to achieve far better understanding of the mechanisms by which 
inequalities are produced and potentially ameliorated. 
 Finally, sociological research on the family suggests potential mechanisms by 
which African Americans could obtain living donor kidney transplants at lower rates than 
whites despite their apparently similar access to suitable living donors in their kinship 
networks. Kidneys for transplant are gifts, and gifts are subject to rules of structured 
exchange (Nelson 2000; Stack 1974). Norms of reciprocity are a frequent element of this 
exchange structure and much research suggests that these reciprocity demands are 
disproportionately strong for African Americans (Miller-Cribbs and Farber 2008; Testa 
and Slack 2002). Previous work has termed the strains such a debtor-creditor relationship 
can place on kin relations the “tyranny of the gift” (Fox and Swazey 1978; Fox and 
Swazey 1992) because kidney transplants are so significant and irreversible. Faced with 
the prospect of such strains, it may be that many African Americans forgo seeking an 
LDKT rather than potentially cause irreparable harm to their kin relations. 
Lessons from the Case of Kidney Transplantation for Sociology 
 Sociologists in the social stratification tradition frequently use the analogy that 
societies are an allocative system which creates valued goods and social positions and 
sorts individuals according to a particular logic (e.g., Davis and Moore 1945). (Of course, 
which logic is thought to govern this process varies widely.) Because we have access to 
such high quality data on kidney transplantation and the rules of allocation in this system, 
the findings of the present research offer a number of lessons for those who may seek to 
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understand the properties of allocation systems generally and health inequality 
specifically.  
 First, the nature of the kidney allocation system orients one to key features of 
more sociologically familiar allocation systems. In the kidney transplantation system, 
over time a series of valued resources (deceased donor kidneys) become available, and a 
set of persons seeking this resource (transplant candidates) compete to obtain these 
resources. Some of these resources are more valued than others (since some kidneys are 
healthier than others) and the value of the resource to the persons seeking it varies by the 
seeker-resource match (due to differences in immunological compatibility which are 
partially dyadic between the donor and potential recipient). Finally, a set of decision 
makers determine to whom this resource should be offered based on a set of criteria 
which they feel serve their institution‟s interests (the deceased donor kidney allocation 
system), and those who are offered this resource may accept or refuse this offer based on 
their own reasoning (when transplant candidates decide whether to accept a DDKT). 
I have argued that the situation just described requires that one abandon standard 
regression-based analyses and individualistic thinking because such a system means that 
individual outcomes are inherently interdependent. The exact same point could be made 
about the labor market or the competition for college admissions. Looking at the above 
paragraph, substitute the following phrases into the parentheses in order: “jobs,” “job 
seekers,” “because some jobs offer better amenities and working conditions than others,” 
“because job seekers vary in their occupational preferences,” “the hiring decision making 
process,” and “when job seekers decide whether to accept a job offer.” This description is 
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equally applicable to the labor market and kidney transplantation. A similar exercise 
could describe college admissions, as well. 
This last point was not merely intended to be clever
39
. The methodological and 
theoretical implications of adopting the interdependency perspective in the 
socioeconomic attainment process are the same as in the kidney transplantation system. 
Of course, the obstacles to collecting the data necessary to conduct a study parallel to the 
present ones are far more daunting in the case of the labor market than in the kidney 
transplantation system. The size of the system is far larger, for one, and the allocative 
rules are likely occupation-, industry-, and firm-specific. We probably cannot ever hope 
to have access to the type of data I have employed in this dissertation for the labor market 
system as a whole. But it is essential that future researchers in socioeconomic 
stratification keep in mind that, at minimum, standard regression approaches to this topic 
are glossing over crucial elements of this key sociological process. 
Second, the relatively obvious efficiency-equity tradeoff observed in the kidney 
transplantation system calls attention to the likelihood of similar potential tradeoffs in 
more common topics of sociological inquiry. In kidney transplantation, among many 
other things, the age of the candidate and degree of histocompatibility between the donor 
and the recipient are significant predictors of post-transplantation outcomes (Danovitch 
and Cecka 2003; Jassal et al. 2005). Because the availability of organs is limited and 
DDKs are not construed to belong to anyone living, UNOS takes seriously its perceived 
responsibility to allocate these life-saving resources in a manner which maximizes the 
population benefit thereof. However, an allocation policy strictly focused on maximizing 
efficiency would be far more inequitable – a far larger proportion of kidneys would then 
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 And I thank Ted Mouw for pointing out the parallels between these two systems to me. 
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be allocated to the young (because they typically gain health benefits above those 
garnered by older persons) and, somewhat less so, the white (because they on average 
have more similar ABO and HLA profiles to the donor pool than do racial and ethnic 
minorities).  
This tension, familiar to economists (e.g., Blank 2002; Okun 1975), is rarely 
discussed by sociologists. Of course, measuring any potential tradeoffs between 
efficiency and equity in the labor market or in college admissions would be quite tricky 
because the factors which will maximize efficiency for these institutions‟ gatekeepers are 
less well understood and the measurement of efficiency is less well-defined. The social 
stratification literature has often treated group differences in outcomes as a prima facie 
wrong. Although certainly all can agree that such situations are lamentable, careful 
thought should be spent considering the potential costs of equality-at-all-costs thinking. 
For instance, a sure way in which to produce total equality in the kidney transplantation 
system would be to adopt a “first come, first serve” allocation model (where “first come” 
would be defined as the time of onset of ESRD or CKD to account for differential 
waitlisting behavior). However, such a policy would at this time be sure to greatly reduce 
the efficiency of the kidney transplantation system and would certainly harm many of its 
supposed beneficiaries when their transplanted kidneys were rejected at higher rates than 
is currently observed. Furthermore, because prior transplants are associated with 
substantially higher PRA values, such a policy would reduce their prospects for obtaining 
a well-functioning transplant in the future. 
Although the human costs of eliminating any potential source of group disparities 
in the labor market and education are likely to be less severe, they are likely to be 
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nonetheless very real. If employees are not well matched to their positions, then other 
employees at a firm and the firm‟s customers suffer. If persons attend college who are not 
prepared to benefit from it while other students who could are turned away, the 
educational benefits of the university system is diminished. Certainly many inequities in 
the labor market and educational systems are observable, and many are the results of real 
injustices. However, in other cases observed inequalities in outcomes are attributable to 
perfectly valid criteria designed to promote efficiency in the system in question. 
Unfortunately, as I have argued previously, in a racially and socioeconomically stratified 
society many efficiency-promoting criteria, such as prior grades and standardized test 
scores, are likely to be racially and socioeconomically stratified as well, and the causes of 
these disparities should be closely investigated. However, observed inequalities in access 
to a system do not necessarily reflect injustices in that system. 
Third, social disparities in the kidney transplantation system emphasize the limits 
of disparities in financial resources and “access to care” in the explanation of health 
inequality. Certainly, not all potential costs are covered – in particular, 
immunosuppressant costs after the first three years post-transplantation likely plays a key 
role (Gordon et al. 2008). However, to an unusual degree for the U.S. socioeconomic 
disparities are leveled in the kidney transplantation system due to the availability of 
universal health insurance coverage through the Medicare ESRD program. Although 
social groups differ sharply in the probability of successfully enrolling in the waiting list 
(Epstein et al. 2000), once on the waiting list all persons have affordable access to 
transplantation, yet large differences remain in the probability that members of different 
groups will obtain a transplant. This finding is buttressed by quasi-experimental research 
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that document limited health-promoting effects of expanded insurance access (Finkelstein 
et al. 2011; Newhouse and Group 1993). Although socioeconomic resources and health 
insurance do play a substantial role in population health, ameliorating these inequalities 
within the health system may not be a panacea for health disparities. 
Fourth, increasingly social scientists are incorporating information on biomarkers 
and genetic data into their study designs, which is a welcome development. In the latter 
case the usual approach is to select a set of genes and a set of outcomes and attempt to 
determine the association of the genes with the outcome, often stratified by 
environmental measures in the gene-environment interaction tradition (e.g., Caspi et al. 
2002). However, the present research emphasizes that processes inside the body and in 
interaction with the immediate environment are not the only mechanism by which genes 
can influence health outcomes. In the case of kidney transplantation, the consequences of 
one‟s ABO or HLA genotype are not of this usual breed. Instead, the effect thereof 
depends on the distribution of genotypes in the deceased donor pool, the transplant 
candidate pool, and one‟s kinship and social networks. 
In this way the effects of genetics in the kidney transplant system embody the idea 
of the “meta-genomic environment” (Conley et al. 2011). When one is considering gene-
meta-genomic environment interactions, it is the intersection between one‟s own genes 
and others‟ which is of crucial importance. In the case of the present research, ABO and 
HLA types are not fundamentally important in themselves – there is no evidence that 
these genes directly influence one‟s mortality hazards, for example. However, the 
presence of racial differences in the distribution of these genotypes, combined with the 
facts that in the U.S. certain racial and ethnic groups are numerical minorities and that 
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histocompatibility in the antigens coded by these genes is predictive of post-transplant 
outcomes, means that group differences in these genes‟ distributions are key mediators of 
racial and ethnic inequality in this system. Although the application of the concept of the 
meta-genomic environment is perhaps not so obvious or likely in other cases, its 
applicability should be investigated in future research. 
 Finally, this research highlights the value of studying specific causes of ill health 
alongside the more traditional sociological and demographic practice of studying broad 
differences in health outcomes. Through the latter avenue much has been learned about 
the nature and causes of social inequalities in all-cause mortality, major causes of death, 
and highly prevalent causes of morbidity such as cardiovascular disease, obesity, and 
diabetes. However, while it is my hope that such research will continue apace, the ability 
of the present work to capture the major mechanisms of social inequalities in the kidney 
transplantation system highlights the inability of much research adopting a broader 
perspective on health to do so.  
 Many researchers in the area of social inequalities in health agree that a key 
challenge facing this literature is to measure and identify the mechanisms linking social 
position to health outcomes (e.g., Adler and Rehkopf 2008). I completely agree. 
However, I find it unlikely that a broad health research program alone is capable of 
achieving this goal. First, social disparities in patterns of ill health vary widely by disease 
(Smith 2003), as seen in my work on the living donor kidney transplant opportunity 
structure. While it is likely that the effect of key mechanisms of ill health vary by 
morbidity type and mortality cause, it is equally likely that many of the key mechanisms 
themselves vary widely between different causes of ill health. By studying more specific 
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causes of ill health in great detail while still keeping an eye on the broader picture of 
population health inequality, I propose that the mechanisms linking social position to 
health outcomes, and the diversity of these mechanisms, will be far better understood. It 
is my hope that my dissertation has contributed to this desirable outcome. 
Policy Implications for Transplantation 
 The results of the analyses in this dissertation also suggest a number of potential 
sites of intervention should policymakers wish to take additional steps to ameliorate 
social inequalities in the kidney transplant system. The two most significant steps which 
could be taken would be to reconsider the role of geography in the kidney allocation 
system and to make additional efforts to promote living donor kidney transplants as an 
option for racial minority and lower SES transplant candidates. These are the major 
mediators of overall social inequalities in the KT system and the most amenable to direct 
and immediate intervention measures. 
 Basic research efforts into post-transplant care, and especially 
immunosuppression drugs, could also promote racial and SES equality in the KT system. 
The previously more substantial role of HLA genes in the kidney allocation system has 
been reduced over time as improving immunosuppressant regimes have permitted their 
reduction without unacceptable losses in the efficiency of the system. It could be that 
future improvements in the success of these efforts could continue to promote racial 
equality in transplantation. 
 Currently UNOS is considering changes to kidney allocation policies which are 
intended to jointly improve the efficiency and equity of the KT system
40
. They propose to 
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 A full discussion of the specifics of this new proposed system is beyond the scope of this work, but the 
details are available at 
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do so by having donor-candidate age match play a vastly increased role in this system 
and to combine this age sorting mechanism with components accounting for the 
estimated quality of the donor kidney and the candidate‟s expected survival time post-
transplantation. Although it may well be, as UNOS argues, that such a system would 
reduce racial and socioeconomic inequalities in kidney transplantation, because organ 
donors are disproportionately young this system would also reduce the share of kidney 
transplants awarded to older members of the KT waiting list. It may be, then, that 
candidate age will become an increasing determinant of transplantation prospects in the 
future. 
Needed Research 
 A number of questions on the topic of inequalities in the kidney transplantation 
system merit future research, which I hope to explore in future research. First, the largest 
racial and socioeconomic differences in outcomes are attributable to differential rates of 
LDKTs, yet relatively little is known about the processes by which families and friends 
navigate the question of who, if anyone, should be evaluated for donation, and how these 
processes intersect with events within transplant centers. Deep description based on 
careful ethnographic observation of these processes in families in different social 
positions would be a welcome contribution to the literature. It is my hope that I can gain 
access to members of the waiting list in the future to conduct such research. Furthermore, 
my findings on the likely racial differences in the LDKT opportunity structure had to rely 
on secondary data on kinship, health, and genetic distributional patterns in the U.S. It is 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/SharedContentDocuments/KidneyConceptDocument.PDF. Accessed 
8/15/2011. 
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my hope that, in the longer term, direct data on the characteristics of donor families may 
be collected to verify the conclusions of this research. 
 Turning to the DDKT allocation system, a number of topics merit future attention. 
First, geographic inequalities in kidney transplant outcomes are large (Mathur et al. 2010) 
and although the medical literature increasingly recognizes this issue, much remains to be 
learned. As with much else in the social science literature on transplantation, Healy‟s 
(2006) work points the way, investigating the role of population and organizational 
characteristics in the collection of DDKs for transplantation and suggesting key 
characteristics of the transplant exchange network. I have gained access to data on the 
hospital, OPO, and regional affiliations of most kidney transplant candidate and donors in 
the U.S., so the recent availability of this data permits me to further his analyses in future 
work. Transplant centers are nested within a complex exchange network structured by the 
allocation algorithm, in which kidney sharing is structured by the availability of any 
perfect HLA match candidates, geography, and a system of kidney debts and paybacks 
between OPOs. My future research will investigate the properties of this system and 
whether transplant centers‟ position in the kidney exchange network mediates social and 
geographic inequalities in transplantation outcomes. 
Conclusion 
 Although transplantation, with notable exceptions, is not a traditional topic of 
sociological research, the study of societies and of transplantation have much to offer 
each other. Adopting a sociological perspective which situates transplant candidates as 
participants in an allocative system with clearly defined distributive rules and recognizes 
the permeation of familial, geographic, metagenomic, and immunological contexts into 
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this system, this research produces a number of key findings. First, substantial racial 
inequalities in kidney transplantation outcomes are primarily the result of racial 
differences in living donor kidney transplants, geographic residency, and the distribution 
of immunologically important genes. Second, educational attainment is linked to 
transplant outcomes primarily through the type of transplants obtained. Furthermore, 
higher educated candidates are advantaged by their higher rates of living donor kidney 
transplantation and higher probability of genetic compatibility with the deceased donor 
pool, whereas lower educated persons are advantaged by their places of residence and the 
dynamics of immunological crossmatching. Finally, black-white disparities in living 
donor kidney transplantation do not appear to be the result of group differences in the 
availability of suitable donors in their kinship networks. However, the findings of this 
research do suggest that each white kin is more probable than black kin to be a suitable 
living donor. Given the relatively sparse number of potential donors most transplant 
candidates have evaluated for donation, it is likely that this higher probability of 
suitability is a major determinant of racial differences in living donor kidney 
transplantation rates. Taken together, these findings significantly improve on previous 
research in the medical literature on the determinants of social disparities in kidney 
transplantation outcomes. 
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